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MYRES S. MCDOUGAL DISTINGUISHED LECTURE 2016
MASS MIGRATION, CULTURAL CONFLICT, AND THE FEAR OF
TERRORISM:
DILEMMAS OF THE DEMOCRATIC WEST
*PRESENTED BY PROFESSOR TOM FARER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE
OF LAW ON THE OCCASION OF THE ANNUAL SUTTON COLLOQUIUM
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF MASS MIGRATION
There is no reason to believe that 2015 was the high-water mark of migration,
documented and undocumented, from the lands of mass poverty to the wealthy and
comparatively well-ordered countries of the West. In the next thirty-five years, tens
of millions more people are likely to begin the trek to the West driven by the
economic, social and political pathologies of the lands of their birth and pulled by
visions of affluence and security. Some will seek entry invoking the right to be
protected from persecution.I Others implicitly will invoke a moral right to build a
better life for themselves and their families.2 The world's population is headed
* Professor Tom Farer is the former dean of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies (1996-2010)
and currently a University Professor at the University of Denver. He served as a member of the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission of the OAS from 1976-83 (President from 1980-82) and also as
President of the University of New Mexico in the mid- 1980s. He is a member of the editorial board of
the Human Rights Quarterly and the American Journal of International Law.
1. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Introductory Note to Convention and
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 3 (2010), http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aal0.pdf (An
"Asylum seeker" is a person who has arrived at the border of a state or gained entry by whatever means
and has applied for asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention on the ground that he or she has a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political belief or membership in a
social group if they return to their country of origin. Technically a refugee is a person whose application
for asylum has been successful, but in lay discourse the term is often applied to anyone who appears to
have fled their country of origin either because of the stipulated fear of persecution or to avoid being
caught in the cross fire of an armed conflict. The term is often applied as well to persons uprooted by a
natural disaster which has put their lives at risk. Some national courts have stretched the concept still
wider to embrace individuals fleeing fearsomely abusive spouses or families. Once a person has come
within the jurisdiction of a state, the principle of "non-refoulment" precludes a state from expelling the
person to a country, whether or not the country of origin, where he or she is at risk of torture or execution.
While this principle is embodied in the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, it has evolved
into a principle of customary law and so is binding on all countries.).
2. Compare CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN & PHILLIP COLE, DEBATING THE ETHICS OF
IMMIGRATION: Is THERE A RIGHT To EXCLUDE? 8-9 (Sept. 30, 2011). (The author's justification for
debating the ethics of immigration largely in terms of theory rather than more instrumental considerations
like economic impact: "It is the role of theory... to challenge 'common sense,'. And we can at least shift
it out of the consciousness of those who engage in this debate at the theoretical level.... Theory is the use
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toward 11 billion or more by the end of the century3 in the absence of nuclear war
or collision with a large asteroid or the discovery by nihilists of how to combine the
lethality of Ebola with the contagiousness of the common cold. Less than twenty
years ago, the conventional wisdom among demographers was that the world's
population would peak in 2050 at 9 billion.4 Now, according to United Nations (UN)
reports, it is expected to hit almost 10 billion by mid-century and surpass 11 billion
by 2100.'
The largest bulk of that growth will occur in Africa. Experts estimate that a
population that has already grown 50 percent in the last fifteen years will by 2050
double from the present 1.25 billion to approximately 2.5 billion and continue to
surge toward 4 billion by the century's end.' To convey a sense of what that means
for individual countries, Nigeria's population alone is projected to leap from today's
roughly 180 million to 500 million by mid-century7 and the population in the risibly
mirsnamed Democratic Republic of the Congo should expand from the current 75
million (an increase of 55 million since 1970) to 194 million.8 Meanwhile, most of
the rich countries will shrink absent large-scale immigration. Japan, to take an
extreme case, with its 1.1 birthrate is projected to diminish from 120 million to less
than 100 million by the middle of the century.9 Italy, Spain, and Germany tag closely
behind. "
In Asia, Pakistan's increasingly violent and dysfunctional society will likely
add 50 million people just in the next fifteen years. Swelling numbers are also
predicted for Afghanistan, from today's roughly 25 million to 55 million in 2050."
Demographic pressure in the Middle East and North Africa present a
of the imagination to construct possibilities, and we can only critically examine our beliefs if we are
prepared to imagine other possibilities."), with CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE LIBERAL ARCHIPELAGO: A
THEORY OF DIVERSITY AND FREEDOM (2003) (After conceding that a campaign for open borders is
politically untenable, he goes on to encourage theorizing about and coming to recognize the case for it.).
3. U.N. Dep't. of Social and Economic Affairs, World Population Projected to Reach 9.7 billion
by 2050 (Jul. 29, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/2015-report.html (last
visited Apr. 23, 2017); see also Rod Nordland, A Migration Crisis, andIt May Yet Get Worse, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/I1/01/world/europe/a-mass-migration-crisis-and-it-
may-yet-get-worse.html?_r-0 (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
4. U.N. Dep't. of Social and Economic Affairs Population Div., The World at Six Billion,
Introduction U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP.154 (Oct. 12, 1999),
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/sixbillion/sixbilpartl.pdf.
5. U.N. Dep't. of Social and Economic Affairs, supra note 3.
6. Ivana Kottasova, Biggest populations in 2050: Move over Russia and Mexico. Here comes
Africa, CNN MONEY (Aug. 18, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/18/news/countries-with-biggest-
populations/.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Fertility Statistics, Eurostat (Dec. 22, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/pdfscache/1 273.pdf.
I1. U.N. Dep't of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World Population Prospects: The 2015
Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables, ESA/P/WP.241 18 (2015),
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/KeyFindings WPP 2015.pdf
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particularly daunting picture for European political leaders concerned about
managing immigration. In the second half of the twentieth Century, the population
of the Middle East and North Africa increased fourfold, from about 93 to 347 million
people.1 2 Furthermore, that number is projected to double in the next thirty-five
years, becoming roughly 680 million tightly packed persons by 2050.13
Powerful push factors beyond sheer numbers are at work in parts of the Global
South. Anarchic violence, civil war, and persecution have already driven more than
60 million people from their traditional homes.1 4 Some are displaced within national
territories; others have fled across borders.' 5
Potentially dwarfing the numbers fleeing violence and persecution are the tens
of millions of young people arriving at the door of the labor markets of developing
countries, which seem incapable of bringing them into stable employment much less
opportunities to prosper. In the Middle East and North Africa, 60 percent of the
population is now under the age of twenty-five.1 6 Less than 50 percent of people
aged sixteen to thirty have regular employment and prospects for improvement in
that figure are dim." For many young job searchers, formal educatioihal
qualifications appear irrelevant: According to the World Bank, 30 percent of the
unemployed in the Middle East and North Africa are university graduates, the
victims of low quality education and a lack of relevant job skills, as well as
insufficient private sector capital investment and persistent misgovernment. 8
Conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa, where many governments are hardly more than
vertically integrated criminal conspiracies for the extraction of wealth from tortured
societies, are just as grim or grimmer.19
The swelling migrant tide has fueled a political reaction which is proving much
more toxic in Europe than in the United States. In this country, a coalition of liberals,
big business, agricultural interests and members of earlier diaspora battle on the
whole effectively in favor of continuing immigration on a scale calculated to bring
the US population of almost 500 million by the middle of the century.2 o The issue of
migration is more toxic in European politics in part because it has become entangled
12. Patrick Clawson, Demography in the Middle East, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE (Dec. 2009),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/demography-in-the-middle-east-population-
growth-slowing-womens-situation-un.
13. Id.
14. Sam Jones, One in every 113 people forced to flee, says UN refugee agency, THE GUARDIAN
(June 20, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/20 16/jun/20/one-in-every-113-
people-uprooted-war-persecution-says-un-refugee-agency.
15. Id.
16. Middle East and North Africa: Youth Facts, YOUTH POLICY,
http://www.youthpolicy.org/mappings/regionalyouthscenes/mena/facts/ (last visited Feb. 28 2017).
17. Lili Mottaghi, The Problem of Unemployment in the Middle East and North Africa Explained
in Three Charts, THE WORLD BANK (Aug. 25, 2015), http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/problem-
unemployment-middle-east-and-north-africa-explained-three-charts.
18. Id.
19. See generally SARAH CHAYES, THIEVES OF STATE: WHY CORRUPTION THREATENS GLOBAL
SECURITY (2015).
20. UN Dep't. of Social and Economic Affairs, supra note 3.
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in the politics of cultural conflict, inequality and economic stagnation.
II. MIGRATION AND CULTURAL CONFLICT
Cultural conflict in the United States is conducted largely among the long-
settled inhabitants, most sharply between devout evangelicals and conservative
Catholics, on the one hand, and social liberals and libertarians, on the other, between
addicts of Fox News and consumers of the New York Times. Although
traditionalists have not disappeared from West European countries, 2' for the past
several decades social liberals have occupied the commanding heights of politics
and culture. Nominally the faith of the great majority of West Europeans, Christian
piety is more a background to contemporary society than an active presence. It does
not aggressively combat the sunny hedonism of day-to-day life among the middle
classes. To paraphrase Ronald Dworkin, Western Europe is a secular space where
religion is more wallpaper than immediate presence.22 The US is a religious country
in which religious indifference is tolerated.23
Since World War II, a steady stream of Muslim immigrants has entered
Continental Europe from Turkey, North, and to a lesser degree, West Africa. In the
United Kingdom, the stream's headwaters are primarily in South Asia. Despite a
very long history of Moslem-Christian conflict, the first wave of migrants from
predominantly Muslim countries did not generate anxiety, in part because the
migrants were needed to fill gaps in the labor force opened by the Post World War
II economic boom, and in part because particularly in the continental countries
governments assumed that the migrants were in essence guest workers who would
return to their countries of origin when they were no longer needed.2 4 This
expectation proved false. Most migrants stayed, their families joined them, and, as
usually occurs, the existence of diaspora communities encouraged and facilitated
new waves of migration even after the post-war European economies lost their
exuberance. Meanwhile, opportunities for the less skilled members of the indigenous
population and a fortiori for the second and third generations of immigrant families
have been eroding in the face of the economic transformations and disruptions
resulting from globalization and technological change.
Three other developments have turned the growing presence of migrants, but
particularly migrants who identify as Muslim, into a ferocious political issue. One is
simply numbers: A growing Muslim presence has become increasingly manifest at
the grassroots level of society as Muslims have sought space for public worship and
burial according to Muslim traditions and legal authority to slaughter animals in
accordance with Halal law.25 A second development has been the perceptible
21. Adam Nossiter, Frangois Fillon Wins Center-Right Nomination for French Presidency, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/27/world/europe/francois-fillon-wins-center-
right-nomination-for-french-presidency.html.
22. See generally Ronald Dworkin, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013).
23. Id.
24. Muslim Migration to Europe, UNIVERsITY OF MINNESOTA (July 17, 2015),
https://cla.umn.edulihrc/news-events/other/muslim-migration-europe.
25. James Meikle, What exactly does the halal methods of animal slaughter involve?, THE
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alienation of many of the children and grandchildren of the first immigrant wave and
their disproportionate presence in the prison population. The recent phenomenon of
a limited number of young men and women, not all from poor families, 26 departing
Europe to join ISIS has sharpened the perception of alienation.
Developments within the Muslim World have been a third factor generating
Islamophobia in European politics. An aggressive, intolerant piety, hostile to the
liberal norms which in Europe have displaced those of Christian traditionalism, has
gained increasing traction among Muslim populations worldwide, but particularly
in the Arab-speaking sub-world. Its affective power there is in part the result of the
political and military failure of Arab nationalism, a secular ideology of integration
and modernization which briefly captured the imagination of educated Arabs in the
decades before and just after the Second World War. The deflation of Arab
nationalism left a vacuum into which a species of Islamic thought analogous to
Christian fundamentalism rushed in. But it has also gained powerful traction in non-
Arab countries like Pakistan.27
Funded principally by Saudi oil wealth,28 the spread of fundamentalist theology
within Islam coincided with the demographic explosion I have already mentioned. 29
It coincided as well with a vast movement of people from the countryside into the
region's cities3 o bringing with them patriarchal traditions to which fundamentalist
Islam gave a theological legitimacy which could be wielded against the
condescension of sophisticated urban elites.
The spread of fundamentalist piety also coincided, of course, with armed
militancy spurred initially by the successful call for jihad against the Soviet
occupiers of Afghanistan and then reinforced by the difficulties Arab and West
Asian Governments have had in coping with the twin stresses of mushrooming
population growth and rocketing urbanization. Also fueling militancy, has been the
increasing militarized presence of the West in the Middle East and West Asia and
its association with repressive governments unable to help their swollen populations
enter the precincts of that lavish consumerism which the popular majority witness
in the media and in the lives of a small upper class. It is not, therefore, surprising
that the call for jihad against the "far enemy", as Osama Bin Laden described the
GUARDIAN (May 8, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/may/08/what-does-halal-
method-animal-slaughter-involve.
26. Heather Long, Who's joining ISIS? It might surprise you..., CNN MONEY (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/15/news/economy/isis-recruit-characteristics/.
27. Directorate-General for External Policies, The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the
Support and Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World, at 5, AFET (June 2013),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegDataletudes/etudes/join/2013/457137/EXPO-
AFETET(2013)457137_EN.pdf.
28. Id. at 19; see also John Kemp, Saudi Arabia's oil reserves: how big are they really?, REUTERS
(July 11, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-oil-kemp-idUSKCNOZLIX6.
29. Muslim Migration to Europe, supra note 24.
30. Martin Hvidt, Economic diversification in GCC countries: Past record and future trends,
LONDON SCH. OF EcON. AND POLITICAL SC. (Jan. 2013),
http://www.1se.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/kuwait/documents/Economic-diversification-in-the-GCC-
countries.pdf.
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West, found a sufficient number of receptive ears to bring mass casualty terrorism
into the cities of Europe as well as the United States.
These developments have produced in European electorates a mental
association of migration and militant anti-liberalism, an image fueling,
paradoxically, the rise of right-wing nationalist parties, illiberal themselves, and
driving the leaders of main-stream parties to repudiate what they call multi-
culturalism. 3 ' That repudiation implies either a cultural test for prospective migrants
or government-driven efforts at cultural assimilation of multi-generational migrant
families or both.
Obviously, the association of Islam with anti-liberalism in Europe finds an echo
in the United States, principally albeit not exclusively on the political right, even
though the Muslim community in the United States is small,32 for the most part
prosperous,'3 and with few exceptions integrated, by any definition of the word, into
economy and society.34
What makes European political developments exquisitely important to anyone
anywhere committed, however casually, to the defense of human rights is the issues
they raise first about the appropriate limits of liberal tolerance and majority power
and, conversely, the rights of religious and ethnic minorities. Those are the issues I
want to address all too briefly in this lecture and then discuss with you in the time
your patience and Ved's authority will allow.
Before going any further, however, I need to define exactly what I mean by the
words "Liberalism" and "fundamentalism" or "Traditionalism." First, "Liberalism."
I use the term not narrowly as a reference to some fraction of the American electorate
but rather in its larger philosophical meaning as a political and social order dedicated
to enabling individuals to shape continuously a personal identity and life plan in
light of their understanding of the meaning and value and possibilities of human
existence, in other words a political and social order in which human beings are the
architects of themselves. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 35 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights3 6 are legal expressions of my
conception of Liberalism.
A corollary of respect for human agency is toleration of different choices
31. Clifford D. May, The Trouble with Multiculturalism, NAT'L REVIEW (June 21, 2012),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/303529/trouble-multiculturalism-clifford-d-may.
32. Besheer Mohamen, A new estimate of the U.S. Muslim population, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/06/a-new-estimate-of-the-u-s-muslim-
population/.
33. Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 22,
2007), http://www.pewresearch.org/2007/05/22/muslim-americans-middle-class-and-mostly-
mainstream/.
34. Id.
35. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, G.A. Res. 217 (I) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(ll) (Dec. 10, 1948),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/U DHR/Documents/UDHRTranslations/eng.pdf.
36. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf
[hereinafter ICCPR].
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people make, choices which may be implicit in their practices. But suppose their
practices include active membership in communities which reject the premises of
Liberalism and also include propagation of the traditionalist community's il-Liberal
protocols through indoctrination of their children? Should those choices be tolerated
by Liberals? Perhaps the answer to that question depends on whether one advocates
Liberalism as a formula for the peaceful coexistence of people with different systems
of belief. Liberalism does have that instrumental value. But Liberalism itself is a
belief system, at least a conviction about the character of a good society and the
nature of an admirable life. Therefore, Liberalism, like Fundamentalism, can be
messianic particularly when it coincides with the conviction that the propagation of
Liberal values will serve the interests of the United States.
Even more than Liberalism, Fundamentalism can be widely referential, its
meaning varying with context. But I use it as a reference to cultures which idealize
the organization of family life along patriarchal lines with women in a subordinate
position insofar as legal rights, sexual freedom, family decisional power, and
relations with the larger society are concerned. Arguably, typifying this mindset was
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's criticism of a proposed United Nations
Commission on the Status of Women declaration condemning violence against
women," which included a statement of women's rights to choose their marriage
partners, to work, to travel, and to use contraception without their husband's
permission, and to take their husbands to court for marital rape." In a memorandum
commenting on the document, the Brotherhood stated: "This declaration, if ratified,
would lead to the complete disintegration of society"." In response, a spokesperson
for Egypt's National Council for Women condemned the Brotherhood's
condemnation.'
The Traditionalist culture also incorporates the premise that identity is inherited
and fixed rather than individually constructed, that virtue consists in adherence to
inherited traditions, that internal challenges to received beliefs is heresy,
abandonment of the faith is punishable apostasy akin to treason in secular societies,
and external criticism or satire of its central figures or core beliefs is blasphemy and
37. See Muslim Brotherhood Statement Denouncing UN Women Declaration for Violating sharia
Principles, IKHWANWEB (Mar. 14, 2013), http:www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30731; see also
The National Council for Women's Response to the Muslim Brotherhood's Statement on the Proposed
Agreed Conclusions by the 57' Session of the Commission on the Status of Women on Violence Against
Women, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR WOMEN (Mar. 15, 2013),
http://www.ncwegypt.com/index.php/en/media-centre/ncw-news/147-ncw-s-stand-with-regards-to-the
curent-events-and-issues/748-the-national-council-for women-s-response-to-the-moslem-brotherhood-
statement-on-the-proposed-agreed-conclusions-by-the-57th-session-of-the-commission-on-the-status-of
women-on-violence-against-women.
38. AIRES/48/104, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (Dec. 20, 1993),
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48rl04.htm.
39. Id.
40. Michelle Nichols, Egypt's Islamists warn giving women some rights could destroy society,
REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-women-un-rights-
idUSBRE92EO3D20130315; see also The National Council for Women, supra note 37.
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should be punishable.4 1
Liberal minorities present public policy challenges to a secular Liberal state in
a host of areas: free speech, sexual and reproductive freedom, educational standards
including educational content and length, the regulation of marriage, gender equality
with respect to divorce and control of family property, and the treatment of children,
including protection of children from arranged marriages.4 2
III. MIGRATION AND THE RIGHT TO CULTURAL PRESERVATION
I want you to consider three questions: The first is whether international human
rights law prevents Western Governments from denying entry to migrants who
profess fundamentalist values. The second is whether human rights law requires
Western Governments to respect the practices of fundamentalist minorities already
settled in their countries. The third is whether, even if traditionalist minorities are
not legally protected, people who think they are supporters of human rights should
at least tolerate the efforts of fundamentalists to live and perpetuate culturally
distinctive lives.
The first question, that is whether governments can impose cultural tests on
persons wishing to enter and settle, assumes that governments have a broad
discretion to exclude those wishing to enter, indeed could if they wished (and if they
withdrew from the Refugee Convention), ban migration altogether. The legal case
for governmental power in this regard is powerful. The UN Charter is first and
foremost a defender of existing states from any threat to their "territorial integrity
and political independence."43 As opponents of any right to migration have argued,
what meaning can the political independence and territorial integrity of states have
if people can wander across their borders at will and settle on their territory?" A
heavily populated but militarily weak state could engulf its well-armed neighbor
simply by lifting border controls.
The omission in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of a
right to enter45 corresponding to the specifically enumerated right to leave46 can
therefore be seen as a corollary of the UN Charter's guarantee of state sovereignty.47
State practice reinforces the argument grounded in authoritative texts.
The moral as distinguished from the legal case for a right to exclude is much
41. Kareem Elbayar, Reclaiming Tradition: Islamic Law in a Modern World, GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIV., http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/23.
42. Ben Hubbard, A Saudi Morals Enforcer Called for a More Liberal Islam. Then the Death
Threats Began., N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/1 l/world/niddleeast/saudi-arabia-islam-wahhabism-religious-
police.html.
43. U.N. Charter, art. 2, 1 4.
44. Catherine Dauvergne, Challenges to sovereignty: migration laws for the 21 "century, (UNHCR
Working Paper No. 92, 2003), http://www.unher.org/3f2f69e74.pdf.
45. ICCPR, supra note 36.
46. Id
47. See generally U.N. Charter.
VOL. 45:3294
2017 MIGRATION, CONFLICT & TERRORISM: DILEMMAS OF THE WEST
less clear.4 8 A moral right to enter could be seen as an emanation from the totality
of Liberal values reflected in the various human rights treaties. Consider the
Freedom of Association and Assembly.49 What could be more basic than my right
to share my home permanently with a person I met on my travels abroad or on the
Internet? In the globally connected world of 2016, and with the already enormous
migration of people from the lands of their birth, many citizens of every state are
likely to have human connections, both intimate and professional, that cross national
boundaries. So to say that the state has a largely unconstrained right to close its
borders is to concede to the state the authority sharply to diminish my associational
rights and, incidentally, to create great disparities among citizens in the enjoyment
of that right: those citizens whose intimate connections are entirely local will enjoy
the right fully while those whose connections are transnational will be vulnerable to
whatever limits the state chooses to impose.
A moral right to enter need not rest only on emanations from specific rights. It
may rest, perhaps even more securely, on the principles or deep normative premises
seen to lie behind the various legal enumerations. Arguably, one such moral premise
is that the state should not use violence against individuals whose actions do not
threaten the rights of others. Many aspiring migrants to Europe have repeatedliL
demonstrated that only physical violence will stop them. Africans, for instance, have
climbed high barbed wire fences and faced hails of rubber bullets trying to enter the
Spanish enclave of Ceuta in North Africa.5 0
A second principle or normative premise which could support a right to enter
is that no one should be denied the opportunity to lead a life with some opportunity
for improvement and some measure of choice. When a person struggling from day-
to-day in some Southern country's informal economy, a person like Mohamed
Bouzazi, the Tunisian street vendor whose self-immolation ignited the Arab Spring,
moves from his or her country of birth into a comparatively well-governed, capital-
rich country in Europe or North America, he or she enters a new universe of
opportunity and quotidian security. Where grotesque inequality in life chances
stemming from the accident of birth in a poor country can be radically mitigated by
no more than acquiescence in entry, can persons who believe in the moral equality
of all people bar the gates? Barring entry of non-threatening migrants is an
affirmative action denying people the chance to escape the prison of poverty and
powerlessness where the accident of birth deposited them. It is a means of enforcing
what Josef Carens calls a geographical caste system, "the modem equivalent to
feudal privilege which was an inherited status that greatly enhanced one's life
48. WELLMAN, supra note 2.
49. The Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association and the Internet, ASS'N FOR
PROGRESSIVE COMMUNICATIONS, https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/Gl0/166/98/PDF/GlI016698.pdfOpenElement; see generally Special
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, UNHCR,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/AssemblyAssociation/Pages/SRFreedomAssemblyAssociationlndex.as
px (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).
50. Spain: 400 migrants storm North African border fence, FoX NEWS (Dec. 9, 2016),
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/12/09/spain-400-migrants-storm-north-african-border-fence.html.
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chances.""
Despite its considerable power, the moral argument for open borders is not
decisive. There is a possible response also grounded in the Liberal values which
inform the human rights texts, in particular the linked rights of self-determination,
self-government, and, paradoxically, the Freedom of Association and Assembly. 52
In long-established states like those of North America and Western Europe, which
have evolved organically and where a certain unifying national spirit prevails,
people imagine themselves as forming an enduring political association with
boundaries within which members share a history, a sense of comradeship, and sets
of quotidian practices and understandings. From that association they derive an
identity. Not their only identity but one of such power that, when necessary, they
risk their lives for it.
Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declares
the right of citizens "to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through
freely chosen representatives." 3 Taking part in public affairs through freely chosen
representatives would be gaseous rhetoric if it were not construed to mean that
majorities can decide issues of great moment.5 4 Who can enter the country and on
what conditions has long been such an issue.
That is one string to this argument's bow. Its second string is the plausible claim
that the coherent management of public affairs is impossible without a fairly stable
body politic. Issues need to be defined, proposals for their resolution tested, potential
representatives identified and assessed. How can this be accomplished if millions of
people unfamiliar with the society's problems and personalities, its resources and
institutions and historical experiences, persons who may not even be able to read or
speak its principal language, can pour into the body politic in an unending stream?
The political philosopher Michael Walzer has put the point in a slightly
different way. The political order, he has argued, is the outcome of negotiation and
struggle over time and in a determinate place, a struggle towards what he calls a
"common standpoint of morality," a moral settlement.55 Where the moral settlement
not only sustains civic peace but is as well the source of individual freedom and the
relatively equal application of the law, it can be defended in the name of Liberalism.
So, if migration of a certain size or composition is reasonably calculated to
undermine the settlement, then on this view the Liberal democratic society is entitled
to restrain or condition it. Whether migration does or could have that effect is, of
course, a judgment about which people continue to disagree furiously.
The triumph of Liberal values in each Western country is not decisive.5 6 So,
51. Compare CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE LIBERAL ARCHIPELAGO: A THEORY OF DIVERSITY AND
FREEDOM 153-54 (2003), with JOSPEH H. CARENS, IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP 131-35 (2002).
52. Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, supra
note 49.
53. ICCPR, supra note 36, art. 25(a).
54. Id.
55. Michael Walzer, Response to Kukathas, in IAN SHAPIRO AND WILL KYMLICKA, EDS.,
ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS (1997).
56. See generally James Taub, FOREIGN POLICY, https://foreignpolicy.com/author/james-traub/.
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one could argue, defenders of those values have reason to resist an unqualified right
to cross borders. If there is a largely unqualified right to enter, persons coming from
societies where Liberal values have not prevailed might bring with them the
dominant values of those societies and thus serve as reinforcements for Liberalism's
enemies.
But do international human rights norms allow for discrimination among
prospective migrants on the basis of a person's cultural values? Certainly, a case can
be made that they bar discrimination on the basis of religion. But would a test
intending to bar entry for persons who believe that women must be governed by men
or express homophobic views constitute discrimination on the basis of religion? A
government like that of the Netherlands which has introduced something like a
cultural test5 7 would argue that such views are not integral to any of the great faiths
but can be found among certain believers in all of them. For instance, a virulent
strain of homophobia exists in Christian majority countries like Uganda where
radical American evangelists have encouraged the passage of vicious anti-gay
laws.5 1 In any event, people are denied entry not because of their religious identity
but rather because certain of their practices or convictions threaten the rights of
others.
But, even if we assume that states have a moral as well as legal right to limit
entry, there remains the question of the legal and moral rights of traditionalist
minorities who have already entered and settled. What legal protection do
international human rights norms offer to minority communities in general and to il-
Liberal minorities in particular? Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (Covenant) requires states "to have respect for the liberty of
parents.. .to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity
with their own convictions."" However, it makes that liberty subject to "such
limitations... as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others."' That limitation can cover a lot of
ground. It could, for instance, be construed to give governments discretion to require
private schools established by Islamic fundamentalists to teach: (1) the necessity of
respect for members of other faiths and for agnostics and atheists, (2) the equality of
men and women and their equal right to shape their individual lives and the life of
their family, (3) the value of free speech including speech critical of religious beliefs,
and (4) the right of every person to change his or her religious identity: In short, to
teach things at odds with traditionalist culture.
Article 23 of the Covenant declares the family to be "the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and entitled to protection by society and the
state."' An emphasis on the family unit rather than the individual is promising from
57. Dutch set immigrants culture test, BBC (Dec. 22, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4551292.stm.
58. David Smith, Why Africa is the most homophobic continent, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/africa-homophobia-uganda-anti-gay-law.
59. ICCPR, supra note 36, art. 18(4).
60. Id. art. 18(3).
61. Id.art.23(1).
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the fundamentalist perspective. However, it turns out that the family being protected
is not necessarily the fundamentalist's idea of a proper family model, for Article 23
also provides that "States Parties... shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of
rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its
dissolution." In addition, it declares that "No marriage shall be entered into without
the free and full consent of the intending spouses." 6 2 So much for arranged
marriages-particularly of the very young.
Fundamentalists might also invoke Article 26 which obligates State Parties to
"prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on the basis of 'political or other opinion."'"6 They
could contend that their views on the rights of women or on intimate same-sex
relations are protected "opinions." The government, conversely, could invoke
Article 26 since it requires governments to prevent discrimination on the basis of
sex.' Only Article 27 addresses the minorities question directly,6 5 but it can most
reasonably be construed to reinforce the previous articles and to guarantee equal
opportunity and treatment for ethnic and religious minorities in competition for jobs
and access to education and other societal goods.
Putting aside the question of legal protection, what is the moral argument for
toleration of traditionalist practices by secular Liberal governments? On both
principled and prudential grounds strong multiculturalists like Chandran Kukathas
urge us to reject the "what-should-be-tolerated" framing of the policy issue.6 6
Kukathas urges Liberals to think instead of cultures as coming together in a position
of equality of right to reproduce themselves. He concedes that probably would lead
to an archipelago of cultural identities and social practices within the Liberal nation-
state.6 1
Multiculturalists differ in the lengths to which they would push the idea of
communal cultural autonomy. Kukathas would deny the Liberal state the right to
override community practices and beliefs which offend Liberal sensibilities such as
the patriarchal organization of the family, isolation of women, arranged marriages,
and gendered differences in education. What he does insist on, however, is a state-
protected right of exit from the community."
The Canadian multiculturalist Will Kymlicka's formula is cultural autonomy
for migrant communities up to the point where their practices violate basic human
rights.69 It leaves us with a serious line-drawing problem. Which human rights are
basic? Can the government in the name of equal protection punish Sunni
fundamentalist owners of restaurants who refuse to admit Shia Muslims, Christians,
62. Id. art. 23(3).
63. Id. art. 26.
64. Id.
65. Id. art. 27.
66. KUKATHAS, supra note 2.
67. Id.
68. Id
69. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS
1-9 (1996).
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Jews, and others who do not share their beliefs? Can it enforce rape law against a
fundamentalist who did not have the consent of his wife for sexual intercourse? Can
it insist in the name of protecting fundamental rights that all children attend public
pre-schools where they will be taught Liberal values embedded in the constitution?
Michael Walzer, whom I mentioned earlier, enters the debate from a slightly
different angle. What every successful society needs, he argues, is a "common
standpoint of morality" but one defined in primarily political not cultural terms. 70
The common standpoint is a consensus about a just organization of society which
means it defines the terms in which groups compete for social and economic
goods-income, wealth, access to education, celebrity-and identifies the things
they should share equally like impartial application of the law, equal access to public
services, equal opportunity to work in the state bureaucracy, and protection from
destitution. The consensus, in his words, "represents the gradual shaping of a
common life-at least, a common political life."7 1 "Religious differences and
cultural pluralism," he adds, "are entirely compatible with this kind of common
moral standpoint." 72
IV. CULTURAL DIFFERENCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY
And so we arrive at the last question I want to put to you and to me as well,
because I am not sure of the answer. Is a common moral standpoint necessary for a
long-enduring democratic society?
Consider the United States. Can its electorate be said to enjoy a "common moral
standpoint"? Where is the point of commonality between those who believe that
abortion is largely a matter of choice and those who label it murder; that physically
intimate same-sex relationships are sinful and those who believe that sexual
relationships between consenting adults are entirely a matter of choice; that the state
should protect all members of the society from destitution and those who believe
that in most cases destitution is the result of personal failings and therefore its
consequences should not be mitigated; between those who believe that all persons
are created equal and those who believe in a racially-defined hierarchy of talent and
character; between those who believe that atheists and agnostics are unfit for public
office and those who believe that faith is irrelevant for assessing candidates?
Could it nevertheless be argued despite those polar differences in value there
exists a "common moral standpoint" among the settled inhabitants of the United
States? My reply is "maybe". It depends what we mean by a common moral
standpoint. It could mean only a consensus about the justness of a society's
constitutional arrangements, about, that is, the procedure by which it produces public
policies rather than the policies themselves. And arguably there is commonality in
this sense.
In order to achieve this common standpoint of morality, however, we had to
fight a ferocious Civil War and as evidence recently presented to the United States
70. WELZER, supra note 55.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Supreme Court in connection with litigation over the Voting Rights Act implies,7 3
the attribution of fundamental rights much less support for equal life chances for all
citizens is not universal. Opinion polling supports my intuition that a considerable
majority of the American people believes or at least thinks it believes that all
citizens, whatever their color, ethnic background, or creed should have equal
opportunities to improve the conditions of their lives and that all of us are entitled to
the equal protection of the laws, to a fair trial, to privacy in our homes, to an
extensive freedom of speech and conscience and expression of religious faith and a
right to participate in the political process. Those shared beliefs could be said to
constitute a common moral standpoint.
One thing that worries me these days is evidence of stress on that common
standpoint. I am concerned particularly with the 25 percent of the population who
continue to question the legitimacy of the Obama Presidency ostensibly on the
grounds that he was probably born abroad. 74 Also concerning is recent polling data
indicating that people who identify with either of the two major political parties are
beginning not simply to disagree but literally to hate each other for the sheer fact of
belonging to the other party as if their party affiliation were a proxy for moral
degradation. 7 Additional grounds for concern are efforts to limit the right to vote.
Fortunately, there remains a majority of Americans committed to the idea of a
common citizenship, a patriotic bond, which transcends differences about how to
implement our common values. 7  And even more fortunately, tolerance of
difference, all kinds of difference, is far greater among younger people.77 And that
gives us grounds for optimism, even after this terrible electoral season, that the Bill
of Rights culture will endure.
What is the prospect for Liberal values in West European societies where on
the whole economies are grinding more slowly and the pressure of migration from
culturally more distinct countries is more intense? One source of hope is their
economic need for large-scale migration in order to support the aging indigenous
population. For instance, to maintain the current ratio of employed persons to
retirees, Germany needs an annual intake of four-hundred-thousand working age
people.78 But the rise of right-wing parties and the signs of a kind of cultural panic
like the local level banning from public beaches in France of women in body-
covering garments7 9 demonstrates to me that the economic argument is politically
73. Shelby County v. Holder, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/shelby-
county-v-holder/ (listing all amici curiae briefs submitted to the Court regarding this case).
74. Edward L. Hudgins, America's Particular Patriotism, CATO INST. (July 3, 2000),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/americas-particular-patriotism.
75. Lynn Vavreck, Younger Americans Are Less Patriotic. At Least, in Some Ways., N.Y. TIMES
(July 4, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/upshot/younger-americans-are-less-patriotic-at-
least-in-some-ways.html.
76. Partisanship and Political Animosity, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 22, 2016),
http://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/.
77. Id.
78. Germany is not Shrinking, DW (Feb. 4, 2017), http://www.dw.com/en/germany-is-not-
shrinking/a-37415327.
79. Ben Quinn, French police make woman remove clothing on Nice beach following burkini ban,
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weak.
In Europe, the state must summon the human and material resources to connect
new arrivals with long-established residentsso and with the supportive institutions of
the state, not simply its repressive ones. I do not see how this can be done without
the introduction of compulsory national service where young people in small units
integrated by class and ethnicity and led by carefully-trained adults serve the
common good while living together and establishing thereby networks which could
last a lifetime. In addition, the state must establish catchment areas in North and
West Africa where prospective migrants can be taught a European language and
labor force skills. To finance such an effort, Europe will, among other things, need
to redeploy much of the 70 billion a year in foreign assistance it currently sends to
countries in the Global South other than the funds, now inadequate, needed to assist
the millions of displaced persons in the Middle East and West Asia. European states
must also, I believe, require and integrate pre-school socialization. At the same time
it must avoid measures which evidence contempt for traditionalist communities like
the laws banning signs of piety such as headscarves and it must demonstrate positive
respect by helping to finance the construction of prayer spaces and community
centers and revising textbooks to reflect and celebrate the historical and
contemporaneous presence and contributions of migrant communities.
Can the European state undertake the respectful integration of Muslim
immigrants in the face of the continuing threat of mass-casualty terrorism? One
searches with difficulty to find grounds for optimism. As Lawrence Wright, one of
our most empathetic and incisive writers about jihadi terrorism, concludes in his
recent book The Terror Years, it is "common to suggest," he says,
that dealing with the root causes of terrorism is the best and maybe the
only way to bring it to an end, but there is very little evidence to support
that notion. Poverty doesn't necessarily lead to acts of terror. Nor does
tyranny, nor do wars, corruption, a lack of education or opportunity. [...]
Not one of these factors by itself is sufficient to say that here at last is the
reason that idealistic young people line up for the opportunity to behead
their opponents or blow themselves up in a fruit market. But each of those
factors is a tributary in a mighty river that floods the Middle East, a river
that we can call Despair.8 '
I ask myself: can we in the West find the will, the understanding, and the
capacity to help dam that river? All I get in the form of an answer is a large question
mark. This is, no doubt, how Winston Churchill felt about Britain's prospects early
in World War H. All we can do is what he did, namely to struggle forward toward
an uncertain end.
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/24/french-police-make-
woman-remove-burkini-on-nice-beach.
80. Belgium to require immigrants to sign up to European values', THE GUARDIAN (Apr. I, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/01/belgium-to-require-immigrants-to-sign-up-to-
european-values.
81. LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE TERROR YEARS: FROM AL-QAEDA TO THE ISLAMIC STATE 342
(2016).
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MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES ARE ROUTINELY DENIED THE
PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: WHAT DOES
THE FUTURE HOLD?
VED P. NANDA*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a globalized world, it is no surprise that human mobility is on the rise. The
number of international migrants' increased from approximately 173 million in
20002 to 214 million in 20103 and stood at 244 million in 2015.4 This includes over
65 million forcibly displaced persons and more than 21 million refugees.' In
addition, although not a focus of this comment, 10 million stateless people6 and 40
million internally displaced persons 7 also suffer varying deprivations of human
rights.
While more migrants and refugees are on the move, they increasingly suffer
from serious violations of their basic human rights en route, at the borders, and in
the countries of transit as well as destination countries. This article discusses the
challenges migrants and refugees face as they seek protection and the several recent
efforts to find solutions to their plight. In Part II, I review the nature, magnitude, and
complexity of the current international movement of migrants and refugees. Part III
* John Evans University Professor, University of Denver; Thompson Marsh Professor of International
Law and Director of the Ved Nanda Center for International & Comparative Law, University of Denver
Sturm College of Law
1. There is no universal or legal definition of a migrant In common usage, an international
migrant is a person who is outside the state of which he or she is a national or citizen and if a stateless
person, he or she is outside the state of birth or habitual residence.
2. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, 1
8, U.N. Doc. A/71/40767 (July 20, 2016) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur's July 20, 2016 Report],
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SRMigrants/DevelopingGlobalCompactOnMigration.pdf;
U.N. Secretary-General, In safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, 1
12, U.N. Doc. A/70/59 (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.undocs.org/A/70/59.
3. U.N., Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], Migration: a global
governance issue (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/MigrationGlobalGovernancelssue.aspx.
4. G.A. Res. 71/1, 1 3 (Oct. 3, 2016) [hereinafter N.Y. Declaration], http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/57e39d987.
5. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Figures at a Glance (2015),
http://www.unher.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html (I will often use the term migrants to include
refugees. A refugee is officially defined under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
infra note 180 and accompanying text).
6. Id.
7. UNHCR, Internally Displaced People, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/intemally-displaced-
people.html.
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discusses the challenges migrants face and recent efforts undertaken to protect their
rights and find a more orderly, predictable, coordinated, and humane process to
address these challenges, contrasted with the current unregulated and ad hoc
approaches. Part IV presents the recent developments related to refugee admissions
in the United States. Part V notes the applicable international law, including the
international law of migrants and international refugee law. Part VI provides
analysis, followed by conclusion in Part VII.
II. NATURE, MAGNITUDE, AND COMPLEXITY OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS
On September 19, 2016, the United Nations General Assembly aptly stated the
reasons for voluntary movement and forced displacement:
Some people move in search of new economic opportunities and
horizons. Others move to escape armed conflict, poverty, food insecurity,
persecution, terrorism, or human rights violations and abuses. Still others
do so in response to the adverse effects of climate change.. or other
environmental factors. Many move, indeed, for a combination of these
reasons.8
Among the major pull factors is that destination states need migrant labor.
The number of displaced persons is indeed staggering and has grown
dramatically, partially due to the continuing Syrian conflict, and also because of
ethnic and religious tensions in several countries including Afghanistan, Eritrea,
Iraq, Libya, and Somalia. More than a million refugees (those who flee across
international borders because of war, violence, and persecution) and migrants
crossed the Mediterranean in 2015, seeking safety,' and the number of those who
applied for asylum in Europe between July 2015 and May 2016, also stood at more
than one million.' 0
The numbers of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Europe are on the
rise, as well - 198,500 entered Europe between 2008 and 2015, and 48 percent
arrived in 2015 alone." UNICEF has stated in a recent report, Hitting Rock Bottom:
How 2016 Became the Worst Year for Syria's Children, that Syria's children have
suffered the most during their country's civil war, for, as, in 2016 at least 652
children were killed, 850 were recruited and used in the conflict; more than 1.7
million inside Syria are out of school, and nearly six million were dependent on
humanitarian assistance.' 2 The number of Syrian children living as refugees in
Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq is over 2.3 million.' 3 The report adds,
8. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4, 1 1.
9. UNHCR, Better Protecting Refugees in the EU and Globally, at 2 (2016),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/58385d4e4.html [hereinafter Better Protecting Refugees].
10. Phillip Connor & Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key facts about the world's refugees (PEw RESEARCH
CENTER Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/05/key-facts-about-the-worlds-
refugees/.
11. Id
12. UNICEF, Hitting Rock Bottom: How 2016 Became the Worst Year for Syria's Children, at 2
(March 2017), http://www.refworld.org/docid/58c6bdc24.htm.
13. Id.
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"[s]ince the beginning of the conflict in 2011, thousands of children crossed Syria's
borders unaccompanied or separated from their families. The situation of more than
47,000 people stranded at the no man's land near Syria's southeastern border with
Jordan continues to deteriorate. "14
The number of migrant arrivals to Europe by sea has slowed, due to the
increased border restrictions on refugee and migrant movements toward and within
Europe in 2016, and Turkey's decision to end the irregular migration from Turkey
to the European Union, as set out in the EU-Turkey statement of March 16, 2016."
Nevertheless, during the first 73 days of 2017, 19,653 migrants, including refugees,
still arrived in Europe."
The perilous journeys resulted in the deaths of 7,763 migrants worldwide in
2016, an increase of 27 percent compared to 2015 and 47 percent compared to 2014;
5,085 of them died in the Mediterranean Sea in 2016, an increase of 34 percent from
2015."1 Despite increased search-and-rescue efforts, 788 migrants, including
refugees, died during the first 71 days of 2017.18
The recognition of the variety of reasons for the movement of people mentioned
above was in a resolution the General Assembly adopted on September 19, 2016,
entitled the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (Declaration);1 this
was the outcome document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting on addressing large
movements of refugees and migrants. The Heads of State and Government and High
Representatives had assembled to address this topic. Earlier, in March 2016, a
regional process in the Asia-Pacific Region, the Bali Process on People Smuggling,
Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, had charted a
comprehensive regional approach to managing migration flows and combating
people smuggling and human trafficking.20
A day following the UN Summit, President Barack Obama opened the Leaders'
14. Id.
15. European Commission Press Release 144/16, Council of the European Union, EU-Turkey
statement (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-
turkey-statement/.
16. International Organization for Migration [IOM], Mediterranean migrant arrivals reach 19,653,
Deaths: 525, MISSING MIGRANTS PROJECT (Mar. 14, 2017),
https://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-19653-deaths-525 [hereinafter
Missing Migrants].
17. Migrant Deaths and Disappearances Worldwide: 2016 Analysis (IOM Mar. 17, 2017),
www.iom.int/news/migrant-deaths-and-disappearances-worldwide-2016-analysis.
18. Missing Migrants, supra note 16; see, e.g., Declan Walsh, Libyans Find Bodies of 74 Migrants
on Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2017, at A4 (from a shipwrecked inflatable raft boat found on the shore);
Ben Hubbard & Shuaib Almosawa, Somali Migrants' Trek Becomes Scene of Horror, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
18, 2017, at A7 (killed by firing from a military helicopter on their boat).
19. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4.
20. Sixth Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons
and Related Transnational Crime, Co-Chairs' Statement (Mar. 23, 2016),
http://www.baliprocess.net/UserFiles/baliprocess/File/BPMC%20Co-
chairs%20Ministerial%20Statement-with%2OBali%20Declaration%20attached%20-
%2023%20March%202016_docx.pdf.
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Summit on Refugees,21 at which donors increased the financial contributions made
earlier to the United Nations and other international humanitarian organizations by
approximately $4.5 billion over the 2015 level. 22
As part of the Declaration, the Member States reaffirmed that they would "fully
protect the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status; all are
rights holders." 23 They added that their response would "demonstrate full respect for
international law and international human rights law and, where applicable,
international refugee law and international humanitarian law." 24
Among other commitments, the world leaders stated that they would recognize
and... address, in accordance with our obligations under international law, the
special needs of all people in vulnerable situations who are traveling within large
movements of refugees and migrants, including women at risk, children, especially
those who are unaccompanied or separated from their families, members of ethnic
and religious minorities, victims of violence, older persons, persons with disabilities,
persons who are discriminated against on any basis, indigenous peoples, victims of
human trafficking, and victims of exploitation and abuse in the context of the
smuggling of migrants.25
Member States also committed to take measures to improve the integration and
inclusion of migrants and refugees, as appropriate, with particular reference to
access to justice.2 They also "committed to implementing border control procedures
in conformity with applicable obligations under international law, including
international human rights law and international refugee law." 27 In addition, they
stated that they would "protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all
refugee and migrant children, regardless of their status," and, referring to Article
3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, they would "giv[e] primary
consideration at all times to the best interest of the child." 28
Member States plan to adopt a global compact for safe, orderly, and regular
migration and present it at an inter-governmental conference to be held in 2018.29
They also plan to develop a comprehensive refugee response framework through the
process of state negotiations and based on the principles of international cooperation
and on the sharing of the burdens and responsibilities of refugees more equitably,
21. U.N. Summit for Refugees and Migrants 2016 (Sept. 19, 2016),
http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit; U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on the Leaders'
Summit on Refugees (Sept. 20, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/09/20/fact-sheet-leaders-summit-refugees.
22. Id; see also Ved Nanda, The world's refugee system is broken, and solutions are elusive, THE
DENVER POST (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/09/29/the-worlds-refugee-system-is-
broken-and-solutions-are-elusive/.
23. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4, 1 5.
24. Id
25. Id 123.
26. Id. 139.
27. Id 124.
28. Id. 132.
29. Id at Annex II in 1, 9.
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and which will be elaborated by UNHCR.30
Along with these undertakings, the Declaration includes many more
commitments by Member States. Human Rights groups have been critical of the
Declaration, as will be evaluated later in this article. It should, however, be noted
here that notwithstanding these glowing promises, state practices do not match those
commitments.
III. CHALLENGES OF MIGRATION AND RECENT EFFORTS TO PROTECT
MIGRANTS' HUMAN RIGHTS
Migrants increasingly face restrictive immigration policies by states, such as
restricting the inflow of migrants and "push-backs" at land and sea as border control
measures, interception practices, detention, and even deportation. Two recent
examples are the detention law in Hungary and deportation law in Belgium. On
March 7, 2017, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a new law calling for mandatory
detention of all asylum seekers, including children, for the entire length of the
asylum procedure." In a press briefing, the UNHCR spokesperson expressed deep
concern that the asylum seekers "will be detained in shipping containers surrounded
by high razor wire fence at the border for extended periods of time."3 2 It should be
noted that Hungary had already enacted legislative and policy obstacles in addition
to the physical barriers it had erected, which had made it nearly impossible for
asylum seekers to enter the country and apply for asylum. The spokesperson
reminded Hungary that there are only a limited number of grounds to justify
detention of refugees and asylum seekers and it must be "necessary, reasonable and
proportionate" to do so. She reminded Hungary that failure to consider alternatives
to detention could render detention arbitrary. Children, she said, should never be
detained, for detention is never in a child's best interest.3 3
Under the law passed by Belgium's Parliament, the government is given
extraordinary powers to deport legal residents of foreign origin, of whom there are
about 1.3 million;34 however, the law excludes Belgian nationals and refugees.
Under the law, foreigners legally resident in Belgium could be deported on the mere
suspicion of engaging in terrorist activities, or for "presenting a risk to public order
or national security." Such action may be taken without a criminal conviction or
even involving a judge. Several human rights groups protested this new law in a
letter and the Belgian Human Rights League is planning to appeal. The fear of
terrorism has already led several European countries - Hungary, Austria, and The
Netherlands - to lower their threshold for deportation in recent years.35
30. Id. at Annex I.
31. UNHCR deeply concerned by Hungary plans to detain all asylum seekers, UNHCR (Mar. 7,
2017), http://www.tinhcr.org/news/briefing/2017/3/58be80454/unhcr-deeply-concemed-hungary-plans-
detain-asylum-seekers.html.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Milan Schreuer, Rights Groups See Red Flag in Belgian Deportation Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 2017, at A9.
35. Id.
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The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants has described the
migrants' plight in his report of July 26, 2016: "Unregulated migration in host
countries has led to rising anti-migration sentiment, discrimination and violence, as
migrants are portrayed as 'stealing' jobs and draining social services." 3 6 He notes
that the rise of nationalist populist parties and the tragic terrorist attacks around the
world, xenophobia and hate speech have increased, creating a significant trend in
the negative perceptions of migrants, as well creating a stumbling block in the
development of more efficient evidence-based and human rights-based policies. 37
The Special Rapporteur asserts that these negative perceptions persist
notwithstanding immigrants' positive overall impact on employment generation and
investment. 38 Referring to an OECD study 39 and another study by the OHCHR,40 he
states that migrants contribute to economic growth in the places they go and they
contribute more in direct and indirect taxes than they take out.4 1
Migrants facing special challenges are those considered "irregular" migrants 42
and migrants in a vulnerable situation; children, especially those unaccompanied or
separate from their families; and women and girls migrant workers. Although there
is no universally accepted definition of the term, "irregular migrants," it usually
refers "to the movement of international migrants who enter or stay in a country
without correct authorization." 43  They are also usually described as
"undocumented," "unauthorized," "unlawful," and even "illegal.""
According to the Global Migration Group, which is composed of 21 UN and
other international entities working on migration, an "irregular migrant" is "every
person who, owing to undocumented entry or the expiry or his or her visa, lacks
legal status in a transit in a host country. The term applies to migrants who infringe
a country's admission rules and any other person not authorized to remain in the host
country." 45
36. Special Rapporteur's July 20, 2016 Report, supra note 2, 1 18.
37. Id
38. Id 1 19.
39. OECD, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK 2013 (OECD, 2013), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/intemational-migration-outlook-2013_migroutlook-2013-
en. See also OECD, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK 2016 (OECD, 2016), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2016_migr outlook-2016-en
(analyzing the economic impact of migration and how the OECD countries should respond).
40. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS IN AN IRREGULAR SITUATION, at 4, U.N. Sales No. E.14.XIV.4 (2014),
http://www.OHCHR.org/documents/Publications/HR-PUB-14-l_en.pdf [hereinafter 2014 OHCHR
Report].
41. Special Rapporteur's July 20, 2016 Report, supra note 2, 1 19.
42. 2014 OHCHR Report, supra note 40, at 4.
43. Id
44. Id.
45. Glob. Migration Grp., International Migration and Human Rights: Challenges and
Opportunities on the Threshold of the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
at 7 (Oct. 2008),
http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/system/files/uploads/documents/Int MigrationHumanRights.p
df.
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In the latest draft, in February 2017, OHCHR and the Global Migration Group
provided a set of principles and guidelines on the human rights protection of
migrants in vulnerable situations.' They state that the concept of a "migrant in a
vulnerable situation" is to be understood as a range of the following intersecting
factors which can exist simultaneously: a vulnerable situation arising from the
reasons for leaving countries of origin; occurring in the context of the circumstances
migrants encounter en route, at borders, and at reception; or related to a specific
aspect of a person's identity or circumstance. 7
It was no surprise that the rise in migration numbers led to greater national,
regional, and international attention. International entities have, however, been
actively involved with international migration issues for several decades. These
include the United Nations and its various agencies, especially the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights,48 the Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights of Migrants,49 and the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families."o Two special initiatives by the
UN are the Global Forum on Migration and Development, a "voluntary, informal,
non-binding and government-led process open to all States Members and Observers
of the United Nations, to advance understanding and cooperation on the mutually
reinforcing relationship between migration and development and to foster practical
and action-oriented outcomes,"' and the Global Migration Group, an UN inter-
agency group currently comprising 21 entities, which was established by the
Secretary-General in 2006, and which promotes the wider application of all pertinent
norms relating to migration and encourages "the adoption of more coherent,
comprehensive and better coordinated approaches to the issue of international
migration."52 Other organizations include the International Organization for
Migration, which has now become a related organization to the United Nations, 3
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.54
The major refugee organization is the United Nations Office of the High
46. Office of the High Comm'r of Human Rights & Glob. Migration Grp., Principles and
Guidelines, supported by practical guidance, on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable
situations, Draft (Feb. 2017),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/Pages/Draftsforcomments.aspx.
47. Id. at4-5.
48. U.N., Office of the High Comm'n for Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
49. U.N., Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights of Migrants, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/migration/rapporteur (last visited Apr. 23,
2017).
50. U.N., Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Comm. on Migrant Workers,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CMW/Pages/CMWIndex.aspx.
51. Glob. Forum on Migration and Dev., Background and Objectives,
http://gfmd.org/process/background.
52. U.N., Glob. Migration Grp., http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/.
53. INT'L ORG. ON MIGRATION, http://www.iom.int; Int'l Org. on Migration, IOM Becomes a
Related Organization to the UN (Jul. 25, 2016), https://www.iom.int/news/iom-becomes-related-
organization-un.
54. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], http://www.oecd.org.
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Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Refugee Agency "dedicated to
saving lives, protecting rights and building a better future for refugees, forcibly
displaced communities and stateless people."55 Among the non-governmental
organizations in the United States on migration, major actors include the Migration
Policy Institute, 56 and the Population Reference Bureau.5 ' The International Rescue
Committee," U.S. Committee for RefugeeS, 59 Refugee Council USA,60 and
Refugees International 6 1 are among the major US NGOs active on refugee issues.
In 2015, European countries struggled to cope with the influx of migrants.
Furious efforts were made to stem the tide of migrants entering Europe. These
include the Valletta (Malta) Summit on Migration in November 2015,62 which
brought together European and African heads of state and government and was
designed to build upon the earlier successes of the Rabat and Khartoum processes
on migration, and the EU-Africa Dialogue on Migration and Mobility so as to
address the new challenges of migration and to strengthen cooperation. The outcome
was a Political Declaration6 3 and a Plan of Action.M After committing "to respond
decisively and together manage migration flows... guided by the principles of
solidarity, partnership and shared responsibility," to respect international obligations
and human rights, to make joint efforts against irregular migration, and for
"preventing and fighting migrant smuggling, [and] eradicating trafficking in human
beings," 65 the participants agreed an Action Plan with five identified priority areas:
1. Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular
migration and forced displacement;
2. Legal migration and mobility;
3. Protection and asylum;
4. Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and
trafficking in human beings; and
5. Return, readmission and reintegration. 66
To ensure implementation of the Plan, the participants agreed to launch 16
ambitious initiatives, several under each priority area, by the end of 2016.67
In March 2016, European leaders entered into an agreement with Turkey, under
55. U.N. Office of the High Comm'r for Refugees, About, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-
us.html.
56. MIGRATION POLICY INST., http://www.migrationpolicy.org.
57. POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, http://www.prb.org.
58. INT'L RESCUE COMM., https://www.rescue.org/topic/refugees-america.
59. U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, http://refugees.org.
60. REFUGEE COUNCIL USA, http://www.rcusa.org/.
61. REFUGEES INT'L, https://www.refugeesinternational.org.
62. VALLETTA SUMMIT ON MIGRATION, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-
summit/2015/11/11-12/.
63. Valletta Summit on Migration, Political Declaration (Nov. I1-12, 2015).
64. Valletta Summit on Migration, Action Plan (Nov. I 1-12, 2015).
65. Valletta Summit, supra note 63, at 1, 3.
66. Valletta Summit Action Plan, supra note 64.
67. Id. at 1.
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which Turkey will accept the return of all migrants crossing from Turkey to Greece
who do not need international protection and all irregular migrants intercepted in
Turkish waters." The EU agreed to provide financial assistance to Turkey as part
of the deal. Both countries also agreed to strengthen measures against migrant
smugglers. 69 The accord sharply reduced crossings into Greece.
As the EU-Turkey agreement was considered a great success, the EU
introduced in 2016 a New Migration Partnership Framework (MPF) aimed at fully
integrating migration in the its foreign policy, with the stated objective of "saving
lives and breaking the business model of smugglers, preventing illegal migration and
enhanc[ing] cooperation on returns and readmission of irregular migrants, as well as
stepping up investments in partner countries." 0 Long-term measures of the New
MPF include addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced
displacement by supporting partner countries' political, social and economic
development, and improving opportunities for sustainable development." To
implement it, the EU and member countries would strengthen the existing EU
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and provide eight billion euros over the period
2016-2020.72
Nearly four months after the launching of the MPF, the Commission presented
the first progress report, stating that "the collective work is starting to bear fruit and
is resulting in tangible outcomes." 73 The first group of countries in Africa part of
this partnership were Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal, and Jordan and
Lebanon in the Near East. 74 Similar cooperation agreements are likely to follow
with other countries.
Subsequently, EU heads of state or government met on February 3, 2017,"7 and
agreed on measures aimed at reducing the flow of irregular migrants from Libya to
Italy, whose numbers had reached 181,000 in 2016.76 The outcome of the meeting,
the Malta Declaration,7 7 states that "[a] key element of a sustainable migration policy
is to ensure effective control of our external border and stem illegal flows into the
EU."7 It further states that "[t]he Partnership Framework and the Valletta Action
68. European Council Press Release 144/16, EU-Turkey statement (Mar. 18, 2016),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.
69. Id.
70. European Comm'n, Migration Partnership Framework: A New Approach to Better Manage
Migration (June 6, 2016),
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ec_formatmigrationpartnershipframework update_2
.pdf.
7 1. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id
74. Better Protecting Refugees, supra note 9, at 4.
75. European Council, Informal Meeting ofEU Heads ofState or Government, Malta, 03/02/2017,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2017/02/03-informal-meeting/.
76. Id. at 4.
77. European Council Press Release, Malta Declaration by the Members of the European Council
on the External Aspects of Migration: Addressing the Central Mediterranean Route (Feb. 3, 2017).
78. Id. 12.
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Plan have allowed us to deepen long-term cooperation with a number of partner
countries, including on root causes of migration, through a solid partnership based
on mutual trust. This work is already yielding results and will be intensified.""9
Acknowledging that "[e]fforts to stabilize Libya are now more important than ever,
and the EU will do its utmost to contribute to that objective," the EU leaders decided
on several priorities aimed at strengthening capacity-building efforts80 and allocating
resources to address those priorities.'
To take stock of the progress made under the joint Valletta Action Plan and
Declaration, Senior Officials met in Malta on February 8-9, 2017.82 Delegations
from Africa and Europe participated and the meeting adopted a set of joint
conclusions reiterating their commitment to the principles of "solidarity,
partnership, and shared responsibility" in the areas of mobility and migration
management." Recognizing the benefits of well-managed migration to countries of
origin, transit and destination, they reiterated their commitment to pursue the aims
of the Valletta Action Plan, which requires cooperation, coordination, and
partnership among all stakeholders. 84
Among the key messages, the participants called for addressing the root causes
of migration 5 and efforts to promote legal migration.86 They also recognized the
need to strengthen international protection,8 7 and for "a stronger focus on measures
aimed at fighting trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, as well as
implementing integrated border management and cross-border cooperation.8 8
In a statement at the Senior Officials' meeting, the Director of the Europe
Bureau on behalf of UNHCR, Vincent Cochetel, stressed the need to provide
differentiated responses between refugees and asylum seekers, who cannot return to
their home countries, and migrants.89 He warned against the potential risk of a
fragmented approach to the funding for activities carried out under the joint Valletta
Action Plan and the Declaration because several bilateral actions and projects by EU
Member States since the Valletta Summit were not coordinated with the EU funded
programs and projects under the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Thus, he called
for "comprehensive, integrated and better coordinated approaches across all EU
79. Id. 14.
80. Id. 1 6.
81. Id. 17.
82. Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) held in Malta, on 8 and 9 February 2017, RABAT PROCESS,
https://processus-de-rabat.org/en/rabat-process-in-action/208-senior-officials-meeting-som-valletta-
2.html.
83. Joint Conclusions, Joint Valletta Action Plan, Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) in Malta 8-9
February 2017 at 1.
84. Id. at 2,14.
85. Id. at3,11.
86. Id. at3,12.
87. Id at 3, T 3.
88. Id at 3,T4.
89. UNHCR, Statement delivered by Vincent Cochetel, Director of Europe Bureau on behalf of
UNHCR, Senior Officials Meeting of the Valletta Summit on Migration 8-9 February 2017 (Feb. 10,
2017), http://www.refworld.org/docid/589dc9e34.html.
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funded actions, including those undertaken bilaterally to ensure maximum
impact."o He underlined the importance of increasing available safe legal pathways
to protection, specifically for refugees.
Mr. Cochetel added:
Despite the direct link between family reunification and successful local
integration, refugees still experience unnecessary hardship in ensuring
that their families can join them. Resettlement quotas remain limited,
almost virtual. As an example, less than 2,000 refugees have been
resettled from Ethiopia and Sudan to Europe over the last three years.
Labor mobility or overseas educational schemes for refugees from their
region of flight also remain almost inexistent. Combatting the business
models of traffickers will only be truly successful if such legal pathways
for refugees are accessible to them.9 1
With 25,000 unaccompanied and separated children having arrived in Italy, he
called on states to address this challenge through a child protection dialogue and take
decisions based on the best interest of the children, which may be best served by
"family reunion" and reintegration assistance with relatives in their country of origin
and [or] local integration or legal transfers to a third country," 92  rather than
channeling them into asylum or other enforcement-related procedures.
Earlier, in December 2016, the UJNHCR had proposed in a study entitled Better
Protecting Refugees in the EU and Globally,93 a common, principled and pragmatic
approach for the EU to migration and asylum, which builds on the New York
Declaration. 94 The study called for a comprehensive EU asylum and refugee policy,
both in its internal and external dimensions, which should have the capacity, to
address and respond to movements of people effectively. 95 It elaborated further
under four headings: an EU that 1) is engaged beyond its borders to protect, assist
and find solutions by developing sustainable asylum systems; 96 2) is prepared to
respond to possible future arrivals in significant numbers;97 3) protects through a
well-managed common asylum system that ensures access to territory;98 and 4)
integrates refugees in their communities."
The effectiveness of the EU's MPF initiative, which is debatable, will be
evaluated in part VI.
Long before the mass migration crisis caused by the large-scale and
uncontrolled influx of migrants, EU countries had been developing a Common
90. Id
91. Id.
92. Id
93. Better Protecting Refugees, supra note 9.
94. Id at 2; N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4.
95. Better Protecting Refugees, supra note 9, at 2.
96. Id at 4.
97. Id. at 8.
98. Id. at 10.
99. Id. at 19.
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European Asylum System.'" After the adoption of several legislative measures
harmonizing common minimum standards over the years, and several reforms,' 01 in
May and July 2016, the European Commission presented proposals for another
major reform "based on common rules, a fairer sharing of responsibility, and safe
legal channels for those who need protection to get it in the EU."1 0 2 The Commission
stated that the reform
establishes a fully efficient, fair and humane asylum policy which
functions effectively both in times of normal and in times of high
migratory pressure. It ensures a fair allocation of asylum applications
among Member States and provides for a common set of rules at EU level
to simplify and shorten the asylum procedures, discourage secondary
movements and increase the prospect of integration.1 03
The European Commission describes the main legislation on asylum in the EU:
Asylum Procedures Directive: establishes common standards of
safeguards and guarantees to access a fair and efficient asylum procedure.
Reception Conditions Directive: establishes minimum common standards
of living conditions for asylum applicants; ensures that applicants have
access to housing, food, employment and health care.
Qualification Directive: establishes common grounds for granting
international protection and foresees a series of rights for its beneficiaries
(residence permits, travel documents, access to employment and
education, social welfare and healthcare).
Dublin Regulation: determines which Member State is responsible for
examining a given asylum application.
EURODAC Regulation: establishes an EU asylum fingerprint database.
When someone applies for asylum, no matter where in the EU, their
fingerprints are transmitted to the EURODAC central system. '
It is noteworthy that under the Dublin Mechanism, the responsible Member
State is usually the state through which the asylum seeker first entered the EU, and
thus the responsibility is primarily left to the Member States located at the external
borders of the EU. As Greece was overwhelmed with the migrants crossing to its
shores from Turkey and the responsibility was not shared, especially by the Northern
European countries, the Dublin regime has seemingly failed. In Part VI, I will
elaborate further.
100. Common European Asylum System, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (June 12, 2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum en.
101. Id.
102. The Common European Asylum System (CEAS), EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/background-
information/docs/20160713/factsheetthe commoneuropeanasylum system en.pdf.
103. Id.
104. Id.
314 VOL. 45:3
2017 MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 315
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO REFUGEE ADMISSIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES
The movement of refugees and migrants has recently become a major, central
area of contention in the United States, beyond its usual place as merely important.
Within the first three months of its existence, the new Trump administration ordered
an abrupt halt to the processing of refugees and asylum-seekers. The expressed
intention was to avert potential terrorist attacks within the US. This Order was
promptly rebuffed by the courts. The Trump administration then scaled back its
Order, and was again rebuffed. At issue was the motivating intent of the action and
its justifiability under the US Constitution and international refugee regimes.
During his presidential election campaign, Donald Trump voiced the anxiety
of many Americans over refugees entering America from predominantly Muslim
countries. Accordingly, within a week following his inauguration as President,
Trump announced a ban on refugees or migrants from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.05
Executive Order 13769 of January 27, 2017,106 entitled Protecting the Nation
105. Executive Order 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/01/27/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states [hereinafter
EO- I].
106. Id. In the parts relevant to this article, the Order provides:
Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy ofthe United States to protect its citizens from foreign nationals
who intend to commit terrorist attacks in the United States; and to prevent the admission of
foreign nationals who intend to exploit United States immigration laws for malevolent
purposes.
Sec. 3. ... (c) To temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies during the
review period described in subsection (a) of this section, to ensure the proper review and
maximum utilization of available resources for the screening of foreign nationals, and to ensure
that adequate standards are established to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists or criminals,
pursuant to section 212(f) ofthe INA, 8 U.S.C. § 182(f), I hereby proclaim that the immigrant
and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens from countries referred to in section
217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § II 87(a)(12), would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States, and I hereby suspend entry into the United States, as immigrants and
nonimmigrants, of such persons for 90 days from the date of this order (excluding those foreign
nationals traveling on diplomatic visas, North Atlantic Treaty Organization visas, C-2 visas
for travel to the United Nations, and G-1, G-2, G-3, and G4 visas).
Sec. 5. Realignment of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year 2017. (a) The
Secretary of State shall suspend the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for 120
days. During the 120-day period, the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the Secretary of
Homeland Security and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall review
the USRAP application and adjudication process to determine what additional procedures
should be taken to ensure that those approved for refugee admission do not pose a threat to the
security and welfare of the United States, and shall implement such additional
procedures. Refugee applicants who are already in the USRAP process may be admitted upon
the initiation and completion ofthese revised procedures. Upon the date that is 120 days after
the date of this order, the Secretary of State shall resume USRAP admissions only for nationals
of countries for which the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
Director of National Intelligence have jointly determined that such additional procedures are
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from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, reduced to less than half the
number of refugees who would be accepted into the US and suspended for four
months processing of refugees under the US Refugee Admissions Program.o7
Under this program, refugees and asylum seekers are generally processed into the
country under recognized criteria and are given assistance and opportunities for
settlement. The Order also suspended processing of refugees from Syria until further
notice and suspended entry of persons from countries whose vetting standards do
not meet US requirements.
Executive Order 13769 cited pertinent US law,'o which authorizes the
President to "suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or
nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be
appropriate," if he finds that their entry "would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States." This language from the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 "
was amended by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,'o which provides,
adequate to ensure the security and welfare of the United States.
(b) Upon the resumption of USRAP admissions, the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Secretary of Homeland Security, is further directed to make changes, to the extent
permitted by law, to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-
based persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the
individual's country of nationality. Where necessary and appropriate, the Secretaries of State
and Homeland Security shall recommend legislation to the President that would assist with
such prioritization.
(c) Pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), I hereby proclaim that the entry
of nationals of Syria as refugees is detrimental to the interests of the United States and thus
suspend any such entry until such time as I have determined that sufficient changes have been
made to the USRAP to ensure that admission of Syrian refugees is consistent with the national
interest.
(e) Notwithstanding the temporary suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security may jointly determine to admit
individuals to the United States as refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion, but
only so long as they determine that the admission of such individuals as refugees is in the
national interest-including when the person is a religious minority in his country of
nationality facing religious persecution, when admitting the person would enable the United
States to conform its conduct to a preexisting international agreement, or when the person is
already in transit and denying admission would cause undue hardship-and it would not pose
a risk to the security or welfare of the United States.
107. Memorandum for the Secretary of State on the Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017,
THE WHITE HOUSE; OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (Sept 28, 2016), ("In accordance with
section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ... (8 U.S.C. § 1157), and after appropriate
consultations with the Congress, I hereby make the following determinations and authorize the
following actions: The admission of up to 110,000 refugees to the United States during Fiscal
Year...2017 is justified by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national
interest; .... "'), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/09/28/presidential-determination-refugee-admissions-fiscal-year-2017.
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
109. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 Pub. L. No. 82414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at
8 U.S.C. ch. 12).
110. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1968) (codified at
8 U.S.C. ch. 12).
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inter alia: "No person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated
against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person's race, sex,
nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.""I
Thus, despite the administration's protestations to the contrary, President
Trump's campaign promises, banning immigration of Muslims and people from
predominantly Muslim countries, were found to evidence the administration's intent
when lawsuits challenging the Executive Order were brought in numerous federal
courts. Those courts thus rejected the administration's argument that the Order was
necessitated only by security concerns.
In nearly 50 lawsuits challenging the Order after it was announced, between
January 28 and January 31, federal courts granted temporary relief, including a
temporary restraining order (TRO) barring enforcement of core elements of the
Order, including its provisions suspending entry for nationals from the seven listed
countries for 90 days and limiting the acceptance of refugees.11 2 The courts often
highlighted the special priority that had been promised for "certain religious
minorities," as had been stated by President Trump in an interview on the day he
signed the order, that Syrian Christian refugees would be given priority status in the
United States." 3
On February 3, District Judge James Robart of the Western District of
Washington at Seattle granted the first TRO in Washington [later joined by
Minnesota] v. Trump."l4 The court stated:
The proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief [and temporary
restraining order] requires a party to demonstrate (1) 'that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in
his favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.' [Citations
omitted.]"'
In the alternative, Judge Robart noted,
[An injunction is appropriate if "serious questions going to the merits
were raised and the balance of the hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's
favor," thereby allowing preservation of the status quo when complex
legal questions require further inspection or deliberation, [provided] the
plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that
the injunction is in the public interest. [Citations omitted.]" 6
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a).
112. The following section considers a few of the actions.
113. See Glenn Kessler, Trump's Claim that it is 'Very Tough'for Christian Syrians to get to the
United States, WASH. POST: FACT CHECKER (Jan. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/01/28/trumps-claim-that-it-is-very-tough-
for-christian-syrians-to-get-to-the-united-states/?utm_term=.el47c7cdlIb4.
114. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Washington, et al., v. Donald J. Trump, et al., (Feb. 4, 2017).
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id. at 3-4.
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The court found in favor of the plaintiffs, ordered that sections 3(c)i 7 and 5(a),
(b), (c), and (e)'" not be enforced, and found further that, under the legislative
imperative that the immigration laws be administered uniformly throughout the
country, this order enjoining enforcement must be effective nationwide and thus
could not be limited to the plaintiff states.' 19 The government filed its appeal and an
emergency motion to stay the TRO in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
denied the motion on February 9, 2017.120
On February 14, Judge Leonie Brinkema of Virginia issued a similar ruling,
granting the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction against the travel ban.'21 She found
the Order clearly discriminatory and emphasized its violation of the First
Amendment Establishment Clause. 2 2 Looking at the proliferation of evidence
against the ban as showing clear intent to ban Muslims, she stated, inter alia, that
"[i]t is a discriminatory purpose that matters, no matter how inefficient the
execution."l 2 3 She ultimately found, "[E]njoining unconstitutional action by the
Executive Branch is always in the public's interest." 24
The administration's appeal in the Ninth Circuit was subsequently voluntarily
dismissed by the administration' 25 when it issued Order 13780 (EO-2) on March 6,
2017, similarly entitled Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the
United States.126
On March 15, Judge Theodore Chuang of the District of Maryland blocked
section 2(c)1 27 of the revised order, which purported to ban travel into the US by
citizens from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, Iraq having been
exempted from the list in Order 13780.128 And on March 17, Washington's Judge
Robart, in a new case, Ali v. Trump, 29 stayed the action allowing the Hawaii ruling
to govern the matter across the country.1 30
Later in March, some 13 states joined together to support the Trump travel ban.
On March 24, 2017, US District Court Judge Anthony Trenga found that the March
6 travel ban was sufficiently different from the initial one and thus the plaintiffs were
117. EO-1, supra note 105, at § 3(c).
118. Id, §§ 5(a), (b), (c), and (e).
119. Washington v. Trump, supra note 114, at 6.
120. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017), reconsideration en banc denied, No. 17-
35105, (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2017).
121. Aziz v. Trump, No. 117cv00I 16LMBTCB (E.D. Va., Feb. 13, 2017) [hereinafter Aziz].
122. See Rachel Weiner, Federal judge in Virginia issues strong rebuke of Trump travel ban, WASH.
POST (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/judge-in-virginia-grants-
preliminary-injunction-against-travel-ban/2017/02/13/a6l64bfe-f255-1 l e6-a9bO-
ecee7ce475fcstory.html?tid=ainl&utm term=.c41f3e0de8eb.
123. Aziz, supra note 121, at 9.
124. Id at 11.
125. Washington v. Trump, No. cv-0141JLR (W.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2017) dismissed.
126. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 FR 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) [hereafter EO-2].
127. Intl. Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, CV TDC-17-0361, (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2017).
128. See EO-2, supra note 126.
129. Ali v. Trump, No. C17-0135JLR (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17,2017).
130. Id.
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"no longer likely... [to] succeed on their claim that the predominate purpose of EO-
2 is to discriminate against Muslims based on their religion and that EO-2 is a pretext
or a sham for that purpose."1 31 He thus denied the TRO requested by the plaintiff.13 2
However, on March 29, Judge Watson of Hawaii granted the plaintiffs' motion
to convert the temporary restraining order he had previously entered to a
Preliminary.Injunction enjoining the enforcement or implementation of sections 213
131. Sarsour v. Trump, Case No. 1: 17cv00120, 12 (E.D. Va., Mar. 24, 2017).
132. Id. at 32.
133. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017),
Sec. 2.(a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Director of National Intelligence, shall conduct a worldwide review to identify whether,
and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country to adjudicate
an application by a national of that country for a visa, admission, or other benefit under the
INA (adjudications) in order to determine that the individual is not a security or public-safety
threat The Secretary of Homeland Security may conclude that certain information is needed
from particular countries even if it is not needed from every country.
(b) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the
Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the President a report on the results of the
worldwide review described in subsection (a) of this section, including the Secretary of
Homeland Security's determination of the information needed from each country for
adjudications and a list of countries that do not provide adequate information, within 20 days
of the effective date of this order. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a copy
of the report to the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of National
Intelligence.
(c) To temporarily reduce investigative burdens on relevant agencies during the review period
described in subsection (a) ofthis section, to ensure the proper review and maximum utilization
of available resources for the screening and vetting of foreign nationals, to ensure that adequate
standards are established to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists, and in light of the national
security concerns referenced in section I of this order, I hereby proclaim, pursuant to sections
212(f) and 215(a) ofthe INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) and I185(a), that the unrestricted entry into
the United States of nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States. I therefore direct that the entry into the United
States of nationals of those six countries be suspended for 90 days from the effective date of
this order, subject to the limitations, waivers, and exceptions set forth in sections 3 and 12 of
this order.
d) Upon submission of the report described in subsection (b) of this section regarding the
information needed from each country for adjudications, the Secretary of State shall request
that all foreign governments that do not supply such information regarding their nationals
begin providing it within 50 days of notification.
(e) After the period described in subsection (d) of this section expires, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, shall
submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential
proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals of
countries that have not provided the information requested until they do so or until the
Secretary of Homeland Security certifies that the country has an adequate plan to do so, or has
adequately shared information through other means. The Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, or the Secretary of Homeland Security may also submit to the President the names of
additional countries for which any of them recommends other lawfusl restrictions or limitations
deemed necessary for the security or welfare of the United States.
(f) At any point after the submission of the list described in subsection (e) of this section, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney
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and 6134 of the second Executive Order across the nation.135 He found that the new
Order was indeed a .'sanitize[d]"'l 36 version of the prior Executive Order and noted
that the events leading up to the "adoption of the challenged Executive Order are as
General, may submit to the President the names of any additional countries recommended for
similar treatment, as well as the names of any countries that they recommend should be
removed from the scope of a proclamation described in subsection (e) of this section.
(g) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the
President a joint report on the progress in implementing this order within 60 days of the
effective date of this order, a second report within 90 days of the effective date of this order, a
third report within 120 days of the effective date of this order, and a fourth report within 150
days of the effective date of this order.")
134. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017),
Sec. 6. Realignment of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year 2017. (a) The
Secretary of State shall suspend travel of refugees into the United States under the USRAP,
and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall suspend decisions on applications for refugee
status, for 120 days after the effective date of this order, subject to waivers pursuant to
subsection (c) of this section. During the 120-day period, the Secretary of State, in conjunction
with the Secretary of Homeland Security and in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence, shall review the USRAP application and adjudication processes to determine
what additional procedures should be used to ensure that individuals seeking admission as
refugees do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United States, and shall
implement such additional procedures. The suspension described in this subsection shall not
apply to refugee applicants who, before the effective date of this order, have been formally
scheduled for transit by the Department of State. The Secretary of State shall resume travel of
refugees into the United States under the USRAP 120 days after the effective date of this order,
and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall resume making decisions on applications for
refugee status only for stateless persons and nationals of countries for which the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence have
jointly determined that the additional procedures implemented pursuant to this subsection are
adequate to ensure the security and welfare of the United States.
(b) Pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA, I hereby proclaim that the entry of more than 50,000
refugees in fiscal year 2017 would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and thus
suspend any entries in excess of that number until such time as I determine that additional
entries would be in the national interest.
(c) Notwithstanding the temporary suspension imposed pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security may jointly determine
to admit individuals to the United States as refugees on a case-by-case basis, in their discretion,
but only so long as they determine that the entry of such individuals as refugees is in the
national interest and does not pose a threat to the security or welfare of the United States,
including in circumstances such as the following: the individual's entry would enable the
United States to conform its conduct to a preexisting international agreement or arrangement,
or the denial of entry would cause undue hardship.
(d) It is the policy of the executive branch that, to the extent permitted by law and as
practicable, State and local jurisdictions be granted a role in the process of determining the
placement or settlement in their jurisdictions of aliens eligible to be admitted to the United
States as refugees. To that end, the Secretary of State shall examine existing law to determine
the extent to which, consistent with applicable law, State and local jurisdictions may have
greater involvement in the process of determining the placement or resettlement of refugees in
their jurisdictions, and shall devise a proposal to lawfully promote such involvement.
135. Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-00050 (D. Haw., Mar. 29, 2017) (order granting motion to convert
TRO to a preliminary injunction) [hereinafter Watson 2].
136. Id. at 18.
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full of religious animus, invective, and obvious pretext as is the record here, it is no
wonder that the Government urges the Court to altogether ignore that history and
context."'37
Judge Watson declined to stay this ruling or hold it in abeyance should an
appeal of this Order be filed'38 and that next day, March 30, the administration filed
its appeal of Judge Watson's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
While the travel ban saga continued in the courts, the provisions directed at the
US Refugee Admissions Program in Section 6140 violate America's commitments
under international refugee law, which is incorporated in US domestic law. It also
runs afoul of the US commitment under the New York Declaration on Refugees and
Migrants. 141
Experts and advocacy groups took issue with the President's premise that
refugees from the listed countries were especially likely to commit terrorist attacks
within the United States because those groups had been responsible for previous
attacks; this was factually inconsistent with the actual record of such attacks. To
illustrate, terrorism scholar Charles Kurzman of the University of North Carolina
has stated that there had been no terrorist killing in the US by any person who had
emigrated or whose parents had emigrated from the seven listed countries since
September 11, 2001, and that only two of the 9/11 attackers would have been
identified to fall within the restricted countries because of their national origin, and
they had resided in the US for several years.1 42
Another expert asked:
Had this temporary prohibition been in effect since 9/11, how many lives
would have been saved? Not one. None of the fatalities resulted from
attacks by individuals from the seven countries named in the directive.
The directive also would not have prevented the 9/11 attacks. This is not
an argument for adding to the list of proscribed countries.1 43
The same conclusion was stated by the Department of Homeland Security
Intelligence and Analysis Unit in an internal report which found that people from
the countries listed in the ban "pose no increased terror risk,"'" and that "country of
137. Id. at 16.
138. Id.
139. Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-00050 (D. Haw. Mar. 30, 2017) (Notice of Appeal).
140. Exec. Order 13780 § 6, supra note 134.
141. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4.
142. CHARLES KURZMAN, MUSLIM-AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISM 2,
Triangle Ctr. on Terrorism and Homeland Sec., Uni. of N.C. Chapel Hill. (Jan. 26, 2017).
143. Brian Michael Jenkins, Why a Travel Restriction Won't Stop Terrorism at Home, TiHE RAND
BLOG (Feb. 10, 2017), www.rand.org/blog/2017/02/why-a-travel-restriction-wont-stop-terrorism-at-
home.html.
144. Vivian Salama & Alicia A. Caldwell, AP Exclusive: DHS report disputes threat from banned
nations, THE BIG STORY: ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 24, 2017, 6:36 PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/39fl f8e4ceed4a30a4570f69329 I c866/dhs-intel-report-disputes-threat-
posed-travel-ban-nations.
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citizenship is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of potential terrorist activity." 45
Under Executive Order 13780, the most recent US commitment to admit
110,000 refugees in 2017 has been reduced to 50,000, with a stay of 120 days on
further processing and imposition of numerous further restrictions on their
eligibility, beyond the very stringent vetting process already in place for refugee
admissions. 146
V. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW
As human rights apply to all persons, irrespective of their migration status or
their nationality, migrants and members of their families, as well as refugees, enjoy
the protection of international human rights law. Migrants also enjoy international
labor standards and, more specifically, protection under the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
their Families (Migrant Workers Convention), adopted by the UN General Assembly
in 1990. In addition, several International Labor Organization (ILO) instruments
apply to migrants in general, while several apply specifically to migrant workers.
Refugees are specially protected under the current international refugee regime - the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.
Selected applicable instruments are noted here, without elaboration, with the
only exceptions being the Refugee Regime, the 1990 Migrant Workers Convention,
and two ILO Conventions.
A. Selected International Human Rights Instruments
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966.147
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 10, 2008. 148
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966.149
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966.1s0
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
145. Ron Nixon, People From 7 Travel-Ban Nations Pose No Increased Terror Risk, Report
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/us/politics/travel-ban-nations-
terror-risk.html?_r=); see also Eric Tucker, AP Fact Check: No arrests from 7 nations in travel ban?,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 6, 2017), https://apnews.com/cf244d096e084e7a943b45168deafc5f/AP-
FACT-CHECK:-No-arrests-from-7-nations-in-travel-ban?-Nope.
146. EO-2, section 6, supra note 126.
147. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3.
148. G.A. Res. 63/117, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, (Dec. 10, 2008).
149. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
150. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Dec. 15, 1989.'1'
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965.152
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979.1'5
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Oct. 6, 1999.154
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 1, 1984. "s
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 18, 2002.156
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989.s1
Optional Protocol to the Convention on The Rights of the Child on the Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 2000.'1
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000.' 5
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children on a Communications Procedure, Dec. 19, 2011.160
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006. 161
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
Dec. 13, 2006.162
151. G. A. Res. 44/128, at 206, Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty (Dec. 15, 1989).
152. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 12,
1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 212.
153. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
154. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 6 Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83.
155. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 85 U.N.T.S. 1465, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a94.html.
156. Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Jan. 9,2003, A/RES/57/199, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de6490b9.html.
157. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989,3 U.N.T.S. 1577,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html.
158. G.A. Res. 54/263, annex 11, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (Mar. 16, 2001),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38bc.html.
159. G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex 1, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Mar. 16, 2001).
160. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/18, Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure (July 14, 2011).
161. G.A. Res. 61/106, Annex I, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Dec. 13,
2006).
162. G.A. Res. 61/106, Annex II, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (Dec. 13, 2006).
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International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, Dec. 20, 2006.63
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1 9 4 8 ."
Declaration of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and
Development, 2013.165
B. International Labor Organization Instruments
The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 6 6
1) Freedom of Association and the Effective Recognition of the Right to
Collective Bargaining;1 6 7
2) Elimination of All Forms of Forced or Compulsory Labor;' 6 8
3) Effective Abolition of Child Labor;' 6 9 and
4) Elimination of Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.1 70
It should be noted that migrant workers' needs are specially mentioned in the
Declaration's Preamble.
ILO Convention Number 189 - Domestic Workers' Convention, 201 1.171
ILO Convention Number 97 - Migration for Employment Convention
163. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Dec.
20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 48088.
164. G.A. Res. 217 (111) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) 217 A (III).
165. G.A. Res. 68/4, In 11-12, UN General Assembly, Declaration of the High-level Dialogue on
International Migration and Development (Jan. 21, 2014) (The Declaration recognized "[t]hat women
and girls account for almost half of all international migrants at the global level, and the need to address
the special situation and vulnerability of migrant women and girls by, inter alia, incorporating a gender
perspective into policies and strengthening national laws, institutions and programmes to combat gender-
based violence, including trafficking in persons and discrimination against girls." The General Assembly
emphasized "the need to establish appropriate measures for the protection of women migrant workers in
all sectors, including those involved in domestic work.").
166. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO (June 18, 1998),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ednorm/--declaration/documents/publication/wcms_
467653.pdf.
167. Freedom ofAssociation and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, No. 87, ILO (July
9, 1948),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:Pl2100_ILOCODE:CO
87.
168. Forced Labour Convention, No. 29, ILO (June 28, 1930),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp
=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:Pl2100_INSTRUMENTID:312174:NO.
169. ILO, Freedom ofAssociation and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, supra note
167, 1 2(a).
170. Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, No. I11,
ILO (June 4, 1958),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/p-NORMLEXPUB: 121 00:0::NO: 121 00:Pl2100_ILOCODE:Cl
11.
171. Domestic Workers Convention, No. 189, ILO (June 16, 2011),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp-NORMLEXPUB: 12 100:0::NO: 121 00:P 12100_LOCODE:C 1
89.
VOL. 45:3324
2017 MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
(revised), 1949.172
ILO Recommendation Number 86 - Migration for Employment
Recommendation (revised), 1949.173
ILO Convention Number 143 - Migrant Workers' (Supplementary Provisions)
Convention, 1975.174
ILO Recommendation Number 151 - Migrant Workers' Recommendation,
1975.171
C. Migrant Workers Convention176
As a core landmark international human rights treaty, this is the most
comprehensive international treaty on 1) the rights of migrant workers and their
families, 2) migration regulation, and 3) interstate cooperation. The Convention
explicitly states that all fundamental rights articulated in the international bill of
rights and all international human rights instruments apply to all migrant workers.
The Convention's provisions to protect undocumented migrant workers in an
irregular situation are premised on the recognition in the Preamble that such workers
face even more serious human problems than those faced by persons in a regular
situation (documented migrant workers). Also, these migrant workers "are
frequently employed under less favorable conditions of work than other workers." 77
Thus, in Part III (arts. 8-35), all migrant workers and their families, including
undocumented workers, are granted civil and political rights, 78 as well as economic,
social and cultural rights. 7 1
D. ILO Convention No. 97 & Recommendation No. 86 and ILO Convention
143
In 1966, the ILO adopted Convention No. 97 and Recommendation No. 86
concerning Migration for Employment (Revised). 8 0 Under these instruments, the
172. Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), No. 97, 1LO (June 8, 1949),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/nonnlex/en/fp=NORMLEXPUB: 121 00:0::NO: 12 100:Pl 2100_ILOCODE:CO
97.
173. Migration for Employment Recommendation (Revised), No. 86, ILO (June 8, 1949),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:Pl2100_ILOCODE:RO
86.
174. Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, No. 143, ILO (June 4, 1975),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:Pl2100_ILO_CODE:Cl
43.
175. Migrant Workers Recommendation, No. 151, ILO (June 4, 1975),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fp=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_ILOCODE:Rl
51.
176. G.A. Res. 45/158, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families (Dec. 18, 1990); see also Ved P. Nanda, The Protection of the
Rights of Migrant Workers: Unfinished Business, 2 ASIAN & PACIFIC MIGRATION J. 161, 161 (1993).
177. G.A. Res. 45/158, supra note 177, at Annex, Preamble.
178. Id. at pt. III, arts. 8-24.
179. Id. at arts. 25-35.
180. Convention (No. 97) Concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949) art. 6, ¶ 1, July 1,
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principle of equal treatment was further elaborated. Subsequently, in 1975, the ILO
adopted Convention No. 143, concerning Migration in Abusive Conditions and the
Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers
(Supplementary Provisions)."' In Part I, this Convention obligates each State Party
to respect the "basic human rights of all migrant workers,"'82 including those who
are not legal migrants, and to adopt all measures that are "necessary and appropriate"
to suppress the clandestine movement of workers and illegal employment of
migrants. States are required to provide sanctions against employers of illegal
immigrants, with the aim to prosecute those trafficking in labor.'
Part II of Convention No. 143 applies only to legal migrants and States Parties
are obligated to declare and pursue national policies to promote equality of treatment
between migrant workers and nationals pertaining to employment and occupation,
social security, cultural rights and trade union rights, and individual and collective
freedoms.18 4
E. The International Refugee Regime
Under the 1951 Convention' 8 5 and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,' 8 6 a person officially referred to as
a "refugee" is one who has lost the protection of the government of his/her
nationality or permanent residence and has fled that state seeking refuge and
assistance in another country. The refugee must have fled the state due to
persecution or a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of "race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Under
the system, individual claims are addressed for protection and the system is not
responsive to situations of mass influx. Those who have fled or attempted to flee
but who have not been allowed to leave or have not been able to leave the country
are generally referred to as "internally displaced persons." In light of the current
refugee crisis, this definition of a refugee is rather inadequate to meet the needs of
those fleeing war, famine, economic deprivation and natural disasters.
To fill the gap in the 1951 Convention's narrow definition of a refugee, regional
efforts took place in Africa and Latin America to widen the definition. In 1969, the
Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) adopted the Convention on
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.8 I It expanded the definition in
1949, 120 U.N.T.S. 71; International Labour Organization, supra note 174, at annex, art. 17.
181. ILO, Migrant Workers Recommendation, supra note 175.
182. Id at pt. 1, art. 1.
183. Id at pt. 1, art. 3.
184. Id at pt. 2, arts. 10-14.
185. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954).
186. U.N. General Assembly, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 267, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html.
187. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art. 1(2), 1000
U.N.T.S. 45, 8 I.L.M. 1288, Sept. 10, 1969 (entered into force June 20, 1974),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36018.html.
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the Convention by accepting as refugees those who are compelled to flee because of
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing
public order. Subsequently, in 1984, ten Central American states adopted a similar
approach in the non-binding Cartagena Declaration,"' expanding the definition
further by adding flight from generalized violence, internal conflicts, and massive
violation of human rights.
VI. ANALYSIS
Despite several international and regional attempts to address the complex
challenges of migrants and refugees, the problem persists. And since 2014 it has
indeed worsened with rising xenophobia and anti-immigration violence in several
countries. The UN General Assembly declaration addressing the problem, the New
York Declaration, discussed above, brought the world's leaders together to explore
common ground aimed at protecting the rights of migrants and refugees. The
outcome, however, was mixed. While UNHCR officials considered the Declaration
a "game changer for refugee protection and for migrants" 8 9 and "nothing short of a
miracle,"'" the fact remains that it was not legally binding and lacked tangible
outcomes.
As the first General Assembly declaration specifically on refugees and
migrants, it acknowledged the high level of human mobility and its magnitude and
complexity. This evidently shows that the world cares about refugees and migrants.
This expression, in itself, is laudable, as are the principles and commitments agreed
by world leaders and enshrined in it. These include: "We . . . will fully protect the
human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status;"' 9' and "We declare
our profound solidarity and support" for migrants and their families.1 92 The leaders
expressed their determination "to find long-term and sustainable solutions," 93 and
"to address the root causes of large movements of refugees and migrants, including
through increased efforts aimed at early prevention of crisis situations based on
preventive diplomacy." 94 The Declaration also contains specific provisions for the
protection of migrant women and children and for supporting countries affected by
migration.
However, this lofty rhetoric and these lofty principles notwithstanding, the
Declaration did not adequately and effectively address the enormous challenges the
188. 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, OAS / Ser. LIJV/1I.66, doe. 10, Rev. 1, 190-3
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/51c801934.pdf.
189. UiN Summit seen as "game changer" for refugee and migrant protection, UNHCR (Sept. 6,
2016), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/9/57ceb07e4/un-summit-game-changer-refugee-
migrant-protection.html.
190. Volker Tirk, The New York Declaration: Once-in-a-lfetime opportunity to enhance refugee
protection, UNHCR (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.unher.org/admin/dipstatements/57fe577b4/new-york-
declaration-once-lifetime-opportunity-enhance-refugee-protection.html.
191. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4, at 5.
192. Id. at 8.
193. Id. at 10.
194. Id. at 12.
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world community faces with the current migration crisis. As the Declaration is a
voluntary and non-binding document, the commitments are not measurable, there is
no obligation to implement the commitments and there is no concrete plan of action.
But for the goal two years hence to develop a global compact on refugees,1'9 there
is and a global compact for "safe, orderly and regular migration" 96 there is no
timeline for action in the Declaration. Alexander Betts, the head of Oxford's
Refugee Studies Center, called the Declaration "thin on content and connections to
practice."' 9 7
The Declaration also suffers from several gaps, such as excluding from its
agenda the challenge of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) - it simply mentions in
passing that there are more than 40 million IDPs 98 and notes that the needs of such
persons along with those of refugees and migrants are explicitly recognized in the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 9 9 The Declaration also fails to include
the protection of vulnerable migrants and does not explicitly prohibit the detention
of children.
The Declaration fails to provide guidelines on protection for migrants in
vulnerable situations, offering instead just assistance, as it states:
We will consider developing non-binding guiding principles and voluntary
guidelines, consistent with international law, on the treatment of migrants in
vulnerable situations, especially unaccompanied and separated children who do not
qualify for international protection as refugees and who may need assistance.200
It is appropriate to ask why migrants who flee humanitarian crises, severe
violence, famine, gangs, would not receive protection, but only assistance. The
Member States should be considering developing principles and guidelines for their
actual protection and not merely assistance.
The Declaration also stops short of committing to end the immigration
detention of children. Although Member States said in the Declaration that they
would pursue alternatives to detention while the assessment of the migrants' legal
status, entry, and stay is being considered, the leaders added:
Furthermore, recognizing that detention for the purpose of determining
migration status is seldom, if ever, in the best interest of the child, we will use it only
as a measure of last resort, in the least restrictive setting, for the shortest possible
period of time, under conditions that respect their human rights and in a manner that
takes into account, as a primary consideration, the best interest of the child, and we
195. Id. at 21.
196. Id at annex 11(1).
197. Alexander Betts, UN. Refugee Summit: Abstract Discussions in the Face of a Deadly Crisis:
In the first of a two-part prelude to the U.N. summit, Alexander Betts, the head of Oxford's Refugee
Studies Centre, plots the flawed origins of a meeting some states celebrate having sabotaged, NEWS
DEEPLY (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2016/09/12/u-n-refugee-
summit-abstract-discussions-in-the-face-of-a-deadly-crisis.
198. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4, at 3.
199. Id. at 16.
200. Id. at 52.
328 VOL. 45:3
2017 MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
will work towards the ending of this practice. 201
Notwithstanding all these qualifications, it bears repeating: detention is never
in the best interest of the child. As the Council on Community Pediatrics has stated,
The conditions in which children are detained [in the United States] and
the support services that are available to them are of great concern to
pediatricians and other advocates for children. In accordance with
internationally accepted rights of the child, immigrant and refugee
children should be treated with dignity and respect and should not be
exposed to conditions that may harm or traumatize them. The
Department of Homeland Security [DHS] facilities do not meet the basic
standards for the care of children in residential settings.202
The Council recommends: "DHS should discontinue the general use of family
detention and instead use community-based alternatives to detention for children
held in family units."203 Earlier, in June 2014, a Human Rights Watch researcher had
spoken at a hearing of the US House of Representatives Committee on Homeland
Security: "The US government's policy of detaining large numbers of children
harms kids and flouts international standards."2 4  She added, "Congress should be
exploring alternatives to detention that other countries facing spikes in border
crossings have used successfully." 205
In the New York Declaration, Member States did commit to promoting
international cooperation on border control and management but noted that "[s]tates
are entitled to take measures to prevent irregular border crossings."2 03 6 This raises
the concern that states may feel empowered to resort to taking especially harsh
border control measures aimed at deterring migrants and refugees from entering.
That is exactly what has happened in many European countries which, when
Faced with an unprecedented flow of migrants into the continent, built fences and
used many deterrence measures and strict border controls to keep migrants from
entering. As for the European Union initiatives, it undertook the MPF initiative
mentioned above 207 and further reformed the Common European Asylum System. 208
The MPF and the Malta Declaration reflect Europe's desire to control and secure its
borders, but this will likely be achieved at the cost of violating its obligations under
201. Id. at 33.
202. Julie M. Linton, et al., Detention of Immigrant Children, 139 PEDIATRICS 4, 1 (2017),
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/early/2017/03/09/peds.2017-0483.full.pdf.
203. Id. at 8.
204. Clara Long, US: Surge in Detention of Child Migrants: Congress Should Protect, Not Punish,
Unaccompanied Children, HRW (June 25, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/25/us-surge-
detention-child-migrants.
205. Id. See also Frangois Cr6peau, Any detention of migrant children is a violation of their rights
and must end, THE CONVERSATION (co-published with UNICEF) (Sept. 7, 2016),
http://theconversation.com/any-detention-of-migrant-children-is-a-violation-of-their-rights-and-must-
end-64985.
206. N.Y. Declaration, supra note 4, at 24.
207. Migration Partnership Framework, supra text accompanying note 71.
208. See European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs, Common European Asylum System,
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum en (last updated Apr. 22, 2017).
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international law toward migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, primarily the
obligation to protect their human rights.
Although the EU is providing development aid to partner countries, many
partner countries lack the wherewithal to fulfill their own obligations under the MPF,
because of weak government institutions and frail political situations; Libya is a
clear example. Thus, Europe will have to make substantial investments toward
capacity building and improving the living conditions in its partner countries to
ensure a significant reduction in migrant flows.2 09 As to the reform of the Common
European Asylum System, it has been aptly criticized as aimed at externalizing
protection and reinforcing the EU's policy of containing refugees outside the EU
through migration control and by sending asylum seekers to third states without
examining their protection claims.2 10
The Dublin mechanism has been often reformed but remains broken, as only
member states located at the external borders of the EU assume responsibility for
migrants entering Europe. Also, it does not take into account the asylum seekers'
preference. A November 2016 report by Human Rights Watch, entitled EUPolicies
Put Refugees at Risk,2 11 states that the European Commission's reform of the
Common European Asylum System is more informed by a logic of deterrence than
a commitment to basic human rights. Far from insuring the right to family
reunification, over the past year numerous EU countries have restricted the right to
bring family members to safety, and there is a discernible trend towards granting
subsidiary - temporary - protection over refugee status. Proposed changes to the
EU directives governing procedures, qualifications for asylum, and reception
conditions include some positive measures but also measures to punish asylum
seekers for moving from one EU country to another, obligatory use of "safe country"
and "internal flight alternative" concepts to deny protection, and compulsory
reviews to enable revoking refugee status and subsidiary protection.2 12
The urgent need is to protect the fundamental human rights of migrants and
refugees during transit and within the receiving state's territory, without
discrimination. We find the current protection gap is created as a result of 1) crises
in the home country of migrants and refugees and 2) stringent border controls by
receiving states. An urgent reform on collective responsibility-sharing is essential
because currently there is no equitable distribution of responsibility; the global south
209. For critical comments, see Olivia Akumu, The EU's Ethical Dilemma: The scramble to stem
the refugee and migrant flow into Europe, MARTIN PLAUT WORDPRESs (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2017/02/27/the-eus-ethical-dilemma-the-scramble-to-stem-the-
refugee-and-migrant-flow/; Elizabeth Collett, New EU Partnerships in North Africa: Potential to
Backfire, MIGRATION POLICY (Feb. 2, 2017), www.migrationpolicy.org/news/new-eu-partnerships-
North-Africa-Potential-Backfire; Bob Van Dillen, The EU Agenda Behind the Migration Partnership
Framework, CARITAS (June 29, 2016), http://www.caritas.eu/news/the-eu-agenda-behind-the-migration-
partnership-framework.
210. Vincent Chetail, Looking Beyond the Rhetoric of the Refugee Crisis: The Failed Reform of the
Common European Asylum System, 5 EUR. J. HuM. RTS. 584, 587-88 (2016).
211. Human Rights Watch, EU Policies Put Refugees at Risk, HRW (Nov. 23, 2016),
www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/23/eu-policies-put-refugees-risk.
212. Id.
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carries a disproportionately large share. Similarly, an urgent need is to expand the
number of legal pathways for refugee admission and settlement in third countries
with access to jobs, as well as a prohibition on the detention of children and access
for children to education and preservation of family unity. Only then will the
smuggling of people stop.
Furthermore, humanitarian efforts and development must be linked. The
private sector, the World Bank, and the current initiative regarding the Sustainable
Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda,21 3 will be essential so that refugees can
become contributing members of society.
VII. CONCLUSION
The challenge indeed is formidable. A series of efforts has been ongoing for
over a decade to find a solution. But the goal of comprehensive and effective global
governance for migration through international cooperation has yet to be
achieved. 214 In this state-centered international system, states are empowered to
decide who enters their territory and on what terms. Given that reality, what is
ultimately required is implementation of international human rights and labor
standards that protect migrants and refugees' human rights, which states have
already voluntarily accepted. However, what is in evidence is the states' efforts to
manage migration to serve their interests. This they do by connecting policies such
as those of deterrence, strict border controls, and meeting their labor needs. The two
global compacts - one each on refugees and migrants - must aim for a human rights-
based framework to inform the various provisions for inclusion in those compacts,
such as shared responsibility, finance, resettlement, and other matters related to
refugees' and migrants' protection.
We do not lack norms. But what is severely lacking is the political will to
translate these norms into concrete, operational outcomes.
213. While adopting the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, the World Leaders at the UN Summit stated: "We also recognize that international
migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin,
transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses. ... Such cooperation
should also strengthen the resilience of communities hosting refugees, particularly in developing
countries." G.A. Res. 70/L. 1, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
at 29 (Sept. 25, 2015). Goal 8.8 states: "Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working
environmental for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in
precarious employment." Id. at 8.8. Goal 10.c states: "By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the
transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5
percent." Id. at 10.c.
214. See generally Inter-Parliamentary Union, Migration, Human Rights and Governance:
Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 24 (2015),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MigrationHRandGovernanceHRPUB1 5_3_EN.pd
f; see also Francois Crdpeau & Idil Atak, Global Migration Governance: Avoiding Commitments on
Human Rights Yet Tracing a Course for Cooperation, 34/2 NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTS. 113, 113-146 (2016).
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CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
*M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI
I. ROOTS AND BASES OF INTERNATIONAL CODIFICATION
The history of the human civilization appears to have started more than six
million years ago while homo sapiens, from which we humans descended, first
evolved in East Africa about 2.5 million years ago.' Throughout this process of
evolution and development, homo sapiens and other early human species left traces
of their existence and development in many locations around the world.2
Archeologists undoubtedly found scattered evidence, mostly in epigraphy in caves,
disclosing the existence of rules of conduct that would later on be called laws and
methods of addressing those who violate them. In time, we have come to refer to
these laws and methods as a legal system.' Surprisingly, throughout this long
historical course, legal history did not record significant progress in legal
codification.
The first such accomplishment is the Code of Hammurabi in 1772 BCE,4
followed by what is referred to as the Ten Commandments brought down by
Moses from Mr. Sinai and later recorded in the Tanakh and the Old Testament.'
* Emeritus Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; Honorary President, Siracusa Institute
formerly the International Institute for Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences; Honorary President,
L'Association Internationale de Droit Pinal.
1. In the course of the subsequent two million years at least six human species inhabited the
earth, including the Neanderthals that evolved in Europe and the Middle East some 500,000 years ago
and the mega fauna in the Americas. Then about 45,000 years ago the homo sapiens migrated to and
settled in Australia and some 30,000 years ago the homo sapiens migrated to Europe and caused the
extinction of Neanderthals. The homo sapiens also caused the extinction of the mega fauna after
migrating to the Americans approximately 16,000 years ago. See RICHARD LEAKEY, THE ORIGIN OF
HUMANKIND (1996). See also Richard G. Klein, Darwin and the Recent African Origin of Modern
Humans, 106 NAT'L A. SCIENCES U.S. 16007, 16007 (2009).
2. Erin Wayman, How to Retrace Early Human Migrations, SMITHSONIAN, Sep. 26 2012.
3. Tommaso Beggio, Epigraphy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW AND SOCIETY 43
(Paul J de. du Plessis, Clifford Ando & Kaius Tuori eds., Laurence Hooper trans., 2016). See H.
PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 134-143 (5th ed. 2014).
4. See GLENN, supra note 3, at 97 n.2. See also Kathryn E. Slanski, The Law ofHammurabi and
its Audience, 24 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 97, 97-98 (2012). See also Martha T. Roth, Mesopotamian
Legal Traditions and the Laws ofHammurabi, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 13, 13-15 (1995-1996).
5. There is no historic record of the actual occurrence/existence of the Ten Commandments and
their passage, therefore by archeologists' standards this would fall under the category of legend, since it
cannot be proven. Steven K. Green, The Fount of Everything Just and Right? The Ten Commandments
as a Source ofAmerican Law, 14 J. L. & REL. 525 (2000). This is also true of the Old Testament. See
GLENN, supra note 3, at 99-130. See also ZEEV W. FALK, HEBREW LAW IN BIBLICAL TIMES (1964);
333
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
These and other historical sources and narratives indicate an emerging
commonality of human and social values.6 Certainly as time has passed and
globalization has become a binding social and socio-psychological factor to the
ever-evolving human society, increased commonality of shared human and social
values, have emerged in different aspects of domestic law and gradually in what
we have also called international law.' This process is evident in the history and
evolution of the jus in bello and subsequently in the jus ad bellum.' Both of these
subjects have in time become part of international criminal law as the jus ad
bellum became known as the prohibition of aggression and the jus in bello as the
law of armed conflict reflected in war crimes.9
Even though many legal systems have followed some type of codification
approach, mostly as derived from Roman law,'o international criminal law has
NAHUM RAKOVER, A GUIDE TO THE SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW (1994).
6. See A MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMS CONTROL
AGREEMENTS 5-15 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2000) [hereinafter Bassiouni, MANUAL]; see also
CHARLES FREEMAN, EGYPT, GREECE, AND ROME: CIVILIZATIONS OF THE ANCIENT MEDITERRANEAN
(3d ed. 2014); PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW
(4th ed. 2010). See generally ANDREW CLAPHAM & PAOLA GAETA, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT (2014). See generally ARNOLD TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF
HISTORY (12 vols., 1961); WILL DURANT & ARIEL DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION (11 vols.,
1993). See also HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON, PHILO: FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY IN
JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM (2 vols. 1947); ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terence
Irwin trans., 2d ed. 2000).
7. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 F. J.
INT'L L. 269, 269 (2010). See also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2014). [hereinafter INTRO TO ICL].
8. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1485). See generally KEIICHIRO OKIMOTO,
THE DISTINCTION AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUS AD BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO (2011). See also
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW: JUS AD BELLUM, JUS IN
BELLO AND JUS POST BELLUM (Nigel D. White & Christian Henderson eds., 2015).
9. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (1977); LARRY MAY, WAR CRIMES AND JUST WAR (2007). See M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUS OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM VERSAILLES TO
KAMPALA AND WHAT THE FUTURE MIGHT HOLD (forthcoming 2017).
10. Legal history shows that by about the 18th century there were a number of what we today
call, families of legal systems. See generally RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL
SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (2d ed.
1978). They included the family that descended from Roman law, which was essentially a codified
system and which had developed a technique with respect to codification. Certainly for its time, the
science or technique of legislation developed by Roman law codification was an extraordinary
progressive and enlightened system, if for nothing else than that the system, in about 1000 BCE,
divided legal subjects into categories such as civil law and criminal law and within them other
subdivision applied to different normative aspects regulating individual and social conduct. See M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 269, 275 (2010).
The Roman law science or technique of legislation was adopted in different ways in Italy, France and
Germany with the latter developing more cultural characteristics than the Italian, which remained the
closest to its historical Roman antecedent and then by the French codification under Napoleon starting
with the Napoleonic Code or civil code of 1805. See generally Pierre Crabites, Napoleon and the
French Code of Civil Procedure, 10 LOY. L.J. 3, 3 (1929). The modem codifications in Italy are also
from that period but German codifications particularly of criminal law started in the 1500s with modem
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emerged in a very haphazard and ad hoc manner. With the exception of piracy,
which emerged from customary international law," all other international crimes
have been established by international conventions. A survey made by this writer
reveals that 281 conventions have been passed between 1815 and 200512 that
address a number of categories of international crimes which this author has also
identified and ranked as follows:' 3
(1) Aggression;
(2) Genocide;
(3) Crimes against humanity;
(4) War crimes;
(5) Apartheid;
(6) Enforced disappearance and extra-judicial execution;
(7) Slavery, slave-related practices and the trafficking of human beings;
versions, particularly procedural codes in Austria and Germany around 1875.
The common law remained very resistant even though David Dudley Fields was among those who
urged codification in the 1800s. In English, particularly the presentation of the common law techniques,
notwithstanding their disparities and for all practical purposes their ad hoc evolutionary nature, was
more part of the English culture. These characteristics migrated to the United States with the Pilgrims as
of the 1600s and subsequently to Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and then as of the 1800s to those
colonies that Great Britain had established on different continents.
By the 1700s, philosophical conceptions of systems of governments and the importance of the law
started to emerge in Europe, particularly in the writings of Montesquieu and others. In his seminal work
De I'esprit des lois, Montesquieu added what would today be considered as a substantive dimension to
the rule of law. CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPRIT DES Lots (1748). European
codifications, particularly in the field of criminal law followed that approach and notwithstanding
historical and cultural differences European countries, with the exception of England and its common
law particularities, consolidated the historical evolution of the codification of the laws based on subject
matter, which was quite obviously logical. The criminal law codifications there was also an obvious and
commonsense approach to the division of these codes into the different social interests sought to be
protected and so every code started with the most serious crimes such as those involving life and then
the physical integrity of the person, to be distinguished from another part which dealt with the
protection of the perpetrator and economic interests. This idea of the right to life, liberty and security of
the person was first articulated in positive law in the English Magna Carta of 1215. It was later found in
Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution in 1791.
In time, between the 18th and 20th centuries, these questions were seldom addressed except in some
legal systems such as Germany where a tradition of legal dogmatics accepted and influenced not only
the content but the science and technique of codification of the criminal law. With all of that said, one
would have expected that this cumulative world-wide experience would have benefited ICL. But that
was not the case, and there are various explanations for it. All of that does not explain why ICL did not
develop a legal system of its own.
11. The earliest known international crime is that of piracy, which emerged out of Roman law
and then the naval practices of seafaring nations as of the late 1600s and more particularly in the 1700
and 1800s but that was essentially viewed as it is now, as a matter regarding states. ALFRED P. RuBIN,
THE LAW OF PIRAcY 4-12 (1998). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for
International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practices, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 108-
10(2001).
12. INTRO TO ICL, supra note 7, at 221 (2014).
13. Id. at 148-49.
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(8) Torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;
(9) Unlawful human experimentation;
(10) Unlawful manufacturing, identification, possession, use, emplacement,
stockpiling and trade of weapons, including nuclear weapons;
(11) Nuclear terrorism;
(12) Mercenarism;
(13) Aircraft hijacking and unlawful acts against international air safety;
(14) Piracy and unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation and
the safety of platforms on the high seas and continental shelf;
(15) Taking of civilian hostages;
(16) Threat and use of force against internationally protected persons and
United Nations Personnel;
(17) Use of explosives;
(18) Cybercrime;
(19) Financing of terrorism;
(20) Unlawful traffic in drugs and related drug offenses;
(21) Organized crime and related specific crimes;
(22) Illicit trade or trafficking in goods;
(23) Destruction and/or theft of national treasures;
(24) Unlawful acts against certain internationally protected elements of the
environment;
(25) Unlawful use of the mail;
(26) Unlawful interference with submarine cables;
(27) Falsification and counterfeiting; and,
(28) Corruption and bribery of foreign public officials.
These crimes and their respective rankings are based on the existence of ten
penal characteristics in any given international convention. 14 These characteristics
are predicated on the social interests sought to be protected and the social harm
sought to be prevented. Curiously, all ten of these characteristics are not contained
in all 281 conventions, and there is no explanation for this selective diversity in the
inclusion of these penal characteristics. There has never been any explanation for
the disparity of inclusion of these ten penal characteristics in conventions that
proscribe certain forms of what the international community recognizes as
constituting international crimes. The disparity in inclusion of the ten penal
14. The ten penal characteristics are: (1) Explicit or implicit recognition of proscribed conduct as
constituting an international crime, or a crime under international law, or a crime; (2) Implicit
recognition of the penal nature of the act by establishing a duty to prohibit, prevent, prosecute, punish,
or the like; (3) Criminalization of the proscribed conduct; (4) Duty or right to prosecute; (5) Duty or
right to punish the proscribed conduct; (6) Duty or right to extradite; (7) Duty or right to cooperate in
prosecution, punishment (including judicial assistance); (8) Establishment of a criminal jurisdictional
basis; (9) Reference to the establishment of an international criminal court or international tribunal with
penal characteristics; (10) No defense of superior orders.
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characteristics in all the 281 international criminal conventions is particularly
perplexing because it makes no sense, for example to have some but not others of
the ten penal characteristics in the nineteen conventions addressing different forms
and manifestations of terror-violence." But then, it is equally perplexing to have
the international community reject having a comprehensive anti-terrorism
convention 6 and instead have multiple overlapping conventions with different
parties. That this haphazard legislative approach has been followed for almost a
century, while almost every criminal law system in the world has followed a
certain technical and legislative policy on the compilation of different categories of
crimes, is difficult to explain other than the hidden intentionality of states to create
such a haphazard system for political purposes.' '
15. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented
Perspective, 43 HARV. INT'L L. J. 83, 83 (2002). See also ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER, TERROR
VIOLENCE: ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CONTROL (1982); ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER ET. AL., TERRORISM:
DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 1 (1979); ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER,
TERRORISM: A WORLD ON FIRE 4 (1978). See also RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND TERRORISM (Ben Saul ed., 2014).
16. Draft Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/59/894,
https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup08/basicmats/unterrorism.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2017). Mahmoud
Hmoud, Negotiating the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, 4 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 1031, 1031-32 (2006); Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 537, 537 (2004).
17. These purposes may include the lack of clarity in the norms of each of the conventions,
particularly those applicable to different subjects; the creation of options for governments to become
state parties to some and not to others and be able to avail themselves of the opportunity of claiming to
be part of international criminal law while in reality avoiding it. An example of the result of such an
approach involves the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (Montreal Hijacking Convention) on airplane hijacking, which provides in article 5 that
jurisdiction over crimes covered by the Convention is with the state that has physical custody of the
offender, while article 7 also gives jurisdiction to the state of nationality of the perpetrator through
article 8's extradition provision. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for
signature Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 21931, 206 (entered into force June 3, 1983). The Montreal
Hijacking Convention does not specify the priority of article 5 over article 7 or vice versa, nor does it
deny it. It therefore creates an ambiguity, which became obvious in the Lockerbie case.
On December 21, 1988, Pan Am 103 airplane exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. The United States
and United Kingdom issued indictments for two Libyan intelligence operatives alleged to have planted
explosives on the plane, killing 259 passengers and 11 people in Lockerbie. The two states sought the
extradition of the alleged perpetrators from Libya pursuant to the Montreal Hijacking Convention, but
Libya argued it had the priority right to prosecute based on the nationality of the two individuals. The
UK and US responded arguing that prosecution in Libya would be ineffective because Libyan
authorities were involved in the explosion. Libya filed the case with the International Court of Justice,
on the matter of whether the duty to prosecute or the duty to extradite was superior. Ultimately, the ICJ
never resolved the matter and instead, by agreement of Libya, the United Kingdom and the United
States, the case was held in a Dutch military facility, with Scottish judges applying Scottish criminal
law. Thus, the questions raised by the situation remained unanswered. Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya
v. U.S.) Order, 2003 I.C.J. (Sept. 10). See INTRO TO ICL, supra note 7, at 497-99. Notwithstanding the
case and lack of clarity/judgment, the Montreal Hijacking Convention still has not been amended.
Another related example is why we have 19 conventions on anti-terrorism, which are only distinguished
by the means utilized by the perpetrator. The result is that if there is an airplane hijacking there are four
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Realpolitik is the only explanation for why efforts at the codification of
international criminal law, which was undertaken shortly after WWII beginning in
1947, had failed so miserably by 1996.11 After half a century, the Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, containing thirteen articles in
1954'9 was reduced only to five crimes: aggression, genocide, crimes against
humanity, crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, and war crimes
in 1996.20 Even so, the draft containing these five crimes was never even put to a
General Assembly vote.21
It could be said that there has been some limited form of codification of
international criminal law in the statutes of international criminal courts
established since 1954. This includes the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court, 22 the statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2 3 and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda 2 4 established by the Security Council and the six mixed
model tribunals in Cambodia, 25 Sierra Leone,26 East Timor,27 Kosovo,28 Bosnia
conventions that are applicable but if a diplomat is kidnapped only one convention applies and yet
strangely enough, if a private individual is kidnapped, there is yet another convention that applies. 1963
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, opened for signature
Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 218 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1969); 1970 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105
(entered into force Oct. 14, 1971); 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Civil Aviation opened for signature Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 178 (entered into force Jan.
26, 1973); 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474 (entered into force
Aug. 6, 1989). Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S.
168 (entered into force Feb. 20, 1977). International Convention against the Taking of Hostages,
opened for signature Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 206 (entered into force June 3, 1983). The same is
true for the distinction between the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances which separates
psychotropic drugs from the natural drugs which are covered by the 1961 Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature
Feb. 21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Aug. 16, 1976). Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs of 1961, opened for signature Mar. 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered into force Dec. 13,
1964). Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 976 U.N.T.S. 3 (Mar. 23,
1972). It is impossible to rationalize all of what, from a legislative policy perspective, has to be
irrational unless it is intentional and if so it has to be for political reasons, namely to weaken
international criminal law and make its enforcement more difficult.
18. JACKSON NYAMUYA MAOGOTO, WAR CRIMES AND REALPOLITIK: INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2004).
19. Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 9) U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 Draft Code].
20. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 51 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
10) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Draft Code].
2 1. Id.
22. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
23. S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
24. S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
25. Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001) (Cambodia), as
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and Herzegovina, 29 and Lebanon.30 But it must be noted, that the two tribunals
established by the Security Council were ad hoc and that at best, one can consider
the defmition of crimes contained in their respective statutes as a reflection of
customary international law and not as a codification of international criminal law.
As to the statutes of the six mixed model tribunals, they are indeed ad hoc
institutions created by bilateral agreements between the United Nations and the
respective governments and they can hardly be said to reflect customary
international law, let alone be deemed an exercise in international criminal
codification. This only leaves the Rome Statute whose state-parties are, as of 2016,
124 states out of 193 member-states of the United Nations.'
Why there has never been a codification of international crimes, which could
be divided by subject matter or on any other science or technological basis that
would suit a codification undertaking is something that defies legal logic. But it
does fit very neatly into a realpolitik logic of preventing clarity as a way of
reducing enforcement capabilities in order to maximize the opportunities for states.
to advance their power and wealth interests. This is particularly evident in the new
categories of international crimes that deal with illicit trade (which includes
everything from trafficking in persons to trafficking Hermes ties, for no clear
reason).32 This brief historical background may explain why the codification
efforts of international criminal law have failed so far, as described in the section
below.
H. THE CODIFICATION PROCESSES
As described below, the central codification process was within the United'
Nations and officially proceeded from 1947 to 2010 when it came to its end at
Kampala." During that period of time, the United Nations split the process of
amended by NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004) (unofficial translation).
26. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
137, available at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/SCSIJSierraLeoneUNAgreement.pdf [hereinafter
SCSL].
27. S.C. Res. 1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
28. S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999).
29. The War Crimes Chamber was created in 2003 at the Peace Implementation Council Steering
Board Meeting and underwent extensive negotiations until its adoption on January 6, 2005. The Court is
subject to the 1977 Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia rather than the new
criminal and procedural codes of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court also applies the European Charter
on Human Rights, ratified by Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2002. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 230 (2011).
30. S.C. Res. 1757 (May 30, 2007).
31. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en-menus/asp/states%20parties (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
32. Illicit Trade, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/gov/risk/illicit-trade.htm (last visited Mar. 26,
2017).
33. Dr. jur. h. c. Hans-Peter Kaul, Address on the International Criminal Court: Perspectives after
the Kampala Review Conference (June 1, 2011). https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/22F9E25C-
B4EC-47FF-9Fl9-
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codification into different mandates given to different United Nations mechanisms
with the obvious purposes of delaying and hampering the process through
bureaucratic means, which ultimately succeeded in wearing out the international
community's interest in the subject. 34 The new use of the old Machiavellian"
technique became bureaucratic and that technique, as well as its attendant
allocation financial and personnel resources became the way of controlling
international criminal justice.36 It was the aftermath of WWII that led to the United
Nations' efforts to codify international criminal law, and parallel efforts by
individual scholars and certain specialized NGOs. 37
In 1946, the United Nations General Assembly established a committee on
international law and its codification 8 and mandated the new committee to "treat
as a matter of primary importance plans for the formulation, in the context of a
general codification of offences against the peace and security of mankind, or of an
International Criminal Code, of the principles recognized in the Charter of the
Niirnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal." 3 The following year,
1947, after examining the report of the new committee the General Assembly
decided to establish the International Law Commission (ILC)40 and requested that
it "formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal" and to prepare a Draft
Code of the Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 4
The newly established International Law Commission formed a
subcommittee, appointed special rapporteur Jean Spiropulous and began drafting a
draft code in 1949.42 This committee worked on the 1950 Draft Code and
CB I CI BB88DD2/283414/110601 lCCVicePresidentKaulStPetersburgMartensReadi.pdf.
34. SIRACUSA GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL FACT-FINDING
BODIES 65-67 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christina Abraham eds., 2013) [hereinafter Siracusa
Guidelines].
35. NICcoLh MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 1513 (N.H. Thompson trans., Dover Publications
1992).
36. Siracusa Guidelines, supra note 34.
37. The 1866 Outlines of an International Code by David Duddley Fields inspired the "Peace
Society," a group of United States jurists, to seek to develop an international code of crimes beginning
in 1872. While the desire to bring about peace through support for an international criminal law system
has certainly long existed throughout the world, it was not until the events of WWI that any tangible
realization was seen. Following the end of WWI, in 1924 international jurists reorganized the
Association Internationale De Driot Penal or International Association of Penal Law (AIDP), originally
founded in 1889 in Vienna, which played an invaluable historic role in the establishment of the
International Criminal Court and continues to do so with respect to strengthening the international
criminal justice. Pierre Bouzat, Introduction, in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL CODE AND STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL, XII (1987) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI,
DRAFT CODE & STATUTE].
38. G.A. Res. 94 (1) (Dec. 11, 1946).
39. Id.
40. G.A. Res. 174 (1II) (Nov. 21, 1947).
41. G.A. Res. 177 (Nov. 21, 1947).
42. Summary Records and Documents of the First Session including the report of the Commission
to the General Assembly, I Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/13 and Corr. 1-3.
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submitted its first report in 1950.43 The contents of the 1950 Draft Code remained
limited to the crimes referred to in its title, namely those that affect the peace and
security of mankind." The 1950 Draft Code and its successors limited criminal
responsibility to individuals, excluding criminal responsibility for organizations
and states. 45
Concurrently, the international community took steps towards formulating a
draft statute for establishment of a permanent international criminal court when the
General Assembly requested that the ILC "study the desirability and possibility of
establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with
genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ
by international conventions", and, "to pay attention to the possibility of
establishing a Criminal Chamber of the International Court of Justice."" The ILC
began by appointing another special rapporteur, Ricardo J. Alfaro, who also
submitted a first report to the International Law Commission in March of 1950.47
Alfaro's report correctly noted that both a code of international crimes and a
statute for an international court were needed to supplement one another, but this
drafting logic largely went unheeded during the following decades as the work on
a draft code and draft statute was assigned to different committees.4 In 1950,
another special rapporteur, Emil Sandstr6m, was appointed to further study the
development of an international criminal court,4 9 but the two rapporteurs differed
on whether the time was right for the establishment of such a court.s0 With the
exception of France, the major powers of the time did not support the
establishment of an international court, however the work continued as no state
wanted to be blamed for interfering with the establishment. 5 1 In that same year, a
43. Jean Spiropoulous (Special Rapporteur), Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/25 (1950).
44. COMMENTARIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S 1991 DRAFT CODE OF CRIMES
AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND 2 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1993) [hereinafter
BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES].
45. Id. at 3.
46. G.A. Res. 260 (Ill) (Dec. 9, 1948). This request was made along with the adoption of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
47. Report of the International Law Commission on Question of International Criminal
Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/15 (1950).
48. See Ricardo J. Alfaro (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Question of International Criminal
Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/15 and Corr.1 (1950).
49. Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR
5th Sess., U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/20 (1950).
50. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: Introduction, Analysis and Integrated Text 56-57 (2005) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE ICC]; I THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 18 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni & William Schabas eds. 2nd rev. ed., 2 vols. 2016) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI &
SCHABAS].
51. The desire to avoid being blamed for the failure of the ICL movement was particularly acute
given that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were established only a few years prior. States feared
that that by publically changing their stance of the establishment of international criminal tribunals they
would give more credence to the claims that the post-WWII tribunals were a form of victor's
vengeance. BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, at 6. See also Bert V.A. R61ing, The
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committee was established by the General Assembly for the purpose of drafting a
statute for the establishment of an international criminal court.5 2 The establishment
of such a committee, separate and apart from the committee convened to draft the
Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, was
essentially dilatory as there was no valid justification to spilt substance from
process, though admittedly the substantive codification included more crimes than
those that were to be subject to the eventual jurisdiction of an international
criminal court. The latter would presumably have jurisdiction over the gravest
international crimes as: aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes, as was ultimately the case with the International Criminal Court.53
In 1951, the committee for the Draft Statute, comprised of representatives of
seventeen states, finished its task and produced the 1951 Draft Statute, structurally
modeled in part after that of the International Court of Justice. 54 The Draft Statute
extended the court's jurisdiction only to heads of states, and not to other
government officials and did not reference state responsibility under international
criminal law.55  The exclusion of state criminal responsibility was the drafter's
response to concerns over the acceptance of the 1951 Draft Statute by major
powers. 56 But even despite the attempt to alleviate the concerns of the major
powers, politics indicated that the project had no chance of acceptance and was
politically premature.5 7 But western states did not want to assume political
responsibility for the demise of an international criminal court within 5 and 6 years
of the end of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) and International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) and so the Draft Statute committee's mandate
was extended.58 After some change in membership, the committee continued to
work on the statute,5 9 while another committee worked on the Draft Code of
Offenses.
In 1953, the committee for the Draft Statute produced a revised Draft Statute
text, the 1953 Draft Statute, which was submitted to the General Assembly. 60 The
revision was the result of political pressure by states and the committee's desire to
Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials in Retrospect, in I A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 590
(M. CherifBassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 2 vols. 1972); M. CherifBassiouni, Nuremberg Forty Years
Later, 18 CASE W. RES. INT'L L. 261, 261-62 (1986).
52. G.A. Res. 498 (V) (Dec. 12, 1950). See also Report of the Committee on International
Criminal Court Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. (No. 11,), U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952).
53. See Rome Statute, supra note 22.
54. 1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, opened for signature June 26, 1995, 33
U.N.T.S. 933 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). See BASSIOUNI, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ICC,
supra note 50, at 57; see BASSIOUNI & SCHABAS, supra note 50, at 64.
55. Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Draft Statute For An International
Criminal Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 36-38 (1952). BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, at 9.
56. BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, at 9.
57. See id at 59-60.
58. G.A. Res. 486 (V) (Dec. 12, 1950).
59. Id. INTRO TO ICL, supra note 7, at 580-81.
60. Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess.,
Supp. (No. 12,), at 21, U.N. Doc. A/26645 (1954).
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produce a draft that was more politically acceptable to major powers.6 ' Therefore,
the resulting 1953 Draft Statute limited the court's jurisdiction and allowed state
parties to retain more control. 62 Upon receiving the 1953 Draft Statute, the General
Assembly found it necessary to first consider the International Law Commission
committee's work on the Draft Code of Offenses, which was not yet completed.
The General Assembly thus tabled the consideration of the Draft Statute until the
Draft Code of Offenses was completed. 63
As to the work of the committee on the Draft Code of Offenses, in December
1952, the General Assembly removed defining "aggression" from the jurisdiction
of the committee for the Draft Code of Offenses and established a new special
committee tasked with defining "aggression,"' thus creating the third parallel
codification track. The special committee to define aggression, consisting of
government representatives rather than independent experts,6 5 was to "draft
definitions of aggression or draft statements of the notion of aggression" to be
submitted at the General Assembly's ninth session in 1954.66
The political strategy was to truncate the comprehensiveness of the
undertaking by having three separate bodies with different compositions and
different mandates, meeting separately in different venues and at different times,
all without any coordination. This eventually produced multiple texts that would
necessarily have gaps and overlaps making them unsusceptible to separate
adoption.
What follows is the extraordinary sequence of events that evidence how
successful the truncated approach was as of 1950 to date.
A year after the General Assembly tabled considerations of the 1953 Draft
Statute for an international criminal court because the Draft Code of Offenses was
not complete, the ILC's 1954 Draft Code of Offenses was completed and
submitted to the General Assembly." The 1954 Draft Code consisted of five
articles, listing thirteen separate international crimes." But it lacked a definition of
61. INTRO TO ICL, supra note 7, at 581 n.200.
62. Id. at 581-82.
63. G.A. Res. 898 (IX), U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 21 at 50, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954);
see BASSIOUNI, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ICC, supra note 50, at 58-9; see BASSIOUNI & SCHABAS,
supra note 50, at 65.
64. G.A. Res. 688 (VII) (Dec. 20, 1952). See also INT'L L. COMM'N, Summaries of the Work of
the Int'l L. Comm'n: Question of Defining Aggression (2015),
http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_5.shtml#a5 [hereinafter INT'L L. COMM'N].
65. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Challenges to International Criminal Justice and International Criminal
Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 385-6 (William Schabas ed.
2016).
66. G.A. Res. 688 (VII), at 2 (Dec. 20, 1952).
67. See Third Report Relating to a Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/85 (1954). See D.H.N. Johnson, The Draft Code
of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 4 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 445 (1955); see generally
BASSIOUNI, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ICC, supra note 50, at 58-60; see BASSIOUNI & SCHABAS,
supra note 50, at 65.
68. See 1954 Draft Code, supra note 19. See also BASSIOUNI, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ICC,
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aggression due to the General Assembly's decision to remove defining the crime
from the committee's purview. Therefore, the General Assembly tabled the 1954
Draft Code until aggression was defined. The domino effect worked: the 1953
Draft Statute for the Court was tabled because the Code of Offenses was not
completed, then when the committee on the Code completed its work, the 1954
Draft Code was tabled because aggression was not defined. And that left only the
definition of aggression as the last barrier against having to adopt a Code and
establishing a Court. And that process also followed an amazingly political,
torturous course.
As stated above, 1952, the General Assembly established a special committee
to define aggression, which did not complete its task until 1974.69 Between the
special committee's establishment in 1952 and 1974 when it completed its task,
there were four special committees that worked on the definition of aggression. 70
The first special committee, consisting of fifteen members, met from August 24th
to September 21st, 1953 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York while
the committees for the Draft Code met at Geneva to work on the text.7 ' A number
of texts aimed at defining aggression were produced.72 The special committee
unanimously decided not to put them to a vote but rather to submit them for
comments from the General Assembly and Member states - another delaying
tactic. 73 The second committee on aggression again met at UN Headquarters in
New York three years later in 1956.74 Why there was a three year hiatus is not too
difficult to explain - it was about delaying the outcome. But again the 1956
committee on aggression did not adopt a definition of that crime and yet in another
delaying tactic it submitted another report to the General Assembly summarizing
various matters, including draft definitions." In 1957, the General Assembly took
note of the special committee's report and again mandated a third special
committee to study the replies of Member States to the report "for the purpose of
determining when it shall be appropriate for the General Assembly to consider
again the question of defining aggression."7 ' The third special committee met only
four times over a period of eight years, namely in 1959, 1962, 1965 and 1967 each
time bouncing the question of aggression to the General Assembly who in turn sent
it back to the committee in a ping-pong like game. But these multiple United
Nations reports created the impression of movement and even progress- and so the
world's public opinion was politically duped.
supra note 50, at 58-60. See BASSIOUNI & SCHABAS, supra note 50, at 65.
69. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 2, 3, 4 (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter 1974 Res. Defining
Aggression]; INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 64.
70. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 64.
71. U.N. International Law Commission, Summaries of the Work of the International Law
Commission: Question of Defining Aggression (July 15, 2015),
http://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_5.shtml.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. G.A. Res. 1181 (XII), at 2-3 (Nov. 29, 1957).
76. Id.
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This lasted until December 1967, when the delaying political games began to
wear quite thin, the General Assembly, by resolution, established a fourth Special
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, stating: "recognizing 'that
there is a widespread conviction of the need to expedite the definition of
aggression."" This fourth Special Committee, comprised of thirty-five Member
States representatives held one session each year from 1968 until 1974,78 yet
claiming, "to consider all aspects of the question so that an adequate definition of
aggression may be prepared." 7 9 Finally, in 1974, the fourth Special Committee
adopted a draft definition of "aggression" and recommended that the General
Assembly adopt it.s0 The definition was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 14, 1974,1' by consensus.
The twenty-two yearlong effort to define "aggression" from 1952 to 1974
resulted in a consensus resolution (not by a vote, so that no state should be held to
remember it).82 More importantly, the resolution was never relied upon in any
Security Council decision, the body prescribed in the U.N. Charter under article 39
to deal with "aggression."" This consistent negative practice leads to 'the
conclusion that the concept of "aggression" as reflected in the U.N. Charter has
fallen into disuitude.84
1974, in addition to being the year in which a definition of aggression was
finally adopted, was also the year that the AIDP elected this writer as the
Secretary-General of the Association," which was the starting point of the creation
of an alternative Draft Code of Crimes in 1980.86 To support the United Nations'
processes in the drafting of a code of crimes and a statute for the establishment of
an international criminal court, this writer, with the support of a number of
colleagues in the field of international criminal law, undertook to develop an
77. G.A. Res. 2330 (XXII) (Dec. 18,1967).
78. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 64.
79. G.A. Res. 2330 (XXII) (Dec. 18,1967).
80. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 19 1974), supra note 69.
81. Id.
82. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
83. U.N. Charter, art. 39.
84. A common law concept, borrowed from French law known as disuitude, meaning fallen into
disuse, refers to the notion that the consistent absence of use and application of a legal norm renders it
inapplicable or obsolete. While the court has avoided pronouncing on the issue, the concept has been
argued in a number of cases before the International Court of Justice. See generally Case Concerning
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), Preliminary Objections of BeIg., 134-35, 11 413, 414, 416
(July 5, 2000); Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Provisional Measure, Oral Arguments on the Request for
the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection (May 1973), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/58/9445.pdf. See also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUS OF AGGRESSION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM VERSAILLES TO KAMPALA - AND WHAT THE FUTURE MIGHT HOLD
(forthcoming 2017).
85. Id.
86. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Court: Ratification And National Implementing
Legislation, 71 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 1-2 (2000); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE (1980) [hereinafter 1980
Draft Code].
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alternative draft code of international crimes entitled International Criminal Law:
A Draft International Criminal Code," as well as a later draft statute for an
international criminal court. To start this process, this writer began to draft a code
of international crimes to be submitted to experts in the field of international
criminal law in 1979. But this parallel effort led to nowhere and the United Nations
system simply accepted it as another NGO contribution.
Between 1974 and 1978, the United Nations had to tackle another problem. In
1974 aggression was defined and voted upon by the General Assembly.8 8
Consequently, the 1954 Draft Code should have presumably been back on the
General Assembly's agenda since it was then tabled because aggression had not
yet been defined. However, that did not happen until 1978,89 despite efforts
between 1974 and 1978 by a number of governments and NGOs to get the issue
back on the General Assembly's agenda. 90 In 1978, the Draft Code was exhumed, 9'
and on December 16, 1978, the General Assembly invited Member States and
IGOs to submit their comments on the 1954 Draft Code, but it produced few
comments as states had mostly forgotten about that initiative, but more to the
point, any comments in 1978 about a 1954 text had to be negative due to the
passage of time and changing circumstances. Consequently, most states abstained,
some seeking a way to revive that historic effort which had survived the Cold War.
Two years later, the General Assembly again reiterated its request that states
submit their comments in December 1980.92
During this period, developments were made on the establishment of an
international criminal court, on a different front. In 1979, this writer was
commissioned by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Ad Hoc
Working Group on Southern Africa to draft a statute for a specialized international
criminal court for the implementation and enforcement of the Apartheid
Convention. 93 While working on the draft, this writer concurrently continued to
work on an alternative draft a code of international crimes with the support of the
AIDP.94 That same year, this writer and the AIDP committees completed their
87. See 1980 Draft Code, supra note 86.
88. 1974 Res. Defining Aggression, supra note 69.
89. See BAssIouNI, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE icc, supra note 50, at 59-60; see BASSIOUNI &
SCHABAS, supra note 50, at 66.
90. Id.
91. Id. However, the Draft Statute on the establishment of an international criminal court, tabled
in 1953, remained mysteriously tabled and buried.
92. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 64.
93. The Apartheid Convention entered into force in 1976, but at the time there was very little
political will to implement the Convention's article V jurisdictional provision which calls for the
prosecution of violators by an international criminal tribunal, "Persons charged with the acts
enumerated in article II of the present Convention may be tried by a competent tribunal of any State
Party to the Convention which may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused or by an
international penal tribunal having jurisdiction with respect to those States Parties which shall have
accepted its jurisdiction." International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, art. V. (July 18, 1976), 1050 U.N.T.S. 244. See also 1980 Draft Code, supra note 86.
94. See 1980 Draft Code, supra note 86.
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work on an alternative draft code of crimes in July 1979, and submitted the draft to
the Sixth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of
Offenders in Caracas, Venezuela in August/September of that year.95 In fact, less
than twenty-four hours after this writer presented the alternative draft code of
crimes to the UN Congress in Caracas, this writer presented the draft statute for an
international criminal tribunal to implement the Apartheid Convention's article 6
to the members of the Ad Hoc Working Group in Geneva,9 6 in fulfillment of his
appointment.97 The alternative code of crimes was also published in 1980 as
International Criminal Law: A Draft International Criminal Code (1980 Draft
Code), which contained twenty international crimes codified on the basis of then
existing international conventions.98
In regards to the codification of international criminal law within the United
Nations system, the coup de grdce came in 1982. That year, the International Law
Commission appointed Doudou Thiam as Special Rapporteur for the topic "Draft
Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind" and established a
working group on the same topic.99 The Special Rapporteur, who was ill-prepared
for such a task, produced a flawed text in 1991 which was highly criticized as both
exceeding the mandate of the General Assembly as well as overreaching and
ambiguous to the point of violating principles of legality.'o Due to criticism of the
report, it was revised and reduced to five crimes that were adopted by the ILC in
1996. 11 The 1996 Draft Code reduced the twelve crimes contained in the 1991
Draft Code to only five crimes, defined by reference to previous definitions.
Genocide was defined according to the 1948 Convention, war crimes by reference
to the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, and crimes against
humanity was a blend between article 5 of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and article 3 of the International Criminal Tribunal
95. See BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, at 19.
96. Id. at 19-20.
97. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Daniel H. Derby, Final Report on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant
International Instruments, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 523, 523 (1980-1981).
98. See BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, at 19-20. While the draft was discussed at
an ancillary meeting of the Congress, no further action was taken on it. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni,
International Criminal Law: A Draft International Criminal Code and Statute for an International
Criminal (1987). However, this writer and his colleagues were not dissuaded and continued to push
forward with their contributions to the codification of the international criminal law. The 1980 Draft
Code was further supplemented by an alternative Draft Statute for the establishment of a permanent
international criminal court in 1987 and published under the title, A Draft International Criminal Code
and Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal. Id.
99. Rep. of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-fifth session, 3 May- 22
July 1983, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth session, Supplement No. 10, at 13,
U.N. Doc. A/38/10 (1983).
100. See BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, at viii. See also INTRO TO ICL, supra note 6,
at 139-42.
101. M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT, Ch.
2, 121 (3rd ed. 2008).
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for Rwanda (ICTR).102 Despite the adoption of this simplistic text by the ILC in
1996, it was never voted on by the General Assembly.10 3
In 1989, another interesting political maneuver played an important role in the
bureaucratic mandate gamesmanship of the United Nations. This occurred in
connection with the General Assembly's Special Session on the problem of drug
trafficking. During that session the late President, then Prime Minister Arthur N.
Robinson' of Trinidad and Tobago proposed the establishment of a specialized
international criminal court to prosecute persons engaged in drug trafficking.' A
similar effort was undertaken by the AIDP in 1937 to have a special international
criminal court for terrorism as a protocol to the League of Nations Terrorism
Convention.'" The General Assembly in 1989 very deftly requested the
International Law Commission to examine such a proposal.o 7 The referral to the
ILC was ambiguous and intended only to avoid having to deal with this
question.' The ILC responded by producing a short report in 1990, that posed
102. Rep. of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May- 26
July 1996, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first session, Supplement No. 10, U.N. Doc.
A/51/10 (1996).
103. Bassiouni, supra note 101, at 121.
104. As one who advised the late president Robinson, and who was also a very dear personal
friend, I relied on the 1937 Protocol to the League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of Terrorism, which had been elaborated on by distinguished jurists who were then at the
League of Nations. One of them Vespasian Pella, who represented his country, Romania, at the League,
was also president of the International Association of Penal Law, which had been a long-term
proponent of establishing a permanent international criminal court. Pella and others proposed a protocol
to the 1937 Terrorism Convention to establish a specialized international criminal court to enforce the
Convention. Robinson and I thought that this could also work for drug offenses, even though we were
skeptical of the merits of having a permanent international criminal court for one category of crimes,
and one which was not amongst the most serious international crimes but we thought it was a way of
opening the door to the UN revisiting the question after the long history of failure described above. The
1937 Protocol for the creation of an international criminal court was never adopted, neither was the
draft statute for the creation of an international criminal court to enforce the Apartheid Convention,
which I drafted as the UN's independent expert to the Commission on Human Rights' sub-commission
on Southern Africa. Study On Ways And Means Of Insuring The Implementation Of International
Instruments Such As The International Convention On The Suppression And Punishment Of The Crime
Of Apartheid, Including The Establishment Of The International Jurisdiction Envisaged By The
Convention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1426 (Jan. 19, 1981). Commission of Human Rights, Interpretation of
the Intemational Covenant of the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1426, Jan. 19, 1981. Robinson was also an active member in the Foundation for the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, organized by the late Robert Kurt Woetzel.
See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court, I IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. I (1991); M. Cherif Bassiouni & Daniel H. Derby, Final Report on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention
and Other Relevant International Instruments, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 523, 523 (1980-198 1).
105. G.A. Res. 44/39 (Dec. 4, 1989).
106. See Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, League of Nations, Nov. 16,
1937 (discussion of 1937 terrorism convention and attempt to create a specialized international criminal
court).
107. G.A. Res. 44/39, ¶ 1 (Dec. 4, 1989).
108. BASSIOUNi, DRAFT CODE & STATUTE, supra note 37, at 11. G.A. Res. A/RES/S-17/2, 1 82
(Feb. 23, 1990): The mandate stated:
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more questions than it answered, but it paved the way for the TLC's initiative in
1994.109
The ILC completed its report as mandated by the General Assembly's special
session on drugs and submitted it to the 45th session of the General Assembly,"l0
but its report was not limited to the issue of drug trafficking, and it was received
favorably by the General Assembly, which encouraged it to continue its work."'
The tables were suddenly reversed as the political climate in the international
community favored the establishment of an international criminal court. After all,
that was far better a prospect to deal with in realpolitik terms than with an
enforceable definition of aggression. Thus, the ILC went from a mandate limited to
drug trafficking to one encompassing the drafting of a comprehensive draft for an
international criminal court." 2 The ILC prepared a preliminary report in 1992,'13
which was favorably received by the General Assembly, and then the ILC
produced a comprehensive report in 1993,114 which was modified in 1994.1"s
In 1994, the International Law Commission's report on a draft statute for the
establishment of an international criminal court, headed by special rapporteur
James Crawford, was submitted to the General Assembly, which in 1995 had set
up the Ad Hoc Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court.' The Ad Hoc Committee met in April and August of 1995 to review the
"Since the International Law Commission has been requested to consider the question of establishing
an international criminal court or other international trial mechanism with jurisdiction over persons
alleged to be engaged in illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs across national frontiers, the Administrative
Committee on Co-ordination shall consider, in its annual adjustments to the United Nations system-
wide action plan on drug abuse control requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 44/141 of
15 December 1989, the report of the Int'l Law Commission on the question."
Adoption of a Political Declaration and Global Programme of Action, Bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee
of the Seventeenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1 80 U.N. Doe. VA/S-17/AC.1/L.2 (1990)
quoted in BASsIOUNI, DRAFT STATUTE, supra note 10, at 11 n.35.
109. Eighth Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind by
Mr. Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/430/Add.1 (1990). See also
BASSIOuNI, DRAFT CODE & STATUTE, supra note 37, at 1.
110. Rep. of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-second session, 1 May- 20
July 1990, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth session, Supplement No. 10, at 8,
U.N. Doc. A/45/10(1990).
I11. See BASSIOUNI, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ICC, supra note 44, at 62-3; see BASSIOUNI &
SCHABAS, supra note 44, at 68-70.
112. Id.
113. Rep. of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fourth session, 4 May- 24
July 1992, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-seventh session, Supplement No. 10, U.N.
Doe. A/47/10 (1992). This writer's draft statute for an international criminal court to prosecute violators
of the Apartheid Convention served as a model for the ILC's 1993 Draft Statute for an international
criminal court. See INTRO TO ICL, supra note 6, at 584-85, 584 n.217.
114. See Revised Report of the Working Group on the draft statute for International Criminal
Court- reproduced in document A/48/10, A/CN.4/L.490 and Add. 1 (1993)
115. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May- 22
July 1994, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth session, Supplement No. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/49/10 (1994); Timothy C. Evered, An International Criminal Court: Recent Proposals and
American Concerns, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 121, 138-139 (1994).
116. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee was: "To review the major substantive and
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ILC's draft statute and to consider preparations for the convening of a newly
mandated United Nations' body. "7
The Ad Hoc Committee produced its report in 1995,"8 which became the
basis for the General Assembly's establishment of the 1996 Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (PrepCom)." 9
The PrepCom's mandate was explicit and goal-oriented and was subsequently
extended by the General Assembly to 1998, in order to produce a consolidated text
of a convention, statute and annexed instruments to submit to a Diplomatic
Conference to be held in Rome from June 15" - July 17 th, 1998.120 Despite many
obstacles,' 2 ' in April 1998, PrepCom produced a 173-page text containing 116
articles, which was the text that the Diplomatic Conference held in Rome, used to
adopt the statute of the International Criminal Court on July 17, 1998.122
Yet throughout the work of the PrepCom and those delegates at the Rome
Diplomatic Conference there was no agreement on defining aggression. The draft
text produced by the PrepCom included three possible options for the definition, 12 3
but none were included in the final draft of the Rome Statute. Thus, at the time the
Rome Statute entered into force in 2002, the International Criminal Court could
not hear prosecutions for the crime of aggression as it was not yet defined nor were
its jurisdictional conditions set out.1 24 Those opposed to aggression won again by
delaying the definition, even hoping that it would have never been achieved. But a
few committed states and NGOs were not about to let go.' 25 But it took a few years
administrative issues arising out of the draft statute prepared by the International Law Commission and,
in the light of that review, to consider arrangements for the convening of an international conference of
plenipotentiaries." Rep. of the International Law Commission of the Work of its Forty-sixth Session, 1
2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/49/L.24 (1994).
117. The 1991 text was subsequently redrafted by the ILC. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind: Titles and Texts of Articles adopted by the Commission on its forty-
eight session., reproduced in YearbookFalsel996, vol. 11 (Part Two), para 50., U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.532
(1996) rev'd by U.N. Doc. A/CN.4L.532 [and Corr. I and 3]. See BASSIOUNI, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE ICC, supra note 50, at 71. BASSIOUNI & SCHABAS, supra note 44, at 71-2.
118. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supp.
No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995).
119. G.A. Res. A/RES/50/46,¶2 (Dec. 11, 1995).
120. G.A. Res. A/RES/51/207 (Dec. 17, 1997).
121. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations Concerning the 1997-98 Preparatory Committee's Work,
25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 397, 397-400 (1997).
122. Draft Report of the Preparatory Committee, at art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.16 (Apr. 2,
1998).
123. Id. art. 5.
124. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 5(2). See generally COALITION FOR THE INT'L CRIM. CT,
Davis, Cale, Forder, Susan, Little, Tegan, and Dali Cvek, The Crime of Aggression and the
International Criminal Court, 17 THE NATIONAL LEGAL EAGLE 1, 1-2 (Autumn 2011),
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/agression.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2016).
125. It must be said, that Kampala would not have taken place had it not been for the concerted
efforts of a number of persons, chief among them were Ambassador Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein of
Jordan, who served as President of the Assembly of State Parties (ASP), and Ambassador Christian
Wenaweser of Liechtenstein, who at that time who was also the president of the ASP. A number of
NGOS and other individuals representing civil society organizations and academia were also very
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since the Rome Statute was adopted in Rome in 1998 for Kampala to happen in
2010, when the ICC's Review Conference for the Rome Statute, adopted a
definition of aggression.1 2 6 Yet, even with a definition, the International Criminal
Court cannot yet hear cases regarding the crime of aggression, despite the Kampala
Amendments having been ratified by the requisite thirty State Parties. 12 7 However,
more importantly, the Amendments will not enter into force, giving the Court
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, until after January 1, 2017 when a
decision is made by State Parties to activate jurisdiction and will apply only to the
state parties that have opted in.1 28 Aggression as defined in the ICC's Kampala
active and effective including Benjamin F. Ferencz. The ICC Coalition also deserves recognition.
126. The Crime ofAggression and the International Criminal Court, supra note 124.
127. Status of Ratification and Implementation, THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR RATIFICATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KAMPALA AMENDMENTS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION,
http://crimeofaggression.info/the-role-of-states/status-of-ratification-and-implementation/ (last visited
Sept. 23, 2016). As of September 1, 2016 the following thirty states have ratified the Kampala
Amendments: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, El
Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Mauritius, Norway, Poland, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.
128. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 8 bis, 15 bis, and 15 ter. The amendments are as follows:
Article 8 bis: Crime of Aggression
1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime of aggression" means the planning, preparation, initiation or
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or
military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, "act of aggression" means the use of armed force by a State against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other mainer
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a
declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX)
of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military
occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of
force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any
weapons by a State against the territory of another
State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of
another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the
agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the
termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to
be used by that other State for perpetrating an
act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which
carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
therein. Rome Statute, supra note 19, art. 8bis.
Article 15 bis: Exercise Of Jurisdiction Over The Crime Of Aggression (State Referral, Proprio Motu)
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Amendments cannot yet be deemed part of customary international law. It is only
enforceable with respect to those state parties to the Rome Statute who have
specifically opted into it. Thus, despite the immense strides taken in the
codification of international criminal law and the establishment of a permanent
international criminal tribunal, the effects of the ad hoc or haphazard approach
remain.
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with article 13,
paragraphs (a) and (c), subject to the provisions of this article.
2. The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression committed one year
after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty
States Parties.
3. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with this article,
subject to a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is
required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute.
4. The Court may, in accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression,
arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party, unless that State Party has previously
declared that it does not accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar. The
withdrawal of such a declaration may be effected at any time and shall be considered by the State Party
within three years.
5. In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression when committed by that State's nationals or on its territory.
6. Where the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation in
respect of a crime of aggression, he or she shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a
determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. The Prosecutor shall notify the
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the situation before the Court, including any relevant
information and documents.
7. Where the Security Council has made such a determination, the Prosecutor may proceed with the
investigation in respect of a crime of aggression.
8. Where no such determination is made within six months after the date of notification, the Prosecutor
may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, provided that the Pre-Trial
Division has authorized the commencement of the investigation in respect of a crime of aggression in
accordance with the procedure contained in article 15, and the Security Council has not decided
otherwise in accordance with articlel6.
9. A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice to
the Court's own findings under this Statute.
10. This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction with respect
to other crimes referred to in article 5. Id. art. 15 bis.
Article 15 ter: Exercise Of Jurisdiction Over The Crime Of Aggression (Security Council Referral)
1. The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with article 13,
paragraph (b), subject to the provisions of this article.
2. The Court may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes of aggression committed one year
after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty
States Parties.
3. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with this article,
subject to a decision to be taken after t January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is
required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute.
4. A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice to
the Court's own findings under this Statute.
5. This article is without prejudice to the provisions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction with respect
to other crimes referred to in article 5. Id. art. 15 ter.
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III. CODIFICATION EFFORTS
As evidenced with respect to defining and codifying the crime of aggression,
realpolitik often serves as an obstacle to efforts for the development and
codification of international criminal law. This is evident in the intentional
splintering of codification efforts regarding aggression and saw success in stalling
the process for twenty-two years. This is also clear in the attempts made, both
within the United Nations system and outside of it, to draft an internationally
agreed upon code of international crimes. But some efforts are more successful
than others.
A. Comparison of 1974 and Kampala Definitions ofAggression
As detailed above, in 1952 the United Nations General Assembly established
a special committee with the mandate of defining the crime of aggression,
however, it was not until 1974 that the task was complete.'29 The committee was
heavily criticized for taking twenty-two years to define the crime but in retrospect
its efforts were not without impact, as the 2010 Kampala Amendments providing
the International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression,
were adopted in accordance with the definition of the crime adopted by the
General Assembly in 1974.130
The definition of the crime of aggression adopted by General Assembly
resolution in 1974 is as follows:
Article 2: The First use of armed force by a State in contravention
of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of
aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity with the
Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been
committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant
circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their
consequences are not of sufficient gravity.
Article 3: Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of
war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2,
qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by
the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof,
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against
the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed
129. G.A. Res. 688 (VII), at 63 (Dec. 20, 1952).
130. "Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with
United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of
aggression..." Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 11, 8bis(2).
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forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in
contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any
extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of
the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has
placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein.
Article 4: The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the
Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression
under the provisions of the Charter.'3 '
As evidenced by the text of the Kampala Amendment above in section two,1 32
the definition adopted in 2010 refers to the 1974 General Assembly resolution
adopting the definition of aggression,' 3 3 and the enumerated acts constituting
aggression follow the 1974 definition verbatim. 14 Both definitions also explicitly
refer to acts of aggression as violations of the United Nations Charter,' 35 and both
definitions apply regardless of any declaration of war.' 36 There are, however, two
important differences between the definitions, namely individual criminal
responsibility and the role of the United Nations Security Council. The Kampala
Amendments explicitly provides for individual criminal responsibility, stating that
conduct "by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct
the political or military action of a State," may constitute an act of aggression.' 3 7
There is no comparable provision in the 1974 definition of aggression. Also,
differentiating the two definitions is the role of the Security Council in determining
acts that constitute aggression. Under the 1974 definition, the enumerated acts are
not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine other acts constituting
aggression.' The Kampala definition does not contain a similar understanding.
131. 1974 Res. Defining Aggression, supra note 69.
132. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 8bis 12.
133. 1974 Res. Defining Aggression, supra note 69.
134. Compare 1974 Definition, supra note 69, art. 3, ¶¶ (a)-(g) with Rome Statute, supra note 22,
art. 8bis 11| 2(a)-(g).
135. See 1974 Res. Defining Aggression, supra note 69, art. 2; Rome Statute, supra note 22, art.
8bis] 1.
136. See 1974 Res. Defining Aggression, supra note 69, art. 3; Rome Statute, supra note 22, art.
8bis 12.
137. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 8bis l 1.
138. 1974 Res. Defining Aggression, supra note 69, art. 2.
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Another, albeit more minor, distinction is that the Kampala definition explicitly
applies to acts committed against "the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of a State" while the 1974 refers only to acts committed against a
State. 13 9
The similarities and differences between the two definitions of the crime of
aggression highlight an interesting twist on the attempt of the realpolitik to avoid
defining and legally proscribing aggression. The process may have been stalled
time and time again, and the Security Council may continue to avoid referring to
any conduct as an act of aggression, but the definition of aggression adopted by the
General Assembly in 1974 was given new life thirty-six years later when it was
referenced and reiterated in the 2010 Kampala Amendments. But unfortunately,
the same cannot be said for all codification efforts.
B. Comparison of Draft Codes of International Crimes within and outside
the United Nations system
While ultimately, the United Nations has not yet adopted a code of
international crimes, there have been a number of attempts to achieve such a goal,
both within the United Nations' system and outside of it. As stated above, within
the UN system there were three main draft codes: the 1954 Draft Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind;14 the 1991 Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind;141 and 1996 Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind.1 42 Outside of the United Nations'
system, the attempt to codify international crimes was undertaken by this writer
with the support of the AIDP and came to fruition in the 1980 Draft International
Criminal Code.1 43 Despite the United Nations' failure to adopted any of the
proposed codes, the work of these codes' drafters was not in vain.
As the ad hoc and piecemeal approach to the codification of international
criminal law continues to this day, it is paramount that the international community
recognizes all that can be accomplished through the adoption of a clear, policy-
oriented legislative process, and all that is lost in the ad hoc, haphazard drafting
process often employed within the United Nations' system. For a number of
reasons including a lack of political interference, the contributions of highly
experienced international jurists and the ability to work on both a draft code and
draft statute, the alternative draft code produced by this writer in 1980 was able to
succeed in many areas where the Draft Codes from 1954, 1991 and 1996 did not.
The ways in which a clear policy and legislative technique succeeded where the
piecemeal approach employed by the United Nations did not is evident in the
crimes defined and proscribed by the draft codes as well as the structure of the
139. Compare 1974 Res. Defining Aggression, supra note 69, art. 2 with Rome Statute, supra note
19, art. 8bis12.
140. Drafted by a committee of the International Law Commission under a United Nations General
Assembly mandate. See 1954 Draft Code, supra note 17.
141. See BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES, supra note 44.
142. See 1996 Draft Code, supra note 102.
143. See 1980 Draft Code, supra note 86.
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codes themselves and to whom they were applicable. An analysis of the draft codes
within the UN system and how they evolved overtime also evidences all that can
be lost when the legislative process must give way to the realpolitik at play.
In regards to criminal responsibility, the 1954 Draft Code limited criminal
responsibility to individuals for the commission of acts deemed international
offenses,'" while the 1991 Draft Code provided for individual criminal
responsibility but did not provide for state responsibility nor for the criminal
responsibility of organizations or corporate entities.1 45 The 1996 Draft Code
provided for individual criminal responsibility, while stating that such individual
criminal responsibility does not limit state responsibility.1 46 As a whole, the
provisions regarding criminal responsibility in all three draft codes within the UN
system highlight the inability to reach a collectively agreed upon method for
establishing criminal responsibility and how far such responsibility should extend.
The 1980 Draft Code was able to achieve a clear notion of criminal responsibility
as it provided for criminal responsibility for states as well as for any "group or
organization other than a state or an organ of a state, irrespective of the
responsibility of its members." 47
As noted above, the 1954 Draft Code, 1991 Draft Code and 1996 Draft Code
were all limited to crimes that feel within the purview of the codes' title, offences/
crimes that affect the peace and security of mankind.1 48 The 1980 Draft Code of
.international crimes drafted by this writer was not limited to such a grouping of
crimes and therefore was more comprehensive and detailed than its United Nations
counterparts. The 1954 Draft Code is comprised of thirteen international offences
against the peace and security of mankind,1 4 9 the 1991 Draft Code includes twelve
crimesso, and the 1996 proscribes only five international crimes.' 5 ' On the other
hand, the 1980 Draft Code contains twenty articles, divided into four categories: (i)
acts which are deemed international crimes under existing international
144. 1954 Draft Code, supra note 17, art. 1 ("Offences against the peace and security of mankind,
as defined in this Code, are crimes under international law, for which the responsible individuals shall
be punished.").
145. See BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, at 113.
146. See 1996 Draft Code, supra note 102, art. 2,4.
147. Bassiouni 1980 Draft Code, supra note 98, at 95.
148. Highlighting this point is the fact that the first eight offenses included in the Draft Code are
related to acts of aggression, territorial aggression or the use of force by one state against another state.
See 1954 Draft Code, supra note 17. See BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES, supra note 44; and see 1996
Draft Code, supra note 102.
149. 1954 Draft Code, supra note 17.
150. The crimes contained in the 1991 Draft Code are as follows: art. 15-agression; art. 16- threat
of aggression; art. 17-intervention; art. 18-colonial domination and other forms of alien domination; art.
19- genocide; art. 20- apartheid; art. 21- systematic or mass violations of human rights; art. 22-
exceptionally serious war crimes; art. 23- recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries; art.
24- intemational terrorism; art. 25- illicit traffic in narcotic drugs; art. 26- willful and sever damage to
the environment. BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, at 93.
151. These five crimes are: art. 16-the crime of aggression; art. 17- crime of genocide; art. 18-
crimes against humanity; art. 19- crimes against United Nations and associated personnel; art. 20- war
crimes. 1996 Draft Code, supra note 102, at 42-53.
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conventions;152 (ii) acts which are deemed international crimes pending
international conventions before the UN, whose adoption is impending;'I" (iii) acts
whose prohibition in the object of certain international conventions but which are
not considered international crimes;154 (iv) acts which are the object of
contemporary international concern and about which international conventions are
expected.'1 5 This exemplifies the manner in which over time the crimes defined
within the United Nations system were cut short again and again, while a lack of
political bureaucracy allowed the 1980 Draft Code to contain a comprehensive
listing of international crimes.
As for specific crimes, all four draft codes attempt to codify and proscribe the
crime of aggression, albeit with different specificity as to the definition provided
therein. The 1954 Draft Code, as stated above, does not provide a definition for the
crime of aggression because such a definition did not fall under the drafting
committee's mandate.' 56 The 1991 Draft Code's definition of aggression almost
152. This category includes the crimes of: aggression; war crimes; unlawful use of weapons;
genocide; crimes against humanity; apartheid; slavery and related crimes; torture (as a war crimes);
unlawful medical experimentation (as a war crime); piracy; crimes relating to international air
communications; threat and use of force against internationally protected persons; taking of civilian
hostages; unlawful use of the mails; drug offenses; falsification and counterfeiting; theft of national and
archeological treasures (in time of war); interference with submarine cables; international traffic in
obscene material. Bassiouni 1980 Draft Code, supra note 98, at 25.
153. Torture (as a specialized convention). Id.
154. Torture (as a human rights violation); unlawful medical experimentation (as a human rights
violation); theft of national and archeological treasures (in a time of peace as a culturally protected
right). Id.
155. Unlawful medical experimentation (in time of peace); bribery of foreign public officials. Id.
156. Rather the task of defining the international crime of aggression was mandated to a special
committee established for that very purpose. Despite the lack of a definition for aggression, the second
international offenses of the 1954 Draft Code is "[a]ny threat by the authorities of a State to resort to an
act of aggression against another State." 1954 Draft Code of Offenses, supra note 17, art. 2(2). The
following seven offences all relate to the use of force, employment of aggression or interference with
the sovereignty of one state by another state. They are:
(3) The preparation by the authorities of a State of the employment of armed force against
another State for any purpose other than national or collective self-defence or in pursuance of
a decision or recommendation of a competent organ of the United Nations.
(4) The organization, or the encouragement of the organization, by the authorities of a State,
of armed bands within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the territory of
another State, or the toleration of the organization of such bands in its own territory, or the
toleration of the use by such armed bands of its territory as a base of operations or as a point
of departure for incursions into the territory of another State, as well as direct participation in
or support of such incursions.
(5) The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of activities calculated to
foment civil strife in another State, or the toleration by the authorities of a State of organized
activities calculated to foment civil strife in another State.
(6) The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of terrorist activities in
another State, or the toleration by the authorities of a State of organized activities calculated
to carry out terrorist acts in another State.
(7) Acts by the authorities of a State in violation of its obligations under a treaty which is
designed to ensure international peace and security by means of restrictions or limitations on
armaments, or on military training, or on fortifications, or of other restrictions of the same
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verbatim follows the definition of aggression adopted by the General Assembly in
1974'17 and the 1996 did not provide a definition for the crime. 1 5 The 1980 Draft
Code contains not only definition for the crime of aggression, but also provides for
consequences, the scope of the prohibition and method for interpretation,' 5 9
highlighting the advantage of drafting such a code independent from the political
pressure and bureaucratic inference that the UN can have on such a task, as well as
the inability of those who opposed codifying the crime of aggression from
asserting their delay tactics.
All four draft codes also codify the crime of genocide, although the 1954
Draft Code does not refer to the crime as genocide, rather it just provides its
elements. The same is true for crimes against humanity, but both the 1954 and
1991 draft codes do not use the term "crimes against humanity,"' 60 again just
providing its elements. All four draft codes also criminalize the commission of
wars crimes, but the 1991 draft code limits the crime to "exceptionally serious war
crimes."1 6 1
As mentioned above the 1991 Draft Code expanded the number of crimes
contained in the code to the point that it was rejected as overly broad, and thus
resulted in the extremely curtailed 1996 Draft Code. Crimes contained in the 1991
Draft Code that were not included in any prior or subsequent codes, included: the
colonial domination and other forms of alien domination and the willful and severe
damage to the environment.1 62
The 1954, 1991 and 1996 Draft Codes were all a product of the United
Nations' system and as such evidenced the difficulties of a drafting process
intentionally splintered to avoid any real progress. As all three of the UN system
draft codes were drafted separate and apart from the drafting of statute for an
international criminal court, their codification efforts remained pigeonholed to the
drafting of a code of international crimes only. The drafter of the 1980 Draft Code
was not limited to a code of crimes exclusively and was free to consider, and even
character.
(8) The annexation by the authorities of a State of territory belonging to another State, by
means of acts contrary to international law.
(9) The intervention by the authorities of a State in the internal or external affairs of another
State, by means of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force
its will and thereby obtain advantages of any kind.
Id art. 2(3)9).
157. Id. art. 2(3).
158. 1996 Draft Code, supra note 102, art. 16 "An individual who, as leader or organizer, actively
participates in or orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression committed by a
State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression."
159. 1980 Draft Code, supra note 37, at 52-54.
160. 1954 Draft Code, supra note 17, at 150. The eleventh crime contained in the 1954 Draft Code
was "Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecutions, committed
against any civilian population on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities
of a State or by private individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities."
1954 Draft Code, supra note 17, art. 2(11).
161. BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, at 16.
162. Id.
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draft, a statute for an international criminal court that would have jurisdiction over
such crimes when he was undertaking the 1980 Draft Code. Thus, the 1980 Draft
Code was structured in a manner that would allow it to be enforced by an
international criminal court (direct enforcement model) or through the national
criminal justice systems of states (indirect enforcement model)." The 1980 Draft
Code was drafted to be flexible in its applicable as well as designed with the option
of being embodied in a single convention with a draft statute for an international
criminal court or as a stand-alone convention." These successes of the 1980 Draft
Code evidence what can be achieved when the codification of international crimes
is not intentionally separated from the drafting of a statute for a court that would
have jurisdiction over such international crimes, as was the case in the United
Nations system.
The limited nature of the draft codes within the United Nations' system once
again highlights all that is lost when international crimes are codified (or attempts
at codification are made) without any clear legislative approach. The UN approach
began with the 1954 Draft Code which lacked comprehensive definition of crimes
it was attempting to codify; it did not consider the existence of an international
criminal court with jurisdiction over such crimes nor did it include all relevant
international offenses. The successor to the 1954 Draft Code was the 1991 Draft
Code, which had its own issues leading to its demise. The 1991 Draft Code was
considered to be overly broad to the point of violating general principles of
legality, and it contained crimes considered beyond the mandate of the General
Assembly, as they were not yet recognized under international law or had not yet
ripened to the level of international crimes. 6 5 Finally, the 1996 Draft Code was
extremely barebones and failed to define or codify a number of international
crimes.1" The 1980 Draft Code therefore was the most comprehensive and
inclusive draft code submitted to the United Nations and evidences the great strides
163. 1980 Draft Code, supra note 98, at 107-17.
164. Id. The 1980 Draft Code contains far more than just a list of crimes and their definitions, as it
includes provisions regarding the applicability of the code. The 1954 Draft Code did not go so far and
was largely limited to a list of crimes with minimal definitions. The way in which this flexibility was
accomplished was through drafting the 1980 Draft Code in three parts, Part I a General Part, Part II a
Special Part and Part Ill a Procedural Enforcement Part. The General Part is necessary for direct
enforcement by an international criminal court and therefore contains provisions regarding the
applicability of the draft code, jurisdiction, definitions for terms such as 'state,' 'person, individual' and
'group or organization.' The General Part also included an about the references article providing for
criminal responsibility for individual and state and non-state organization as well as a more general
overview on the application of penalties. This General Part presumes the existence of an international
criminal court (i.e. direct enforcement) and therefore may be severed if the code is being enforced by a
national judicial system under the indirect enforcement model. The Special Part is applicable no matter
the enforcement model as codifies twenty-two categories of international crimes. Finally, the third part,
the Procedural Enforcement Part applies to both models of enforcement and contains provisions on
extradition, judicial assistance, recognition of foreign penal judgments and other procedural
mechanisms.
165. BASSIOUNI, COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, at 97.
166. Rosemary Rayfuse, The Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind:
Eating Disorders at the International Law Commission, 8 CRIM. L. F. 58, 59 (1997).
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that can be made when international crimes are codified - or attempts at
codification are made - with a clear legislative approach.
IV. CONCLUSION
As seen in the comparison of the 1954, 1991 and 1996 Draft Codes from the
United Nations system and the 1980 Draft Code undertaken by this writer, on the
path to the codification of international criminal law there is much to be gained by
employing a clear policy-oriented, comprehensive legislative process. The ad hoc
approach taken within the United Nations has produced little tangible gains, and
there is still no comprehensive code of international crimes. Elementary legislative
policy, as applied in states' domestic codifications of criminal law on a variety of
subjects as it exists in almost every country in the world, is absent in international
criminal law. For example, the protected social interest is not always clearly
identified,'67 continuity is frequently lacking in successive conventions on the
same subject,'68 the same or similar provisions appear in multiple conventions on
separate subjects even when these provisions have been found ambiguous or
unclear. 169
The issues regarding the development and codification of international
criminal law pose the question, where do we go from here? In order to combat the
commission of international crimes, particularly those that threaten global peace
and security or offend commonly-shared human and social values, there must be
progress in the codification efforts with greater attention paid to legislative and
policy-oriented approaches. Despite its roots in early Roman legal codification, the
development of international criminal law has strayed from the idea of detailed
codification efforts by subject-matter in a continuous, congruent effort and resorted
to the haphazard approach seen in the path to defining and proscribing aggression.
Unfortunately, the haphazard or ad hoc manner in which the codification of
international crimes developed, particularly the crime of aggression, is the
167. See INTRO TO ICL, supra note 7, at 504-06. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni & Edward M.
Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Daut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in
International Law (1995).
168. See 1912 International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 1921 U.N.T.S. 17. See Convention
on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175. This was followed by the 1925
International Opium Convention, the 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs. Then the 1936 Convention for Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in
Dangerous Drugs, the 1946 Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on
Narcotic Drugs, the Paris Protocol of 1948, the 1953 Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the
Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and the Use of
Opium. See also Bernard Leroy, M. Cherif Bassiouni & Jean-Franqois Thony, International Drug
Control System, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: SOURCES, SUBJECTS AND CONTENTS 855, 864-75
(M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 3rd ed., 2008).
169. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft art. 5-6, Dec. 16, 1970,
860 U.N.T.S. 105 (priority of jurisdiction and the difficulties it created in the Lockerbie case); see
Michael P. Scharf, The Lockerbie Model of Transfer ofProceeding, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2008); Omer Y. Elagab, The Hague as the Seat of the Lockerbie Trial: Some
Constraints, 34 INT'L L. 289, 289 (2000); Michael P. Scharf Terrorism on Trial: The Lockerbie
Criminal Proceedings, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 355, 356-57 (1999-2000).
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paradigm of international criminal law development and not the outlier. The
international criminal law system, as explained above, relies on states to push
forward its development and with state actors comes states' desires of wealth and
power. This world of realpolitik has limited the codification and proscription of
international crimes acting only when necessary as a result. This pattern can be
seen in the new international focus on the illicit trade or trafficking and the many
crimes that fall under its broad umbrella.
Illicit trade or trafficking encompasses a number of different international
crimes and from a codification or proscription view it is most closely associated
with organized crime. Unlike the Roman tradition of codification by subject-matter
with clear legislative policy goals at the forefront of criminal codification, the
international regime of illicit trafficking developed like the rest of international
criminal law. What is referred to as unlawful or illicit trafficking, places in the
same category such diverse activities as: trafficking in human-beings (including
the most abhorrent of these practices involving trafficking in human-beings for
sexual bondage), trafficking in human organs, trafficking in counterfeit materials
whether they be medicinal cigarettes, scarves or neckties. Illicit trafficking also
covers the trade of cultural property as well as trafficking in obscene materials.
As if foreshadowing the lengthy, piecemeal process that would surround the
codification of illicit trafficking, the international focus on illicit trade/ or
trafficking began as an attempt to suppress the existence and growth of criminal
organizations. Between 1975 and 2000, the international community worked to
identify and proscribe conduct of organized criminal enterprises, which included
crimes regarding illicit trade and trafficking.17 0 This process culminated in 2000
170. In 1975, the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders focused on 'Changes in Forms and Dimensions of Criminality-Transnational and National'
which centered on crime as a business and encompassed organized crime, white-collar crime and
corruption. Dimitri Vlassis, Challenges in the Development of International Criminal Law: The
Negotiations of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: SOURCES, SUBJECTS AND
CONTENTS 907, 908 (M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., 3rd ed., 2008) [hereinafter Challenges in the
Development of ICL]. Five years later at the Sixth United Nations Congress the focus became crimes
committed in such a manner that they would be unlikely to be reported to law enforcement agencies or
prosecuted, which included organized crimes, bribery and corruption. Id The Seventh Congress, held in
1985, emphasized crimes committed by international criminal networks and the Eighth Congress further
examined criminal networks and the need for international institutions focused on prevention efforts, in
1990. The Eighth Congress recommended that the General Assembly adopt an international instrument
as well as a set of guidelines for combating organized crimes. Treaties were: the Model Treaties on
Extradition, G.A. Res. 45/116. These continuing efforts lead to the General Assembly's 1991 decision
to overhaul its United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme by disbanding the
Committee on Crime Prevention and Control which oversaw the Programme and instead establishing a
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Vlassis, supra note 170, at 909.
The Commission held its first session in 1992 and its focus was on increasing state corporation in the
efforts combat organized crime and the commission of international crimes. The efforts to codify
legislation on organized crime resulted in the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan
against Organized Transnational Crime, which emphasized the need for states to cooperate in their
efforts against organized crime and was adopted by the General Assembly in 1994. Yet it was not until
1998 that these efforts resulted in the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the drafting of an
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with the General Assembly's adoption of the Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime and its three protocols: Protocol Against the Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children; Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants
by Land, Sea and Air; and Protocol against Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition. 7 '
While the adoption of the Convention and its Protocols appeared to be a step
forward for combatting illicit trade, in the world of realpolitik the codification
efforts were once again haphazard. The breadth of the crime of illicit trade or
trafficking is so broad that illicit trade encompasses everything from human
trafficking to trading in Herm6s ties or cigarettes. While human trafficking is often
considered to fall under the category of international law regarding slavery and
slave-related practices, the codification efforts now also place human trafficking
alongside trafficking in stolen or counterfeit goods and crimes that fall under the
umbrella of organized crime offenses. This categorization from a human and social
values perspective is shocking, but like the majority of the development of the
codification of ICL, it results from a lack of policy and guidelines for legislative
processes.
The attempt to combat illicit trade or trafficking through codification efforts
was also undertaken outside of the organized crime regime. The illicit trade of
cultural property,' 7 2 has been codified in five different international instruments
from 1954 to 2000, including the Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime.' The attempt to combat trafficking in illicit drugs also falls under this
regime and was proscribed in a number of different conventions described in
section one. Trafficking in obscene materials is proscribed in eight international
instruments from 1910 to 1949 and additionally, thirty-two other instruments are
international convention against organized crime.
171. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, at I
(Nov. 15, 2000) (entered into force Sept. 29, 2003); Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, at 41(Nov. 15, 2000) (entered into force Dec.
25, 2003); Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, at 53 (Nov. 15,
2000)(entered into force Jan. 28, 2004); Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/255, at 69 (May 31, 2001) (entered into force July
3,2005).
172. Cultural property is property which reflects the cultural heritage of people who claim it as
their own. James A.R. Nafziger, Protection of Cultural Property, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
SOURCES, SUBJECTS, AND CONTENTS 977 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3rd ed. 2008).
173. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240; First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358; Second Protocol to The Hague Convention
of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253
U.N.T.S. 172; UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter
UNESCO Cultural Convention]; Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 171.
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applicable to the crime.'74 Trafficking in obscene materials poses a unique issue
despite the numerous instruments on the topic in that such instruments do not
define a substantive crime. The instruments do not criminalize the production of
obscene materials, only their international traffic and therefore effective
enforcement is greatly limited when the object of the offense is not punishable,
only its transportation. 7 5
Illicit trafficking also encompasses trafficking in counterfeit goods and
fraudulent medicines, including a wide array of goods such as automotive parts,
chemicals and pesticides, electrical components, pharmaceuticals and tobacco. 76
The traffic and sale of these goods are proscribed under the Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime.
Like other developments in the codification of international criminal law, in
addition to the lack of science or technique involved, the codification efforts apply
almost exclusively to non-state actors.
The trafficking/trade of all the previously mentioned objects and persons fall
under the purview of illicit trade but have been proscribed in a number of
instruments and with the exception of the Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime, there is very little cohesion in the instruments both within each
subject-matter area as well as within the regime of illicit trade or trafficking as a
whole. It is certainly shocking from a value-perspective to see human trafficking
for sexual exploitation put in the same general category as trafficking in unlawfully
branded cigarettes, and to see little differentiation in these crimes that are placed in
the same category, notwithstanding the diversity of the human and social interests
they address, and the human harm they produce.
While the absence of international legislative policy is particularly evident in
the failure to rank crimes on the basis of the human and social values sought to be
protected, it is also quite troublesome to see convention after convention use the
same phraseology and terms applicable to the two most common means of
enforcement namely, extradition and mutual legal assistance with as little
specificity as they usually contain.! One cannot help by being suspicious of the
intentions of the drafters who continuously use de minimus descriptions of the
most important enforcement means, which has led most states not to rely on these
enforcement mechanisms.
Like aggression, the codification process for illicit trade or trafficking
highlights the lack of a clear policy-oriented legislative process applicable to the
development and codification of international crimes. This ad hoc approach has
continually allowed realpoliticians to place their own goals of wealth and power
174. INTRO TO ICL, supra note 7, at 214.
175. Id. at 215.
176. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Focus On: The Illicit Trafficking of Counterfeit
Goods and Transnational Organized Crime,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/counterfeit/FocusSheet/CounterfeitfocussheetEN_HIRES.pdf (last
accessed Oct. 24, 2016).
177. See INTRO TO ICL, supra note 7, at 504-)5; see generally Bassiouni & Wise, supra note 167.
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ahead of the needs of the international community and world's peoples. Whether
this ad hoc approach is the intentional work of realpoliticians or the unavoidable
consequence of the difficult process of criminalizing conduct at an international
level, the codification of international criminal law has long strayed from its roots
in clearly-defined, subject-matter based Roman legal development. The result has
once again favored the interests of states over their populations and allowed
realpolitik to thrive in the face of any real developments in the codification
process. Thus, the question remains as to what path international jurists will
continue to follow, the haphazard approach of the past or a science and legislative
path of the future.
BRINGING BITs BACK FROM THE BRINK
INCORPORATING PROGRESSIVE TREATMENT PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS TO MAINTAIN POLICY SPACE FOR STATE
REGULATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
*Jeremy S Goldstein
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the United Nations (UN), and as proposed by John Ruggie, Special
Representative of the Secretary General, published the Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (UNGP's), with the objective of "enhancing standards
and practices with regard to business and human rights."' The UNGP's offer
"guidance and recommendations to states and companies" 2 in implementing the
Special Representative of the Secretary General's (SRSG) 2008 Report, the UN
'Protect, Respect, and Remedy' Framework for Business and Human Rights.3
UNGP Article 9 recommends that states "maintain adequate domestic policy space
to meet their human rights obligations when pursuing business-related policy
objectives with other states or business enterprises, for instance through investment
treaties[.]"' Article 9 recognizes the impact that investment treaties, primarily
international investment agreements (HAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs),
have on human rights in the modem global economy.' It also posits that IIAs need
not be inherently detrimental to the furtherance of human rights protections when
drafting is guided by policy aimed at maintaining adequate domestic policy space.6
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McCarthy, Ariana Busby and the diligent editing staff at the Denver Journal of International Law &
Policy.
1. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, U.N.
Doc. HRJPUB/I 1/04, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter UNGP].
2. Andrea Shemberg (legal advisor to the U.N. Special Representative to the Secretary General
for Business & Human Rights), Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights A Research Project Conducted
for IFC and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and
Human Rights I (May 27, 2009).
3. John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary General), Protect, Respect and Remedy:
a Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).
4. UNGP, supra note 1, art. 9, at 11 (emphasis added).
5. UNGP, supra note 1, art. 9, at I1.
6. UNGP, supra note 1, art. 9, at I1.
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HAs are agreements between and among states, which "are designed to
protect foreign investment[s] from one country from interference by the
government of the country in which the investment is located."' HAs are typically
embodied as either a BIT between two states or a multilateral investment
agreement among more than two states, and are designed to increase foreign direct
investment (FDI) inflows.' Each BIT is a unique instrument, but all investment
agreements contain fundamental provisions protecting distinct categories of
investor interests.' These categories include the treatment of investment,
nationalization/expropriation, general exceptions, and dispute resolution.'o When
7. JONATHAN BONNITCHA, IISD REPORT: MYANMAR'S INVESTMENT TREATIES: A REVIEW OF
LEGAL ISSUES IN LIGHT OF RECENT TRENDS I (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. ed., 2014).
8. Rational theorists disagree on whether IIAs actually increase FDI. This author believes that
HAs are crucial to attracting investment in order to compete with other nations which also engage in
IIAs. This is discussed in section 11 herein. See generally MARC JACOB, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, (Inst. for Dev. & Peace ed., 2010); Mary Hallward-Dreimeier, Do
Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a bit... and They Could Bite
(World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Policy Research Working Paper No. 3121, 2003),
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/1 0986/18118.
9. The language used to express treatment differs amongst agreements. Often these categories of
interests are not defined in separate provisions and can be confusing, specifically in older treaties. See
generally, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the Peoples Republic of China and the
Government of Jamaica Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Jam., Oct. 26, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/LA/country/104/treaty/917; Treaty
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of
Honduras Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Hond., July 1,
1995, T.I.A.S. No. 106-27; Agreement between The Republic of Turkey and The Kingdom of Spain on
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Spain, Feb. 15, 1995,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/HAlcountry/214/treaty/2953. Alternately, some BITs separate
each distinct interest and actor, and include category headings. See generally, e.g., Agreement between
the Republic of Turkey and the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan Concerning the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Afg., July 10, 2004,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/214/treaty/3; Agreement between the Government of
the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the Republic of France for the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Eth.-Fr., June 25, 2003,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/72/treaty/1475; Treaty between the United States of
America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 2005, TIAS No. 06-1101.
10. The language used to express treatment differs amongst agreements. Often these categories of
interests are not defined in separate provisions and can be confusing, specifically in older treaties. See
generally, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the Peoples Republic of China and the
Government of Jamaica Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
China-Jam., Oct. 26, 1994, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/104/treaty/917; Treaty
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of
Honduras Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Hond., July 1,
1995, T.I.A.S. No. 106-27; Agreement between The Republic of Turkey and The Kingdom of Spain on
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Spain, Feb. 15, 1995,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/214/treaty/2953. Alternately, some BITs separate
each distinct interest and actor, and include category headings. See generally, e.g., Agreement between
the Republic of Turkey and the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan Concerning the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Afg., July 10, 2004,
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an unexpected harm occurs to an investment as a result of an action by a host state,
dispute settlement clauses allow a foreign investor, operating under the protection
of a BIT, to file an 'investor-state arbitration' against the host state."
Most pertinent to the cause of their conflict with state-imposed human rights
protections, BITs create only rights for investors without obligations, and only
obligations for host states seemingly unaccompanied by any substantive rights.' 2
Of principle concern are traditional treatment provisions.' 3 These provisions create
substantial rights for investors to file claims restricting host states' 4 domestic
policy space to legislate to meet its international human rights obligations.
This article analyzes methodology for drafting treatment provisions which
reserve states domestic policy space to regulate human rights in-line with UNGP
Article 9. This article examines: state practice in the form of existing treaties,
model IIAs, draft IIAs, and policy statements; recommendations from civil society,
international organizations, and intergovernmental organizations, including various
Model IIA's and Model BIT's; and the work of popular academics and jurists.
Following this introduction, Section II provides background and context on
the issue. Section III briefly presents the history and purpose of lAs, and considers
their efficacy. Section IV introduces the core principles of traditional BITs and
explains how treatment provisions enshrined therein restrict government policy
space regarding human rights regulation. Section V discusses conflicts between
IIAs and international law. Section VI examines UJNGP Article 9 and analyzes its
recommendations in the context of the greater IIA regime. Section VI presents
and analyzes the methodology available for drafting treatment provisions in IIAs in
a manner which heeds the recommendations of UNGP Article 9, by examining
existing and model IIAs and BITs. Section VIII concludes and provides the
author's opinion.
II. BACKGROUND
John Ruggie, UN Secretary-General Special Representative for Business and
Human Rights, included Article 9 in the UNGP's out of concern for the unequal
distribution of rights and obligations IlAs create, particularly in private investment
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/LA/country/214/treaty/3; Agreement between the Government of
the Federal Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the Republic of France for the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Eth.-Fr., June 25, 2003,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IlA/country/72/treaty/1475; Treaty between the United States of
America and the Oriental Republic of Unmguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 2005, TIAS No. 06-1101.
I1. See BONNITCHA, supra note 7; Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L. J. 435, 436 (2009) ("There are sharp disagreements related to the
legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration. The president of Bolivia asserts that developing countries in
Latin America" never win any cases.).
12. BITs were not originally intended to create any obligations on investors. Investors are subject
to the laws of the states in which they do business. See, e.g., Stiglitz, infra note 24, at 5-11.
13. See infra Sections 11 & Ill.
14. See infra Section IV.
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contracts15 and traditional BITs.1 6 The concern is that this unequal distribution
impacts states' domestic policy space relating to human rights and the
environment." When a state regulates in a manner which seeks to protect or
promote a human rights interest,' 8 foreign investors operating under a BIT are
more likely to successfully challenge the measure than those operating without
investment protections.' 9 Damage awards in investor-state arbitrations can reach
into the billions of U.S. dollars.20 In Occidental v. Ecuador, the International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)2 1 decided that Ecuador had
been in breach of a BIT provision for conduct which was "tantamount to
expropriation."22 While the fairness of the ultimate decision on the issues is not
under intense scrutiny, the tribunal awarded Occidental US $1.7 billion, even
though Ecuador justified their actions with proof that the company had
intentionally committed other serious regulatory violations. 23 As a result, states
have become fearful of advancing domestic policies, particularly those relating to
human rights and the environment, which may encourage claims. 24
This 'regulatory chill' can affect a plethora of policy decisions not protected
15. Private investment contracts frequently include stabilization clauses which can explicitly limit
state's domestic policy space to a specific or unlimited degree. Ruggie, supra note 3, at 3, 112-4.
16. Traditional BITs are loosely defined as those developed prior to the advent of modem flA
model agreements and/or those which include unqualified terms of art, lack of domestic policy space,
and few additional exceptions provisions. These are to be described more in detail herein in Section II.
See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government
of the Union of Myanmar on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Myan., Dec. 12,
2001, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/762.
17. George K. Foster, Investors, States and Stakeholders: Power Asymmetries in International
Investment and the Stabilizing Potential of Investment Treaties, Business Law Forum - Balancing
Investor Protections, the Environment, and Human Rights, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 361, 368
(2013).
18. Examples include a state seeking to use police powers to protect citizens from having their
rights violated by a foreign investor, a policy measure designed to encourage basic rights codified in an
International treaty, and an interpretive decision on an environmental and human safety regulation
intended to remedy a legal-loophole under which an investor operates. PETERSON & GRAY, infra note
29, at 5.
19. Id.
20. E.g., Franck, supra note 11, at 435 ("a typical claim might involve an investor demanding
over US$300 million from a host state").
21. ICSID is the largest, and most commonly utilized, International investment arbitration panel.
For more on the Occidental v. Ecuador ruling see, Tai-Heng Cheng & Lucas Bento, ICSID's Largest
Award in History: An Overview of Occidental Petroleum Corporation v the Republic of Ecuador,
KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/12/19/icsids-largest-award-in-history-an-overview-of-
occidental-petroleum-corporation-v-the-republic-of-ecuador.
22. Occidental Petrol. Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, T 416
(Oct. 5, 2012), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C80/DC2672_En.pdf.
23. Id. T 876.
24. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Multinational Corporations: Balancing Rights and Responsibilities, 101
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 3, 10 (2007).
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under the traditional BIT regime.25 This includes domestic measures that are
advanced to achieve legitimate non-investment related policy objectives, such the
strengthening of labor laws, and the introduction human rights or environmental
protections. 26 States with traditional BIT regimes are most susceptible to policy
space restrictions. The chilling effect weighs heaviest on developing nations
because they have the greatest need to continue advancing their regulatory regimes
as compared to states with developed regulatory environments. 27 Developing states
also more frequently engage in traditional BITs relative to developed nations,
making them significantly more susceptible to investor claims. 2 8
The regulatory chill largely escaped concern until recently because foreign
investors only first began to invoke dispute settlement mechanisms in BITs in the
mid-1980's. 29 With the long term consequences of engaging in IIA's now readily
apparent, some states are rapidly moving to denounce their traditional BITs;30 both
Venezuela and Ecuador have terminated agreements." Other nations have selected
to renegotiate agreements; South Africa and Indonesia have begun this process. 32
However, only so much renegotiation is possible. Basic investor protections that
establish discipline on host state measures, generally obliging them to provide
compensation for expropriation, and to treat foreign investors fairly, equitably, and
in a non-discriminatory manner, are intrinsically necessary in any HA.33 For
capitol-importing nations, FDI is crucial to development and the advancement of
social and economic rights. 34 Investor-protective provisions in agreements which
25. Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International
Investment Agreements, 13(4) J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 1037, 1039 (2010).
26. Id.
27. Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Its Role in Sustainable
Development, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 521, 532-33 (2013); United Nations Conference of Trade &
Development, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Sequel, UNCTAD series on Issues in International
Investment Agreements II (2012), 2 UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5,
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5 en.pdf ("this approach poses special challenges for
developing countries where the State may be required to intervene in the economy and introduce
legislative or regulatory changes more frequently or of a greater magnitude.").
28. Howard Mann, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Its Role in Sustainable
Development, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 521, 532-33 (2013); United Nations Conference of Trade &
Development, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Sequel, UNCTAD series on Issues in International
Investment Agreements II(2012), 2 UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/
unctaddiaeia20 I d5_en.pdf.
29. LUKE ERIC PETERSON & KEVIN R. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES AND IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 5 (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev.
ed., 2003).
30. Spears, supra note 25, at 1043.
31. BONNITCHA, supra note 7, at 7.
32. BONNITCHA, supra note 7, at 7.
33. Spears, supra note 25, at 1037.
34. These rights considered are defined by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. Sustainable development requires
both FDI and human rights protections, but when done properly can advance ICESCR rights. FDI is
therefore crucial to developing nations' ability to advance economic rights. See Megan Wells Sheffer,
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provide the basis for investor-state claims cannot be entirely eliminated.
Most states concerned about the consequences of engaging in HAs are not
abandoning their agreements in whole. Many recognize that IIA's need not be
inherently detrimental to human rights when drafted in a manner which does not
restrict domestic policy space. These states are now developing model agreements
to guide future IIA drafting in line with UNGP recommendations. Guided by the
UNGP, states, specifically developing nations, should be able to take full
advantage of the positive benefits that HAs have on advancing development
without succumbing to a restriction on their ability to regulate human rights
abuses. This is especially true when those abuses are prohibited by conventions
comprising the International Bill of Human Rights, 35 and those enshrined in ILO
conventions enumerating protections for children, minorities, and laborers.3 6
III. WHAT ARE HAs?
a. The History ofllAs
Over the past quarter-century, the number of BITs that comprise the
patchwork of the international investment policy regime has skyrocketed; 37
UNCTAD reports less than 500 agreements before 1980, 1,322 in 1995, 2,495 in
2005, and over 3,000 today." More than 450 investor-state arbitrations claiming
provisions in BITs have been filed,39 but formal investment treaties had their start
with humble beginnings. The first formal BITs were intended to guarantee foreign
investors protections easily justified as necessary to establish business; such as the
right to freedom from unjustified appropriation by the state,40 the right to pay only
the market tax rate,41 and the right to operate free of discrimination on the basis of
Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 483,
483 (2011).
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
36. Freedom of Association and Right to Organise Convention; Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention; Forced Labour Convention; Abolition of Forced Labour Convention;
Minimum Age Convention; Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention; Equal Remuneration
Convention; Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention.
37. PETERSON & GRAY, supra note 29, at 7.
38. United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, International Investment Agreements
Navigator (2013), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IA; Stiglitz, supra note 24.
39. Susan L. Karamanian, The Place of Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration, 17 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 423, 426 (2013).
40. The guarantee of protection from undue appropriation or nationalization without
compensation exists in all BITs and recommended by all models, albeit with slightly varying language.
See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty,
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (2012) [hereinafter U.S. Model].
41. National Treatment is guaranteed by all BITs and recommended by all Models. See, e.g.,
Norway Draft Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment,
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nationality. Some scholars argue that BITs are a form of human rights protection in
that they typically guarantee freedom from discrimination due to nationality.4 2
Other scholars highlight the use of treatment provisions during colonial times as
evidence of their sinister roots in catalyzing the exploitation of Africa, the
Americas, and Asia.43
b. Do HAs Increase FDI?
What impact, if any, do IIAs have on FDI? In the commentary to the UNGP,
the SRSG expressly acknowledges that "[e]conomic agreements concluded by
states.. .such as [BITs].. .create economic opportunities for States[,]"" but does
this opportunity correlate directly to increasing FDI? Numerous quantitative
studies have measured changes in FDI inflows relative to HA proliferation, and the
findings are mixed.45 The prevailing view amongst them is that the relationship
between IIAs and FDI is either unclear,4 or a stalemate. 4 7 Other studies have
found a positive relationship between IIAs and FDI, but only when the study takes
into account other specific factors. 4 8 Some argue that, even in a vacuum, a nation
who executes more HAs will see a resulting gross increase in FDI. 49
As is often true, questioning whether HAs directly stimulate FDI 'when all
other things are equal' is irrelevant, because all things are not equal in this case;
the global economy and political system does not exist in vacuum. Capital-
importing countries, frequently developing nations with weak to moderate
domestic human rights protections, can be effectively trapped in a 'prisoner's
dilemma'.so Conceptually, it would be better for all developing nations with
'evolving' human rights and labor standards to collectively refrain from engaging
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/DownloadffreatyFile/2873 (2007) [hereinafter Norway Model].
42. See Nicholas Klein, Human Rights and International Investment Protection: Investment
protection as Human Right?, 4(1) GOETTINGEN J. OF INT'L L. 199, 204-09 (2012).
43. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 1-2, (2d ed. 2012).
44. UNGP, supra note 1, art. 9.
45. BECKY CARTER, HELPDESK RESEARCH REPORT: THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT LAW AND PROCEDURE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT/GROWTH 2 (Governance & Social Development Resource Centre 2013).
46. Jonathan Bonnitcha, Outline of a Normative Framework for Evaluating Interpretations of
Investment Treaty Provisions, EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION (Chester
Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
47. NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER ET. AL., INVESTMENT TREATIES AND WHY THEY
MATTER TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS (2012).
48. See CARTER, supra note 45, § 2.1.
49. See Hallward-Dreimeier, supra note 8.
50. 'Prisoners dilemma' describes a decision-making scenario wherein a group of actors would be
collectively better off if they ALL choose 'box a'. However, if any one actor chooses 'box b' that actor
will have an advantage over all other actors. The scenario adds a caveat that while collectively all actors
are better with 'box a,' IF all actors choose 'box b,' then all actors lose their competitive advantage
gained through collective selection of 'box a,' AND it nullifies the individual advantage gained by the
singular actor in breaking rank and choosing 'box b'.
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in IIAs to avoid the 'chill'. However, if one state breaks this collective agreement
it would gain a competitive advantage compared to the rest. Similarly, any nation
lacking near equal investor protections relative to its regional counterparts would
be perceived by investors as relatively more risky to invest in, and hence could
receive less investment."' The prisoners' dilemma reality of IIAs extends to other
parts of the decision making process as well, and is a concern in regards to the
'downward regulatory spiral.' 5 2 It is admitted that the relevance of IIAs to this
analysis does not rest wholly on their efficacy; IIAs exist and will continued to be
proliferated.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS IN TRADITIONAL BITS
The core principles of any BIT are codified in provisions offering protections
to investors relating to the treatment of their investment in the host state. These
provisions are the most frequently cited by investors in arbitration claims, 53 and are
the most controversial.54 Most agree that the unqualified terms of art 5 in these
provisions, such as favorable treatment and fair and equitable treatment (FET),
lead to inconsistent interpretations by tribunals and contribute to the restrictions on
policy space that states with traditional BITs face. Other scholars disagree that
regulatory space in treatment provisions has any impact on how investors select a
location. 56
a. National Treatment and Most Favored Nation
National treatment provisions guarantee investors treatment equal-to, or better
than, local investors, and include both pre-investment and post-investment
protections. MFN provisions guarantee investors' treatment equal to any non-party
third-state investors. These two provisions can be included in an IIA separately, or
together as shown here: "[e]ach Contracting Party shall accord to investments of
investors of the other Contracting Party, treatment which shall not be less
favorable than that accorded either to investments of its own investors or investors
51. See JACOB, supra note 8.
52. 'Downward regulatory spiral' describes the condition of states dismantling domestic reforms
in order to attract FDI and is discussed in Section III herein.
53. BONNITCHA, supra note 7, at 1.
54. See South African Development Council Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 4 (2012),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf (recommending
the non-inclusion of an MFN provision and the adoption of a different standard to FET for minimum
treatment) [hereinafter SADC MODEL BIT or SADC MODEL].
55. 'Terms of art' are ambiguous phrases which do not clearly infer intent of the drafters to
arbitral panels, including 'Fair and Equitable Treatment' and 'Full Protection and Security.' Thomas
Innes, Stepoe & Johnson LLP, The Adoption of Terms of Art in Bilateral Investment Treaties, Panel
Address at Sutton Colloquium at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law (Nov. 15, 2014).
56. Tomer Broude, Yorman Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, Who Cares About Regulatory
Space In BITs? A Comparative International Approach, HEBREW UNIV. OF JERUSALEM LEGAL STUD.
RES. PAPER SERIES, No. 16-41, at 8, https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2773686.
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of any third state.""
b. Minimum Standard of Treatment: FET and FPS
Minimum standard of treatment provisions, sometimes referred to 'absolute
standard of treatment', typically include an FET requirement and a 'full protection
and security' (FPS) requirement. The FET standard is designed to be an absolute
standard of treatment, unrelated to how other investments are treated by the host
state." Minimum standard of treatment provisions are the most controversial
provisions in traditional IIAs because they are commonly cited by investors in
arbitrations, and have proven to be a successful basis for claims.59 FET and FPS
provisions permit arbitral tribunals to "look not just at the change in value[,] but
also at the surrounding circumstances"60 of a potential violation of an investors'
rights.
The origin of FET comes from a 1926 international arbitration, Neer v. the
United Mexican States," a commonly cited decision in modem arbitrations. The
Neer tribunal stated that:
[I]n order to constitute an international delinquency, [treatment of a
foreign investment] should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful
neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man
would readily recognize its insufficiency. 62
In an IIA context, the first uses of FET and FPS were in early international
economic agreements such as the Havana Charter for an International Trade
Organization, the US Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties, and the
OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, all developed
between 1948 and 1967.63 These agreements merely stipulate that parties shall
"ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of nationals of the other
parties," and that "[s]uch property shall be accorded the most constant protection
and security."' FET and FPS provisions which proliferated in HAs over the past
50 years are simply not as robust as the Neer standard. They often mirror the
OECD Draft Convention, merely restating unqualified FET and FPS terms without
57. A common example of a National Treatment provision. This example from Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 4:2, India-Bulg., Oct. 29, 1998,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/96/treaty/678 (emphasis added).
58. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 27, at 6.
59. Eric De Brabandere, Human Rights Considerations in International Investment Arbitration,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL
AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 17 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Panos Merkouris eds., 2012).
60. Stiglitz, supra note 24, at 39.
61. L. F. H. Neer v. United Mexican States, IV R.I.A.A. 60, Opinion of Commissioners, ¶ 6 (Oct.
15, 1926).
62. Id. 14.
63. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 27, at 5.
64. Id.
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reference or definition. Today, there is no generally accepted definition of FET.
The China-Myanmar BIT provides the simplest example of a traditional
unqualified FET provision: "Investments of investors of each Contracting Party
shall all the time be accorded fair and equitable treatment in the territory of the
other Contracting Party." 65
Relying on traditional BIT provisions, modem arbitral tribunals have held
FET to be a widely-accepted principle "encompassing such fundamental standards
as good faith, due process, non-discrimination, and proportionality." 66 Tribunals
have held that regulatory measures which go beyond an investor's 'legitimate
expectations' to one of the fundamental standards listed above can violate the FET
requirement. Investors have claimed a range of harms under the legitimate
expectations standard, including that a state failed to provide a stable legal or
regulatory system,67 that treatment was unfair and arbitrary due to unintended
bureaucratic inefficiencies which caused financial harm to an investment,68 or that
a state had not acted in 'good faith' when making a regulatory policy decision. 69
Judgments which penalize a state in reliance on this form of 'good faith'
requirement can have the effect of repudiating states who attempt to enhance
environmental or human rights regulations, or those which make adjudicatory
decisions for the well-being of its citizens. 70 FET provisions traditionally require
that states bear the burden of proof in demonstrating good faith. 7' Most tribunals
only rule in favor of a state when the "record shows that the [state] treated the
Claimant and its investment in good faith, and on equal footing." 72
Some tribunals, however, have interpreted the standard to be even more
investor friendly; in Tecmed, a tribunal awarded the investor just over US $5
million because the Mexican government refused to renew an operating license for
their landfill, which was polluting drinking water in a local community." The
tribunal held that "a State may treat foreign investment unfairly and inequitably
without necessarily acting in bad faith." 74 This expansion of the good faith
standard places significant burden on states to not only refrain from acting in 'bad
65. Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government
of the Union of Myanmar on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Myan., art. 3, Dec.
12, 2012, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/762 (emphasis added).
66. MTD Equity Sdn. Bdh. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, 1] 109 (May
25, 2004).
67. Frontier Petrol. Services Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 11 261 (Nov.
12, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0342.pdf
68. MTD Equity, supra note 66, 1 189.
69. Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 11 153 (May 29, 2003).
70. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 27.
71. See id.
72. Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 236 (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0149_0.pdf.
73. Tecnias Medioambientales Tecmed S.A., supra note 69.
74. Id. 11 153.
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faith', but to actively engage in 'good faith' actions. This is one way unqualified
BIT provisions can lead to interpretations with the potential to restrict a state's
policy space.
Additionally, in Tecmed, the investor had expected the government was aware
of the long-term investment required to operate a landfill, and had assumed that the
investment and initial approval would lead to a guaranteed re-approval of the
operating license at each scheduled renewal period." The government's
revocation of the operating license after they discovered the pollution was cited as
evidence of action contrary to the investors "legitimate expectations[.]"" It is
possible this decision has had a restricting effect on the Mexican government's
inclination to make changes to regulations which affect other similar industrial
operations, even if they are found to be polluting communities, placing citizens in
danger. This is an example of indirect regulatory chill.
When determining whether a regulation constitutes unfair or inequitable
treatment, tribunals also consider the 'proportionality' of the harm suffered as
compared to the benefit advanced by the regulatory measure. The tribunal in
Occidental applied a case-by-case test "balancing the interests of the state against
those of the [investor], to assess whether the particular sanction is a proportionate
response in the particular circumstances."" The complication with this is that
multinational enterprises (MNE's) backing foreign investment are often well
equipped to file claims against states regardless of whether the expectation is of
'lower level punishments' that the court suggested may pass scrutiny as
proportionate when there is no direct causal link between the act that the law seeks
to punish and the harm that the law seeks to prevent.78
c. Stabilization Clauses
Other than these core provisions, there are other types of treatment provisions
which distinctly affect government policy space, the most vilified being
stabilization clauses. Typically inserted in private direct contracts between
investors and states, and rarely included in state-state IIAs, these provisions
guarantee that investment will be exempt from almost all new governmental
regulations regardless of the reason for the measure, or that they will be
compensated for any loss of income resulting from such a change. 9 These
provisions are some of the most damaging to policy space as they explicitly, and
75. See id.
76. Id. 1 88.
77. Occidental Petrol. Corp., supra note 22, ¶ 417.
78. While corporations are undeterred by low-level penalties, they are often conscious of their
image and may choose to employ CSR strategies themselves. Unfortunately, often enough, only the
worst corporate violators are exposed. Stronger penalties are required to deter the worse violators who
have less of a concern for corporate image, including those in the extractives, manufacturing, and
construction industries.
79. See Titus Edjua & Antony Crockett, Human Rights Not Negotiable: Stabilization Clauses and
Human Rights, 28 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 50 (2009).
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by design, prohibit regulation. While demonstrably harmful, stabilization clauses
are appropriately outside of the scope of this analysis because, first, they have
faded from common use, and second, are not commonly included in state-state
BITs.
V. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS AND HAs: WHICH
LAW APPLIES?
What happens when there is a conflict of law between a BIT and another
international treaty to which the responding state is a party? More simply put, do
states' investment obligations supersede the states' other international treaty
obligations? Some authors speak of a "presumption of compliance with
international law[,]" which posits that "the treaty parties would not have intended
that their agreement offends existing rules of international law."80 However,
arbitral tribunals have rarely ruled in this manner, holding that while a state may
have a responsibility to regulate to the standard of its international obligations, "it
equally is beyond a doubt that the state holds responsibility towards the foreign
investor for the breach of the provisions of the investment treaty""1 if remedy of a
regulatory shortcoming causes the violation. Often this type of claim arises, and is
most critical for state policy space, when a respondent state asserts, in defense of a
claim, that a regulatory measure disputed by an investor was intended to comply
with a human rights obligation.
The complex relationship between relevant international human rights
obligations and obligations owed to investors under a BIT requires an analysis of
what rights and obligations each assigns, and to whom. International human rights
law, including the ICCPR82 and ICESCR,3 and customary international law
(CIL)84 such as the responsibility to protect (R2P),8 jus cogens, and erga omnes,"
primarily create rights for people and obligations for states. IIAs create rights only
for investors, and obligations for states to protect investors and investments. As the
80. JACOB, supra note 8, at 28.
81. Brabandere, supra note 59, at 12.
82. ICCPR, supra note 35.
83. ICESCR, supra note 35.
84. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2014) ("International law that derives from the practice
of states and is accepted by them as legally binding.. .This is one of the principal sources or building
blocks of the international legal system.").
85. For more on R2P, see, e.g., Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to
Protect, 81 FOR. AFF. 99, 102-03 (2002)
The responsibility to protect implies a [state] duty to react to situations in which there is
compelling need for human protection. If preventive measures fail to resolve or contain such
a situation, and when the state in question is unable or unwilling to step in, then intervention
by other states may be required.
86. Jus cogens are peremptory principles of international law that cannot be overridden by
specific treaties between countries; that is: norms that admit of no derogation; they are binding on all
states at all times, regardless of accession (e.g., prohibitions on aggression, slavery, and genocide).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)
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SRSG wrote in 2007, international human rights treaties do not "impose direct
legal responsibilities on corporations." 7 The responsibility to advance domestic
human rights legislation and protect its citizens from harm is a responsibility that
rests solely on state actors, which includes protecting citizens from harm caused by
investors covered under a BIT." It is easy to see how a conflict could arise
between these obligations.
Some have questioned whether placing robust international legal obligations
directly on investors would solve this dilemma. The SRSG himself, in referencing
the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights," said that criticism of
applying direct responsibilities on businesses through international law was
appropriate because international law has not been "transformed to the point where
it can be said that the broad array international human rights attach direct legal
obligations to corporations."" International law is also ill-equipped to place direct
legal obligations on businesses because the international judicial and monitoring
mechanisms available for enforcement of any potential direct obligations is
lacking.91 While the CSR movement, driven in the area of domestic regulation by
states like India with its mandatory corporate philanthropy tax,92 is gaining ground,
it is still a largely voluntary regime, and often national in context, not international.
While there is a lack of consensus amongst tribunals on when a state's
international human rights obligations will pre-empt obligations under an
investment agreement or excuse a violation of a BIT provision, preemptory jus
cogens are an exception to the rule. In a case where a term in a BIT were
interpreted to award a corporation damages as a result of a policy measure
designed to prevent jus cogens violations, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties would invalidate such interpretation.9 ' Vienna Convention Article 53
states that "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
87. Report of the SRSG on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility
and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN Doc. 1 44, A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007). It should also be
noted that corporations are now, as a result of some national CSR laws, and for other gross violations,
being held accountable for actions which violate human rights, but this is not yet a common occurrence.
88. Patrick Dumberry & Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, When and How Allegations of Human Rights
Violations can be Raised in Investor-State Arbitration, 13 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 349, 352 (2012).
89. UN Sub-commission on the Promotions and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human
Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Draft Norms].
90. Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006).
91. See Castellino & Bradshaw, Sustainable Development and Social Inclusion: Why a Changed
Approach is Central to Combating Vulnerability, WASH. INT'L L. J., 459, 467 (2015).
92. See Ananda Das Gupta, Implementing Corporate Social Responsibility in India: Issues and
the Beyond, IMPLEMENTING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: INDIAN PERSPECTIVES (Ray & Raju
eds., 2014) (India has mandated a 2% tax on all businesses for corporate philanthropy purposes).
93. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1980).
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peremptory norm of general international law." 94 A case presenting such a scenario
is unlikely to occur, however it does highlight an interesting distinction; provisions
within international human rights treaties which have grown to become preemptory
norms, such as ICCPR Article 8 prohibiting slavery, torture, and forced labor,95
supersede any BIT-based right an investor could claim if conflicting. Additionally,
investors may be held directly accountable for violations of jus cogens norms these
norms under international law.9 6
While conflict of law issues are fundamental to this discussion, there are very
few arbitral tribunals who have ruled directly on them, most seeking to decide such
cases on procedural issues.97 In Azurix Corp. v. the Argentine Republic, the
tribunal gave no consideration to the fact that Azurix failed to make repairs of a
water treatment facility causing an outbreak of dangerous algae in the provincial
water system,9 8 which Argentina claimed was a "violation of its citizens' right to
water[J" 99 The tribunal ultimately did not directly address Argentina's human
rights claim, or provide a holding on the conflict of law issue. The arbitrators
merely issued a judgment in favor of the corporation on the basis of unfair and
arbitrary treatment under an FET standard.'0 The tribunal did declare a position in
the conflict of law debate, albeit unintentionally; by ignoring the petitioners claim
relating to human rights violations the tribunal made it clear that it is acceptable for
arbitrators to ignore other obligations outside the scope of the IIA's express
mandate.
In the few cases which do affirmatively consider human rights obligations,
most tribunals "seem to be very cautious in elevating human rights laws to the
same status of investment protections[,]"'o' and are "are generally reluctant to
accord significant weight to human rights." 02 In fact, "no investment tribunal has
absolved a [state] that has encountered inconsistent human rights obligations from
its investment obligations, or reduced the amount of compensation paid." 0 3 While
it is true that as a general policy "[s]tates are not liable to pay compensation to a
94. Id.
95. ICCPR, supra note 35, art. 8.
96. ICCPR, supra note 35, art. 8.
97. JACOB, supra note 8, at 30.
98. Azurix v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, IIC 24, Award, 1124 (July 14, 2006).
99. U.N. Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15, 1 39-
44, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Nov. 29, 2002).
100. See Azurix, supra note 98, at Executive Summary. Also, in a similar case against Argentina,
Vivendi v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010), the tribunal
did not rule on the conflict of law issue. These cases are some of the primary reasons Argentina is
currently voiding their BITs.
101. Claire Cutler, Human rights Promotions through Transnational Investment Regimes: An
international Political Economy Approach, 1 POLITICs & GOVERNANCE 16, 27 (2013).
102. Moshe Hirsch, Int'l L. Forum at the Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, The Interaction between
International Investment Law and Human Rights Treaties: A Sociological Perspective, Research Paper
no. 06-13, at 228 (2013).
103. Id. at 218.
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foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their regulatory powers, they
adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are aimed at the
general welfare[,]"'" few arbitral tribunals are keen to adopt this holding if
language in the agreement creating such a protection is not explicit.'s
In a slight exception to the rule, some recent tribunals have endorsed the
'clean hands' doctrine, 0 6 giving the English common-law rule weight in arbitral
proceedings. The doctrine may be successfully cited as a state defense when
investors are alleged to have directly contributed to a human rights violation. 0 If a
tribunal comes to the conclusion that an investor has committed a human rights
violation in relation to the disputed investment, it could find the investor's claim
inadmissible as a matter of jurisdiction. 0 A number of tribunals have denied that
they have the jurisdiction to hear claims on the basis inadmissibility due to lack of
'clean hands' for committing acts such as fraud and bribery in the course of the
investment.' This should assuage some human rights concerns, but as the
application of this doctrine is not yet widespread states may still fear that investors
with poor human rights records may be awarded damages as a result of a suit
alleging inequitable regulation of their practices, leading to a regulatory chilling
effect.
One scholar contends that, from a sociological perspective, it is "not
surprising that investment tribunals are generally reluctant to accord significant
weight to human rights treaties in international investment law[,]" because the
"relationships between the social settings involved in human rights laws and
investment laws reveal a considerable socio-cultural divide."" 0o It is possible that
including in BITs explicit references to international human rights treaties, or:to
international law in general, could bridge not only the socio-cultural gap between
these two legal regimes, but also reduce the potential conflicts between them."'
Additional instruction in the language of HAs themselves is necessary to direct
tribunals to engage with international human rights instruments in the case of a
conflict, and in the case of allegations of violations by investors.
104. Saluka Invs. BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Partial Award, 1 255 (Mar. 17, 2006).
105. BITs which include this language explicitly in the general exceptions provisions are discussed
in section VI.
106. Patrick Dumberry & Gabrielle Dumas-Aubin, How to Impose Human Rights Obligations on
Corporations Under Investment Treaties? Pragmatic Guidelines for the Amendment of BITS, Y.B. ON
INT'L L. & POL'Y 575,575 (2011-2012) (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 589.
109. See Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award 1 96 (Aug.
27, 2008); Inceysa Vallisolentana, S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award
192 (Aug. 2, 2006); World Duty Free Company Limited v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award
157 (Oct. 4, 2006).
110. Hirsch, supra note 102, at 228-29.
111. Examples of how this can be accomplished follow in section VI.
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VI. UNGP ARTICLE 9
UNGP Article 9 specifically recommends that "States should maintain
adequate domestic policy space to meet their human rights obligations when
pursuing business-related policy objectives with other States or business
enterprises, for instance through investment treaties or contracts."" 2 The SRSG's
commentary agrees that while IIAs create economic opportunities for states, "they
can also affect the domestic policy space of governments.""l 3 As an example, the
commentary explains that "the terms of [HAs] may constrain States from fully
implementing new human rights legislation, or put them at risk of binding
international arbitration if they do so."'l 4 The SRSG recommends that states retain
"adequate policy and regulatory ability to protect human rights"' 15 when drafting
BITs, while balancing that with the need to provide "necessary investor
protections." 116
Some scholars argue that the UNGP was a failure, and fault the SRSG for
catering to industry efforts to stall the progress of sustainable development
efforts.' These scholars claim that by not creating positive obligations on
investors, the UNGP will not be effective in advancing human rights. Why does
the UNGP merely require that states maintain 'domestic policy space' to regulate
human rights, and not recommend that HA's include requirements that states
implement specific regulations or that investors maintain certain standards? The
answer is two-fold.
First, positive obligations exist in other international human rights
agreements, such as the ICCPR"' and the ICESCR,"I which are open for
accession, and which many nations have eruditely signed. States who accept and
accede to international human rights treaties are typically required to maintain
domestic regulations implementing the standard set by the provisions of the
agreement. For nations not bound by these agreements, jus cogens and erga omnes
still apply.' 2 0 In both situations states are bound by these obligations, however the
duty to correct lax domestic enforcement is entrusted in the UN and the UN
Security Council,' 21 not in investor-state arbitral tribunals. From the perspective of
112. UNGP, supra note 1, art. 9.
113. Id art. 9, Commentary.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id
117. ICCPR, supra note 35.
118. Positive obligations in the ICCPR include; the regulations on use of the death penalty in art.
6, the prohibition on torture in art. 7, and the prohibitions on slavery, servitude, and compulsory labor in
art. 8. ICCPR, supra note 35.
119. Positive obligations in the ICESCR include; the right to work in art. 6, the right to collective
bargaining art. 8, and the requirement of improving all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene
in art. 12. ICESCR, supra note 35.
120. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1980).
121. Id
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international law, positive obligations in IIA's would allow arbitral tribunals to
rule on subject matter far outside of the scope of their mandates.
Second, each state is a sovereign nation with the power to exercise control
over its territory,1 22 and hence is generally free to select its own regulatory regime.
Specific recommendations from the UNGP could invade this right. The SRSG
selects the term policy space as a means of recommending the implementation of
language into IIA's which will reduce restrictions placed on a host states ability to
make legitimate policy decisions regarding human rights regulation, while not
mandating that any specific regulatory changes be made. The choice is left to each
state to develop their domestic regulations in compliance with international human
rights standards.
In an ideal-world, each state would be an efficient, effective actor, with the
power to regulate and enforce domestic human rights regulations, and the will do
to so. This ideal state would always fulfill its internationally binding obligations to
protect its citizens as required by the international instruments they are party to,
and would therefore would be best positioned to regulate investors operating
within in its sovereign territory.' 23 UNGP Article 1 even recognizes the state
responsibility to protect as a core duty which guides the remainder of the
recommendations.1 24
The ideal scenario for a developing state which completely and effectively
implements JNGP Article 9 recommendations into its BIT regime is as follows.
The developing nation proliferates a progressive BIT regime, effectively catalyzing
growth in FDI inflows, kick-starting its economy. As a result of the FDI boom, the
state's available financial resources increase and are allocated to the development
and enforcement of domestic regulations. State citizens then enjoy increased
quality of life resulting from economic development coupled with increased
protection from harms caused by investment.
In the current geopolitical system, some states can effectively regulate and
enforce domestic prohibitions on human rights abuses, but many cannot.1 25
"Because of the overwhelming economic power" 26 of some foreign investors,
many states, particularly developing nations, may not have the resources to
effectively regulate or enforce human rights laws.127 Additional capacity building
and resource sharing is required to overcome this gap.
The UNGP recommendation expressly allows for a case-specific and
differentiated analysis of policy space to be done by each state internally. It
refrains from infringing on state sovereignty or creating obligations which cannot
be adequately implemented. If policy space is the answer, the real question then
122. U.N. Charter art. 2, 11.
123. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 88, at 352.
124. UNGP, supra note 1, art. 1.
125. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 88, at 371.
126. Id. at 352.
127. Id.
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becomes, what is the best way for states to effectively heed the UNGP Article 9
recommendations and maintain domestic policy space to regulate human rights
when engaging in HAs?
VII. MAINTAINING POLICY SPACE IN IIAs
There are numerous ways to ensure that when engaging in an IIA a state
protects its domestic policy space to regulate human rights, some of which are
evidenced in state practice.12 8 Structurally, states can renegotiate existing BITs,
void their BITs and draft entirely new ones, or implement interpretative
addendums to existing treaties that clarify provisions.129 Interpretive language can
be inserted into provisions to clarify ambiguous terms of art; traditional provisions
can be expanded to provide additional protections for human rights and policy
space; additional provisions can be added which explicitly protect governmental
policy space; and, most controversially, positive obligations can be inserted into
BITs which place direct responsibilities on corporations and states to protect
human rights. The following sections present various methodology, as utilized by
some existing IIAs and models.
Section A briefly questions the efficacy of two untenable options which have
been recommended; section B discusses additional language that can be inserted
into agreements; section C analyzes interpretive language that can be included in
troublesome provisions; section D considers general exceptions provisions; section
E highlights potential additional provisions which can be added to bolster the
treaty, although not all are recommended for use therein. 30
a. Untenable Options
There are several unrealistic and untenable methods which have been
suggested to universalize international investment law in a way that would reduce
the regulatory chill and assist states in better maintaining domestic policy space to
regulate human rights. A global Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) has
been proposed and rejected twice, most recently one that was developed by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1995."' A
global MAI, complete with robust provisions protecting domestic policy space,
would go a long way to alleviating the regulatory chill. A global MAI is untenable,
simply because all nations have different needs, and as recent history shows, even
smaller 'dozen-nation' IIAs such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement take
years to develop.' 32
128. JACOB, supra note 8, at 33.
129. JACOB, supra note 8, at 33.
130. This section proceeds without distinction between 'void and re-draft' and 'renegotiation'
methods of adapting agreements.
131. Organization for the Economic Co-operation and Development, Multilateral Agreement on
Investment Draft Consolidated Text, DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV 1, 95 (Apr. 22, 1998) (not enacted).
132. IAN F. FERGUSSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (TPP): IN BRIEF, summary (Feb. 9, 2016) (It took 5 years of negotiation to
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Others have suggested amending the International Centre on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States Convention
(ICSID convention), which arbitrates a vast majority of investment disputes, in
order to allow tribunals to consider international human rights law when hearing
cases.1 3 Most scholars agree that amending this treaty is 'nearly impossible', as it
has not been changed since 1965 and has resisted other more spirited attacks on its
severe rigidity.'34
This is not to say that neither of these changes cannot be accomplished; only
that it would be exceedingly difficult.
b. Preambular Language
Preambular language referencing international human rights treaties,
principles of international law, or other international obligations may help states
maintain domestic policy space in IAAs. While preambular language is not
binding, it can be important in arbitral interpretation. It allows tribunals to adopt
an approach that places more weight on international human rights treaties, even if
not explicitly controlling.13 6
A preamble, proffered by the South African Development Community Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty (SADC Model) includes a recognition that sustainable
development led by FDI can encourage the "furtherance of human rights and
human development."' 37 It also states that
[r]eaffirming the right of the State Parties to regulate and to introduce
new measures relating to investments in their territories in order to meet
national policy objectives, and-taking into account any asymmetries
with respect to the measures in place-the particular need of developing
countries to exercise this right[.] 3 1
This paragraph highlights three important things. First, that states have a right
to regulate and meet national policy objectives, explicitly creating state rights
under the IIA. Second, that there may be asymmetries in domestic legislation
which need to be corrected, noting that investors should expect future regulation to
shore-up those asymmetries. This language is adapted from the World Trade
Organization's General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO GATS),"' which
agree on a final publishable draft of the TPP); MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, MAI AND THE
THREAT TO AMERICAN FREEDOM (1998).
133. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 88, at 358.
134. Id. at 578; CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY art. 65 (2d
ed. 2009). Also, while this author (I) notes that it is illogical, and usually failure-inspiring, to assume
that anything which has not been accomplished in a long time is impossible,. it is justifiable in this
situation.
135. JACOB, supra note 8, at 34.
136. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 88, at 359.
137. SADC Model, supra note 54.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. World Trade Organization, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
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many developed nations are party to, and therefore "is likely to be universally
accepted."1 40 Third, that this is especially true for developing states who are just
beginning to regulate.
The preamble to the Model International Agreement on Investment for
Sustainable Development (IISD Model)141 makes no explicit reference to human
rights, instead focusing on sustainable development and existing international law.
It begins by stating that the goal of the agreement is to promote sustainable
development through investment,1 42 defining sustainable development as per the
1992 Rio Declaration.1 43 The IISD Model preamble continues by "affirming the
progressive development of international law and policy on the relationships
between enterprises and host governments as seen in.. .the [ILO Declaration],'4 4
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 14 and the [UN Draft
Norms].1 46 The preamble adds that it is "seeking an overall balance of rights and
obligations in international investment between investors, host countries and home
countries," 4 7 which is language that strikes right at the heart of the issue while
leaving appropriate room for states and investors to perceive both benefits and
obligations.
The clear majority of other national model agreements do not explicitly assert
human rights or international legal instruments in the preamble. The US Model
states that it desires to increase investment "in a manner consistent with the
protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of
internationally recognized labor rights."' 48 State regulation of international
obligations under labor treaties is crucial to advancing sustainable development,
and they are likely be applicable in arbitral disputes, however preambular language
of this kind does not create an explicit recognition that labor rights supersede
investor rights under an IIA.
Other nations' model agreements are less robust. The Canadian Model BIT
preamble has just one provision which references a desire to promote sustainable
140. Id
141. International Institute for Sustainable Development, Model International Agreement on
Investment for Sustainable Development (2005) [hereinafter IISD Model] (developed by the
International Institute for Sustainable Development [hereinafter IISD]).
142. Id. at preamble.
143. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-
14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.l
(Vol.1), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) (sustainable development is defined as "[t]he right to development
must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations.").
144. International Labor Organization Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
and its Follow-up, Annex 1, 27A.Doc/v3 (June 19, 1998).
145. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (2008).
146. U.N. Draft Norms, supra note 89.
147. IISD Model, supra note 141, at preamble.
148. SADC MODEL BIT, supra note 54.
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development,1 49 the German Model BIT preamble merely recognizes that
encouraging investment is "apt to stimulate...the prosperity of both nations[,]"'s
and the French Model BIT preamble has no reference to sustainable development,
human rights, or labor rights.' 5 '
Other European nations have been more inclusive when drafting model BIT
preambles. One of the most progressive national model BITs, which was never
formally adopted, is the 2007 Norwegian Draft Model BIT. Its preamble has a
number of paragraphs which collectively highlight the importance of "health,
safety, and the environment[," "internationally recognized labor rights[,]"
"corporate social responsibility [(CSR)][,]" "obligations under international law[,]"
"human rights and fundamental freedoms[J" "principles set out in the [UNI
Charter and the [JDHIR][J" and "provisions of international agreements relating to
the environment[.]"l52 The breadth of its preambular reference to human rights and
international law may have been why this model was never formally adopted.
The Investment Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa Common Investment Area (COMESA IA) is one of the most progressive
active IAs.'53 It is in use by nations in the Southern African regional association,
including South Africa. In preface to its 'Part Two', which contains substantive
rights and obligations of investors, the COMESA IA expressly requires an "overall
balance of rights and obligations between investors and Member States." 5 4
Preambular language is effective at presenting the object and purpose of the
treaty, and may be considered by arbitral tribunals when interpreting the intent of
ambiguous language in a provision of an IIA. Most importantly however, it is,
invariably, non-binding. For a state to effectively maintain domestic policy space
to regulate human rights, it must look beyond the preamble of the IIA.
c. Interpretive Language
Several progressive BITs and IlAs include additional interpretive language
defining the intended scope and meaning of BIT provisions. Frequently, this
language is added to traditional treatment provisions to clarify ambiguous
terminology and standards. Interpretive language is most effective in defining and
clarifying language in treatment provisions.
149. Canada Model Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (2004) [hereinafter
Canada Model].
150. German Model Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments (2008) [hereinafter German Model].
151. Draft France Model Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments
(2008) [hereinafter France Model].
152. Norway Draft Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment (2007) [hereinafter
Norway Model].
153. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Investment Agreement for the COMESA
Common Investment Area art. 11, Rmm/(07) (2007) [hereinafter COMESA [A] (this agreement is
progressive throughout its text).
154. Id.
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1. Interpretive Language in National Treatment and MFN
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Comprehensive Investment
Agreement (ASEAN CIA) requires host states to accord investors "treatment no
less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own
investors[.]"' 5 The language 'in like circumstances' "ensure(s) that a broad view
is taken, rather than simply a narrow question of whether the investors are in the
same or related or competitive sector."' This additional text "ensures the reasons
for any measures can be fully considered" by tribunals. 157
The limitation of the language 'in like circumstances' is that it leaves the
interpretation of what 'like circumstances' should include to the discretion of the
tribunal. The COMESA IA has the same language as the ASEAN CIA, but adds
that "[f]or greater certainty, references to 'like circumstances' in paragraph 1 of
this Article requires an overall examination on a case by case bases of all the
circumstances of an investment."' 8 It explains that the circumstances of an
investment include; "its effects on third persons and the local community[,]"
"effects on the [environment][,]" its sector, the "aim of the measure concerned[,]"
the common regulatory process applied to the type of measure, and other factors.' 59
Few modem BITs contain interpretive language as comprehensive as the
COMESA IA.1 60
Some progressive national treatment and MFN provisions include additional
language which limits the scope of application to specific investor actions. The
Finland - Zambia BIT guarantees investors national treatment with respect only to
"the acquisition, expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment
and sale or other disposal of investments."' 6 ' By limiting the scope of non-
discrimination provisions within each clause the state can exclude claims to
"existing or new measures that may be inconsistent with the non-discrimination
obligations." 62  Similarly, many progressive national treatment and MFN
provisions include additional qualified exemptions for non-conforming measures,
taxation, and other international investment treaties to which the state may be a
155. Association of South East Asian Nations Comprehensive Investment Agreement art. 5, Feb.
26, 2009, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3095 [hereinafter ASEAN CIA
or CIA] (emphasis added).
156. SADC MODEL, supra note 54, art. 4.
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. COMESA IA, supra 153, art. 17 (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. E.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Kuwait, Sept. 26,
2011, 2014 Can. T.S. No. 2014/5, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/35/treaty/788
(The national treatment provision does include the language 'like circumstances,' but does not have any
defining clause).
161. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the
Republic of Zambia on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Fin.-Zam., art. III, 1 2, July 9,
2005, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/232/treaty/1 552 (not in force).
162. SADC MODEL, supra note 54.
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Other BITs explicitly list ways in which the state can be found to have
provided 'treatment less favorable' to the exclusion of others possible ways. The
Germany - Oman BIT list includes, among others, that treatment less favorable
may include "unequal treatment in the case of restrictions on the purchase of raw
or auxiliary materials, of energy or fuel or of means of production or operation of
any kind, unequal treatment in the case of impeding the marketing of products
inside or outside the country."'
For a state to effectively reduce restrictions on its domestic policy space
regarding human rights obligations, the minimum language recommended for a
national treatment or MFN clause would be something similar to US Model Article
3. This provision includes a 'like circumstances' requirement, limits the scope of
the provision to the "establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, and sale or other disposition of investment[,]" and has exceptions for
regional government treatment.'6 5 National treatment and MFN provisions are not
the only ones which cause worry for states; FET and FPS provisions also have a
profound effect on policy space.
2. Interpretive Language in FET and FPS
The use of interpretive language in FET provisions often expressly directs
tribunals to apply provisions in a manner that is the least restrictive of the host
state's domestic policy space. Due to the generally risky nature of unqualified FET
provisions, the inclusion of interpretive language in these provisions may be the
single most effective method by which states can protect their policy space.
Among the common qualifiers added to these provisions is language
explaining that "treatment [is] in accordance with customary international
law[.]"l 66 This language clarifies that FET does not require treatment beyond the
minimum required by CIL. 67 However, this is often confusing to tribunals because
"there are further difficulties in determining precisely what standard is required by
[CIL]."'6 In the US Model, following basic FET and FPS provisions,1 69 a longer
explanatory clause states that "for greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the
163. See, e.g., Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Sultanate of Oman
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Oman, art. 3, ¶ 4-7,
May 30, 2007, 1475 U.N.T.S. 261, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctadorg/IIA/country/159/treaty/1731.
164. Id. T 3 ( addressing "measure[s] that have to be taken for reasons of public security and order,
public health or morality[j" by exempting those from the provisions requirement).
165. U.S. Model, supra note 40, art. 3.
166. Id. art. 5, 11.
167. BONNITCHA, supra note 7, § 3.2.1.
168. Id.
169. U.S. Model, supra note 40, art. 5, 1 1 ("Each Party shall accord to covered investments
treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security.").
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minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments."'7 0 it
continues, "the concepts of [FET] and [FPS] do not require treatment in addition to
or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional
substantive rights.""' This explanation distinctly qualifies FET and FPS, explicitly
prohibiting some ways in which investors have been able to file illegitimate
claims, such as by claiming 'regulatory stability', which is not required by CIL.
"By limiting the source of FET to [CIL], these treaties seek to rein in the
discretion of tribunals" and says "to arbitrators that [they] cannot go beyond what
[CIL] declares to be the content of the minimum standard of treatment."' 72 The US
Model goes even further by specifically defining FET as "the obligation not to
deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in
accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal
systems of the world;"" 3 and defines FPS as requiring "each Party to provide the
level of police protection required under [CIL]."'74
The COMESA IA approaches this issue from a different perspective. It states
that FET is merely the minimum standard required under CIL, but adds "[s]tates
understand that different [states] have different forms of administrative, legislative
and judicial systems, and that [states] at different levels of development may not
achieve the same standard at the same time."'7 1 While this provision does leave
more decisions to the discretion of tribunals, it allows them to consider more
broadly the needs of developing nations when applying the FET standard.
The recently published TPP 76 stipulates the minimum standard of treatment
owed to covered investments is "treatment in accordance with applicable
customary international law principles, including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security.""' This language qualifies FET and FPS as merely
subsets of customary international law principles. The TPP states that, "[fjor
greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens as the standard of treatment to be afforded to
covered investments," and continues by stipulating that "[t]he concepts of [FET]
and [FPS] do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required
by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights."17 8
170. Id. T 2 (emphasis added).
17 1. Id.
172. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Fair and Equitable Treatment, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/DIAEIA/2011/5, at 28 (2012).
173. U.S. Model, supra note 40, art. 5, T 2a.
174. Id. T 2b.
175. COMESA IA, supra note 153, at art. 14.
176. TPP, supra note 132. The agreement, negotiated between nations representing 40% of the
world's economy, is far from guaranteed to be implemented as of now, but presents some exceptional
examples of policy space protective language. TPP signatory nations are: The United States, Canada,
Mexico, Peru, Chile, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Australia, and New Zealand. As of
December 2016, it seems likely that the TTP will not go into effect.
177. Id art. 9.6(1).
178. Id. art. 9.6(2).
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To ensure that tribunals consider the minimum standard of treatment as the
lowest possible standard required under international law, the TPP expressly
defines FET as including "the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due
process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world[,]"' 9 and FPS as
requiring "each Party to provide the level of police protection required under
customary international law."80
The TPP also directly addresses concerns of civil society that 'legitimate
expectation' claims can still be brought under a partially qualified FET provision;
"the mere fact that.a Party takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent
with an investor's expectations does not constitute a breach of this Article, even if
there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result."'"' It states further
that "[flor greater certainty, the mere fact that a subsidy or grant has not been
issued, renewed or maintained, or has been modified or reduced, by a Party, does
not constitute a breach of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the
covered investment as a result."'82 This reduces fears that states may place
themselves at risk by using subsidies or grants to attract investment or incentivize
good behavior.
The SADC Model recommends against the inclusion of any FET standard,
instead suggesting a 'fair administrative treatment' standard be used.'8" Fair
administrative treatment requires that, taking into account the level ofdevelopment,
"administrative, legislative, and judicial processes do not operate in a manner that
is arbitrary or that denies justice." 8 4 it also guarantees that investors will be
"notified in a timely manner of administrating or judicial proceedings that directly
affect investment"; that there exists a "right of appeal"; that investors will have
"access to government-held information" in a timely manner; and that states will
"progressively strive to improve the transparency, efficiency, independence, and
accountability" of their governmental processes.'
As a more traditional alternative, the SADC Model does provide an example
of a reduced FET standard for use if needed, which requires "the demonstration of
an act or action by the government that are an outrage, in bad faith, a willful
neglect of fury or an insufficiency so far short of international standards that every
reasonable and impartial person would readily recognize its insufficiency."' 86 Even
this standard, the SADC posits, can lead to unintended claims.'87
Only South Africa and other COMESA state have even considered adopting
179. Id. art. 9.6(2)(a).
180. TPP, supra note 132, art. 9.6(2)(b).
181. Id.art.9.6(4).
182. Id. art. 9.6(5).
183. SADC MODEL, supra note 54, art. 5.
184. Id. art. 5.1 (option 2).
185. Id. art 5.2-5.5 (option 2).
186. Id. art. 5.2 (option 1).
187. Id. art. 5.
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the SADC Model's fair administrative treatment requirements.' 88 Some of the
interpretive language presented in the US Model, the TPP, and other progressive
model BITs is becoming more commonly used. The addition of interpretive
language into existing provisions in IIAs may be the most effective method of
maintaining domestic policy space to regulate human rights, but other changes are
also possible.
d. General Exceptions Provisions
Most IIAs include a general exceptions provision which exempts certain types
of regulatory measures from application. Common exceptions include those for
non-conforming measures, taxation, and national security.' 89 The Canada Model
BIT specifically addresses issues with policy space in its general exceptions
provision, emphasizing that the guarantees therein do not apply to a party
enforcing measures to "protect human, animal or plant life or health[,]" taking
action "in pursuance of its obligations under the [UN] Charter[,]" or to any
investments in "cultural" industries.'90 The last requirement, for actions relating to
any cultural industries, can be especially protective of human rights policy space
because of the potentially sensitive rights involved, such as those enumerated in
the ICCPR and CERD. 9
Another approach, adopted by the US Model, is to not include a single
general exceptions clause, but to provide separate provisions which create
exceptions specifically for taxation, non-conforming measures, national security,
financial services industries, and ones which intend to reduce regulatory chill.1 92
The TPP follows in a similar vein, mandating that no investment provisions "shall
be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any
measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives." 93 The most confounding
approach is evident in the ASEAN CIA, which merely exempts from application of
the IIA any measures "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent with this agreement."94 It is unclear what measures
would be inconsistent with the agreement itself, leaving this determination to the
discretion of the tribunal.
188. The SADC MODEL was heavily considered in the drafting of the COMESA IA, over which
South Africa had a great influence.
189. See Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of the
Union of Myanmar for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment art. 7, Japan-Myan.,
Dec. 15, 2013, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/105/treaty/2155.
190. Canada Model, supra note 149, art. 10.
191. See generally ICCPR, supra note 35; International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966).
192. U.S. Model, supra note 40,passim.
193. TPP, supra note 132, art. 9.15 (emphasis added).
194. ASEAN CIA, supra note 155, art. 17.
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e. Additional Approaches
There are two categories of novel provisions, less common than those
previously presented, which are intended to maintain state domestic policy space.
The first category is one of 'passive provisions'; those which provide exceptions
for certain industries, types of activity, or sectors, like the approach taken by the
US Model."' Included in this category are inventive provisions which are likely to
be effective, and be universally accepted by states.
Several scholars and international organizations have also recommended the
inclusion of provisions from a second category, those which place 'positive
obligations' on states and investors in a few specific areas of international law,
including human rights, labor rights, environmental protection, and anti-
corruption.1 96 These provisions are more aggressive and more controversial. They
expand international legal obligations of states and have a larger negative financial
impact on investors.
1. 'Passive Provisions'
One passive provision, which is arguably successful at preventing a
regulatory 'race to the bottom',' 97 requires that member states "not waive or
otherwise derogate from or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from measures
concerning labour, public health, safety or the environment as an encouragement
for the establishment, expansion or retention of investments."' 9 While this does
eliminate the ability of states to reduce regulations to attract investment, it has no
protection for states who wish to improve their regulations from the current
baselines. Most BITs are concluded between developing and developed nations ' 99
providing little benefit to the developing nation where human rights abuses 'are
more likely to occur due to weak regulation and inadequate enforcement.20
The SADC Model recommends the inclusion of a 'right to regulate' clause as
a stand-alone provision in BITs;2 01 "In accordance with [CIL] . . . the Host State
has the right to take regulatory or other measures to ensure that development in its
territory is consistent with the goals and principles of sustainable development, and
195. U.S. Model, supra note 40, art. 14-21.
196. Dumberry & Dumas-Aubin, supra note 88, at 356-58; see, e.g., SADC MODEL, supra note
54, art. 13 (placing pre- and post-entry impact assessment requirements on states and investors).
197. Definition of race to the bottom, FINANCIAL TIMES LEXICON,
http://lexicon.ft.com/Termterm-race-to-the-bottom (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) ("The situation in
which companies and countries try to compete with each other by cutting wages and living standards
for workers, and the production of goods is moved to the place where the wages are lowest and the
workers have the fewest rights").
198. COMESA IA, supra note 153, art. 5.
199. J ANTHONY VANDUZER ET AL., INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INTO
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Aug. 2012),
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/6thannualforumcommonwealthguide.pdf.
200. Id
201. SADC MODEL, supra note 54, art. 20.
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with other legitimate social and economic policy objectives." 202 This provision
explicitly protects policy space relating to measures designed to advance
sustainable development, which are often directly related to measures seeking to
regulate human rights.203 The IISD Model has a similar provision in Article 25
titled "[i]nherent rights of states[,]" and recommends that this clause, when
included, should be featured in a stand-alone provision. 204
The TPP, in an effort to increase the number of enterprises voluntarily
employing internal CSR programs, states that parties "reaffirm the importance of
each Party encouraging enterprises operating within its territory or subject to its
jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate into their internal policies those
internationally recognised standards, guidelines and principles of corporate social
responsibility that have been endorsed or are supported by that Party." 205 While
this does not create any mandatory obligations, it is one of the first such clauses
included in an active IIA, highlights the importance of social issues, and reaffirms
the notion that investors have a responsibility to people in the countries in which
they operate.
Passive provisions can benefit states seeking to maintain domestic policy
space. Many of these inventive provisions, while quite uncommon, are efficient at
addressing state concerns without creating significantly burdensome fears for
investors. Nonetheless, some progressive IIAs go further, prescribing positive
obligations on both states and investors.
2. Positive Obligations
The inclusion of positive obligations in IIAs as a method for maintaining
domestic policy space to regulate human rights is controversial. Provisions of this
type are diverse. They include provisions requiring recognition of environmental
impact from investments,206 specifically requiring parties to reaffirm their
obligations to the ILO and other international treaties, 207 requiring both pre-entry
and post-entry impact assessments on investments, 208 and creating direct human
rights obligations. Some of these provisions are more widely accepted, such as
those in the US Model; some are less widely accepted, such as those in the SADC
Model.
A. Reference to Human Rights and Labor Treaties
One method by which a BIT may implicate international labor rights or
human rights without directly obligating a state to bring its domestic regulations in
202. Id (emphasis added).
203. Id.
204. IISD Model, supra note 141, art. 25.
205. TPP, supra note 132, art. 9.17.
206. U.S. Model, supra note 40, art. 12.
207. Id art. 13.
208. SADC MODEL, supra note 54, art. 13.
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line with international labor standard2" is to implement language similar to the US
Model. US Model Article 13 requires that parties "reaffirm their respective
obligations as members of the Intemational Labor Organization (ILO) and their
commitments under the [ILO Declaration]."2"o While this provision does not create
additional substantive obligations or new grievance mechanisms, it does highlight
the importance of international labor rights. 211 It also requires that states not
weaken or reduce protections afforded by domestic labor laws or fail to enforce
domestic laws as an encouragement for investment. 212
COMESA IA Article 22 states that "nothing in this agreement shall be
construed to preclude a [state] from applying measures that it considers necessary
for its obligations under the [UN] Charter... with respect to the protection of its
own essential security interests." 213 This type of provision can be expanded to
include any international agreement. TPP Article 19.3 states that "each Party shall
adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder, the
following rights as stated in the ILO Declaration." 2 14
This type of provision creates obligations through reference to existing
international law, but there is no consistent pattern of arbitral tribunal
interpretation to discern the effect this will have on increasing policy space.
B. Direct Human Rights Obligations
The most controversial provisions are those which create direct human rights
obligations on states and investors without direct reference to a treaty. SADC
Model requires that "[i]nvestors and their investments have a duty to respect
human rights in the workplace and in the community and State in which they are
located. Investors and their investments shall not undertake or cause to! be
undertaken acts that breach such human rights." 215 The HSD Model repeats this
language and adds a clause which may be interpreted to expressly dictate that
international human rights treaty obligations supersede BIT obligations; "Investors
and Investments shall not manage or operate... in a manner that circumvents
international environmental, labour and human rights obligations to which the host
state and/or home state are Parties." 216
209. Jeffrey S. Vogt, Trade and Investment Arrangements and Labor Rights, CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS: NEW EXPECTATIONS AND PARADIGMS (Lara Blecher,
et. al. eds., 2014).
210. U.S. Model, supra note 40, at art. 13; ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work and its Follow-up, June 15, 2010,
http://ilo.org/declaration/info/publications/WCMS_467653/lang-en/index.htm.
211. U.S. Model, supra note 40, art. 13.
212. Id.
213. COMESA [A, supra note 153, art. 22.
214. TPP, supra note 132, art. 19.3. This chapter of the TPP is binding on states and investors and
is relevant to all investment provisions.
215. SADC MODEL, supra note 54, art. 15.
216. IISD Model, supra note 141, art. 14.
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TPP chapter 19 expressly enumerates its own prohibitions, closely related but
not identical to, the ILO Declaration Fundamental Principles; "each Party
[recognize] the goal of eliminating all forms of forced or compulsory labour,
including forced or compulsory child labour."21 7 The TPP also expressly
encourages businesses operating under the IIA to move to a forced labor free
supply and manufacturing chain; each party is to "discourage, through initiatives it
considers appropriate, the importation of goods from other sources produced in
whole or in part by forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory
child labour."21 8
These provisions may help to reduce, and in some cases explicitly prevent, the
chilling effect in designated policy areas. Most investors, however, fear the
uncertainty of broad and unqualified language which may allow a state to act in a
truly arbitrary or unfair manner.
C. Essential Elements Clause
The EU-Central America BIT (EUCAA) includes an 'essential elements'
clause, which explicitly references human rights law.219 The EUCAA states that
"[r]espect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights, as laid down in
the [UDHR]," and for the principle of the rule of law, underpins the internal and
international policies of both parties and constitutes an essential element of this
agreement. 2 2 0 While most of the fundamental JDHR obligations have become jus
cogens norms, and therefore already enforceable in investment arbitration, the
remainder of the treaty has a relatively "high level of human rights protection in
relation to the rights mentioned" in BITs. 221 The inclusion of an essential elements
clause protects the host states ability to regulate the worst human rights offenses
perpetrated by business, and meet UDHR standards, without radically altering
substantive language found in traditional BITs.
D. Impact Assessments
The IISD Model 222 and SADC Model 223 BITs suggest provisions requiring
pre-entry and post-entry impact assessments, however few national model BITs or
existing BITs contain them. Impact assessment requirements expressly codified in
217. TPP, supra note 132, art. 19.3.
218. Id art. 19.6.
219. Agreement Establishing an Association between Central America, on the one hand, and the
European Union and its Member States, on the other, 2012/734, 2012 O.J. (L 346) 1,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147660.pdf.
220. Id (emphasis added).
221. Inta Droi, The European Parliament's Role in Relation to Human Rights in Trade and
Investment Agreements 9 (Feb. 13, 2014),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/inta/dv/studyhr-tradeagreements_/stu
dy hr tradeagreements en.pdf.
222. IISD Model, supra note 141, art. 12.
223. SADC MODEL, supra note 54, art. 13.
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BITs are helpful in theory, but most of the examples merely require assessments
"as required by the laws of the Host State[.]" 2 4 There is not much purpose in
creating additional burdens on investors when the assessment requirements are
"consistent with domestic law in virtually every State today." 2 5 States seeking to
enhance domestic regulations relating to pre-entry impact assessment requirements
may fear that the regulatory adjustment would violate obligations under its BITs.
However, if assessment standards in the IIA merely match the standards of the host
state's domestic regulations, no additional policy space would be created, and the
assessment requirements would be toothless. In these situations, general exceptions
for environmental and human rights regulations, as discussed previously, would be
more effective.
Few of these additional positive obligations are likely to be commonly used;
many would assign arbitral tribunals topics for consideration outside of their
mandated scope. Some passive provisions are tenable options for inclusion,
particularly the 'essential elements' clause. In general, whether through
preambular provisions, interpretive language, general exceptions clauses, other
type of provision, states are increasingly seeking ways to maintain domestic policy
space when engaging in HAs. As the UNGP recommends, each state is to make its
own determination as to how much domestic policy space is needed to achieve its
sustainable development goals and to weigh the benefits and risks of each method
of maintaining the ability to meet international human rights obligations. 2 6
VIII. CONCLUSION
The fact that disagreements are brought to the decision of a third party, such
as an ICSID arbitral tribunal, and that a country has offered to do so in a treaty
strengthens rather than detracts from a country's endeavor to attract foreign
investment and treat investors fairly and equitably.227
The tribunal in MTD v. Chile asserts that participating in dispute resolution in
response to a claim emanating from an IA can help a nation attract FDI. FDI does
play a key role in development and in advancing economic and social rights
enumerated in the ICESCR and other human rights treaties. However, the benefits
to a state resulting from additional FDI may be outweighed by the negative impact
that persistent unintended investor-state claims can have on a country's domestic
policy space.
To strike a balance between attracting investment and abrogating policy
space, states now seek to implement UNGP Article 9 recommendations into their
IIAs through diverse methodology. To accomplish this, some states are choosing to
renegotiate existing BITs. Others look to advance new IIAs and regional free trade
associations which supersede exiting BITs.
224. Id.
225. Id. art. 13, Commentary.
226. UNGP, supra note 1.
227. MTD Equity, supra note 66, 1 89.
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The interpretation of treatment provisions has been derided as especially
invasive of domestic policy space to regulate human rights. The methods available
to remedy failures in treatment provisions in traditional IIAs include through the
inclusion of preambular language, interpretive provisions, general exceptions
provisions, passive provisions, and positive obligations. Some are more widely-
accepted and effective than others. The inclusion of direct references to existing
human rights treaties and ILO obligations seem to be the most popular. The
inclusion of interpretive language relating to FET standard is now universally
accepted as fundamental to any IIA. The various methodology for implementing
UNGP Article 9 recommendations highlighted herein do not make for a complete
or exhaustive list.
There is also a need for capacity building by NGO's, IGO's, state policy
makers, and regulatory enforcement departments in regards to assessing the impact
of investment on human rights. The lack of resources in developing states to
effectively regulate and enforce their human rights obligations exacerbates the
issue. To maximize the effectiveness of the UNGP 'policy space' decree in
developing states, the UN should provide states with additional resources by
engaging in domestic capacity building on rule of law issues. Tribunals can also
participate in healing this divide by beginning to take into consideration the
respondent state's level of development. Developed nations should consider the
differentiated level of responsibility they have towards helping developing nations
achieve their policy goals, and should assist as much as possible with policy
development in this regard. 2 2 t
It is yet to be seen what effect, if any, progressive IIAs have on encouraging
or discouraging FDI inflows, as there is not yet a consistent body of arbitration
decisions reliant on them.229 It is uncertain whether claims which most drastically
restrict a state's policy space regarding human rights regulation are less likely to be
brought under an IIA with progressive provisions.
Surely, it will be less difficult for developing nations to defend legitimate
policy decisions under an agreement which conforms to the UNGP's
recommendations; many of the provisions examined herein explicitly protect those
legitimate policy decisions. The responsibility then rests on states which adopt the
UNGP's recommendations to regulate, administer, and enforce laws which protect
their own citizens. Hopefully arbitral tribunals will welcome this new generation of
IIAs by more amply considering states' rights to regulate to meet their
international human rights obligations in accordance with the intent of the drafters
and the UNGP, and uphold the protections which reduce the regulatory chill. If
they do, IIAs can be instruments which invite investment without restricting state's
policy space regarding human rights regulation. Developing nations with
progressive IIA regimes can then begin to reap the benefits resulting from
simultaneous increases in human rights regulation and FDI inflows, most
228. See G.A. Res. 151/26, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Aug. 12, 1992).
229. Spears, supra note 25, at 1045.
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importantly, an overall increase in the welfare of its citizens through sustainable
economic and social development.
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